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LETTERS 



REV. NATHANIEL W. TAYLOR, D. D, 



BY LEONARD WOODS, D. D. 




J 



ANDOVER : 

PUBLISHED BY MARK NEWMAN. 

Flagg & Gould... .printers. 

1830. 






DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS, to wit: 

District Clerk's Office. 
Be it remembered, that on the thirty first day of July, A. D. 1830, in the fifty-fifth year 
of the Independence of the United States of America, RIark Newman, of the said district,, 
has deposited in this office the title of a book, the right whereof he claims as Proprietor, in the 
words following, to wit: " Letters to Sev. Nathaniel W. Taylor, D. D. By Leonard Woods, 
D. D." In conformity with the Act of the Congress of the United States, entitled, " An Act for 
the Encouragement of Learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts and books, to the 
authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned:" and also to an 
Act entitled, " An Act supplementary to an Act, entitled. An Act for the Encouragement 
of Learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts and books, to the authors and proprietors of 
such copies, during thelimes therein mentioned; and extending the benefits thereof to the arte 
of designing, engraving and etching historical and other prints." 

TOHlV \V T1AVT=? \ Clerk of the District 
JOH.\ W . L>A\ lb, I ^j, Massachusetts. 



7/r 



CONTENTS. 



LETTER I. 

Proper manner of conducting- theological discussion. — Duty and danger of 
theological Professors. — Philosophy of religion made too prominent. Its 
hurtful effects appear from the history of the church. Importance of 
conforming exactly to the word of God. — Apology for taking a part in 
this controversy. How the views here controverted may have been oc- 
casioned. — Plan of remarking 5 — 20 

I.ETTER II. 

Passages in the Concio ad Clerum to be considered. — The two common 
positions. Reasons for supposing that Dr. Taylor holds the opposite. 
Interrogative form no objection. — Second position considered. — Meaning 
of the phrase, God could not prevent sm. — Three senses. Circumstances 
which indicate the literal sense. — Second sense adopted by the orthodox 
generally. Third sense inadmissible 21 — 30 

LETTER III. 

Does the nature of things make it impossible for God to prevent sin .'' 
Meaning of the phrase. Nature of created beings. The case of the fa- 
ther and his sons. Analogy supposed does not exist. Does the nature 
of moral agency limit the power of God .' Representation of the Review- 
ers. Opinions of the orthodox as to the existence of moral evil compar- 
ed with Dr. Taylor's. His theory implies the independence of moral 
agents. Reasoning as to the nature of moral agency. Moral agency 
the same in all. Want of motives 31 — 48 

LETTER IV. 

Dr. Taylor's reasoning on the supposed impossibility arising from moral 
agency. — Nature of the subject. Can it be proved that a being who can 
sin, will not sin .' The actual occurrence of any thing depends on appro- 
priate causes. God has a perfect control over human beings. Argu- 
ment from facts as to God's being able to prevent sin. Influence arising 
ftom the existence and punishment of sin not absolutely necessary. 
God's not preventing sin resolved into his unsearchable wisdom. Com- 
mon theory does not limit the goodness of God. Whether God's crea- 
tures have a power which lie has not 49 — 54 



IV CONTENTS. 



LETTER V. 



The reasoning from moral agency farther examined. The supposition, that 
God could not wholly prevent its perversion without destroying it. Dr. 
Dwight's views. The more specific position, that God could not do bet- 
ter for any individual sinner. It has no proof either from facts, or from 
the nature of the subject. Groundless apprehension of what would re- 
sult from the interposition requisite for the conversion of more sinners. 
— Direct proof that God is able to convert more sinners. 1. From his 
omnipotence. 2. From what he has done. 3. From the requisition of 
prayer. 4. From the representation of Scripture, that God converts men 
according to his will or -pleasure 55 — 66 

LETTER VI. 

Farther notice of the question, whether God could have secured the holiness 
of any moral being without the influence of moral evil. The doctrine of 
moral necessity applied to the subject. — The position, that sin is the neces- 
sary means of the greatest good, particularly considered. — A contradic- 
tion. Proper inference from the fact, that God makes use of sin as a 
means of preserving moral beings in holiness. Same reasoning in re- 
gard to the other phrase, i. e. sin so far as it exists prefer able to holiness in 
its stead. Meaning of the expression, sin is, in respect to divine preven- 
tion, incidental to the best moral system 67 — 78 

LETTER VIT. 

Whether the common position is consistent with the fact that sin is forbid- 
den, and punished ; and with the sincerity of God. Can a person sin 
with a benevolent intention ? Case of the Canaanites. Objection of the 
caviller, Rom. III. Dr. Taylor's scheme does not remove difficulties. 
Virtue founded in utility. Intimation that the orthodox consider sin to 
be excellent in its nature. Whether the common scheme admits of sor- 
row for sin. We must regard sin as it is in itself. Distinction between 
God's agency and man's. Benevolent intention of the sinner. Inten- 
tion of the sinner and of God distinguished. Conduct of Joseph's breth- 
ren, and death of Christ. Results of the theory in relation to Christ's 
death 79—93 

LETTER VIII. 

Practical influence of Dr. Taylor's theory compared with the common, in 
relation to the power of God, his blessedness, the system of his works, 
his dominion, the happiness of the good, submission, prayer, humility 
and dependence. Grounds of disquietude. Coincidence with Pelagians, 
Arminians, etc. What ought to be done. Suggestions. Particular 
things to be explained 94 — 107 

Appexpis 109— 114 



LETTER I, 



Proper manner of conducting theological discussion. — Duty and danger of theological Pro- 
fessors. — Philosophy of religion made too prominent. Its hurtful effects appear from the 
history of the church. Importance of conforming exactly to the word of God. — Apology 
for taking a part in this controversy. How the views here controverted may have been oc- 
casioned. — Plan of remarking. 

Reverend and Dear Sir, 

I entirely agree with you in considering free discussion on the 
subject of religion to be of great importance to the cause of divine 
truth. It is obvious, however, that discussion on such a subject 
cannot be expected to produce its proper effects, unless it is prompt- 
ed by a right spirit, and conducted in a right manner. It behooves 
us, therefore, to inquire very carefully, what is that spirit, and that 
manner, in which free discussion should be conducted ? In an- 
swering this inquiry, we may be essentially aided by many passages 
of Scripture, and particularly by the following direction of St. Paul, 
who, as we well know, was far from being deficient either in warmth 
of natural temper, or in Christian decision. " The servant of the 
Lord," he says, " must not strive, but be gentle unto all men, apt to 
teach, patient, in meekness instructing those that oppose themselves, 
if peradventure God will give them repentance to the acknowledging 
of the truth." Even towards those who are hostile to religion, the 
Aj)ostle requires that such a disposition and conduct should be ex- 
hibited. Now if all men, — if even those who wage war against 
Christianity, are nevertheless entitled to a treatment from us, mark- 
ed with meekness and gentleness ; surely these virtues ought to be 
exercised in all their strength and loveliness towards those who, 
notwithstanding some differences of opinion, are united with us in 
the bonds of fraternal affection, and devoted to the same benevo- 
lent cause. 

2 



6 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

My present design, I am well aware, is attended with circum- 
stances of peculiar delicacy. I have undertaken to address myself 
to a respected and beloved Brother, from whom I am constrained to 
differ, — a Brother invested with the same sacred office with myself, 
both as a minister of the gospel, and a Professor of Christian The- 
ology. And I cannot but notice the circumstance also, that this is 
no common case ; as there has been in our country scarcely an in- 
stance, before the present, in which a teacher of Christian Theolo- 
gy in an orthodox Institution has come before the public in his own 
name, to controvert the opinions of another man placed in a simi- 
lar station. This circumstance, I confess, makes a touching ap- 
peal to my feelings, and excites in me a desire which words cannot 
fully express, that every thing relative to the manner of the present 
discussion may be unexceptionable. It cannot be thought impro- 
bable that, among the Professors of our numerous Seminaries, there 
will, from time to time, be diiferences of opinion, more or less im- 
portant, and that these differences will be made the subject of free 
investigation. Now, my Dear Brother, as we have been led to think 
it our duty to engage in the difficult, and shall I say, perilous busi- 
ness of publicly discussing controverted points ; let us consider 
well what is before us, and guard with sacred care against every 
thing which would render our example unworthy of imitation, or in 
any way injure the great interests which we wish to advance. 
Who can count up the evils which might result to the cause of 
Christ, if our manner of treating controverted subjects should in any 
respects be such, as would tend to promote in others around us, and 
especially in our pupils, feelings of unkindness and acrimony ? On 
the contrary, may we not hope that important good will result 
from our example, if, whenever we engage in discussing such 
subjects, under all the excitements and provocations attending pub- 
lic debate, we may be enabled by divine grace, to copy the meek- 
ness and gentleness of Christ? When I dwell on such reflections as 
these, I cannot avoid the persuasion, that I should commit a less of- 
fence against the Christian religion by had reasoning, than by a 
had spirit ; and therefore that I am bound to take as much pains 
at least, to cherish xighi feelings , as to frame right arguments. But 
a Christian disposition pervading our writings is not only required 
by the spirit of our religion, but is necessary to the success of our 
cause ; since, without it, our opinions and arguments, especially 



LETTER I. 7 

those which we may regard as improvements, will not be likely to 
pass easily and pleasantly into the minds of others ; as we may have 
frequently found by our own experience. 

It will undoubtedly be a question with some good men, whether 
it can in any circumstances conduce to the welfare of the church, 
for Christian ministers, and especially for Professors in our Theo- 
logical Seminaries, to enlist in a public discussion of the topics on 
which they differ. And I readily acknowledge that controversy, 
or even the appearance of controversy among Theological Professors, 
is likely to be attended with peculiar danger, as the feelings of their 
pupils, and the vital interests of their respective Institutions, must 
be so much involved. On this account, I have felt a strong reluc- 
tance to take any part in the examination of those peculiar opinions 
which you have exhibited before the public. But after all, is there 
any sufficient reason why we should be deprived of the right, or 
rather, exempt from the duty, of bearing testimony against the er- 
rors of the day, and especially against whatever we may consider 
erroneous in one another ? Is it not a matter of special propriety 
that we should hold ourselves responsible, in a sense, to each other, 
and to all devout Christians in the community 1 Is there any thing 
in our situation or employment, which can free us from this respon- 
sibility ? Nay, is it not true that we are peculiarly responsible ? 
And is it not true also that we are, in some respects, peculiarly lia- 
ble to error ? Now if at any time we are betrayed into wrong opin- 
ions ; especially if we make those opinions public ; can we expect 
to escape animadversion ? Can we justly desire to escape ? I well 
know what noble sentiments you have expressed in relation to this 
subject, and how often you have invited your brethren to a thorough 
and unsparing examination of your opinions. And I trust you will 
now join with me in saying ; Let the Christian community watch 
over our Theological Seminaries with an ever wakeful eye. Let 
these Seminaries extend a kind hut faithful inspection over one an- 
other. Let no deviation from sound doctrine pass unnoticed. If 
any of those who are appointed to give instruction to the rising min- 
istry, shoiD the least signs of error ; — if they only begin to indulge 
in modes of interpreting the word of God, or in modes of reasoning 
on moral or metaphysiccd suhjects, which have an unfavorable, or 
even doubtful tendency in regard to the fundamental doctrines of 
Christianity ; let all the teachers of religion in our Churches, Col- 



8 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

leges and Seminaries be awake to the danger. It is far better for 
the cause of divine truth that this general wakefulness to danger 
should rise to an extreme, — better that solicitude, and fear, and even 
jealousy should be excited, than that those who are appointed to stand 
as Zion's watchmen, should slumber on their posts. 

I cannot but feel that every public teacher of religion needs the 
vigilant inspection of his brethren. Indeed, where is the pious min- 
ister of Christ who has not this feeling in regard to himself, and 
who does not find reason for it in his own experience ? And where 
is the intelligent Christian, who has not at times detected in him- 
self the commencement of such habits of thinking, as might lead on 
to wide departures from the truth as it is in Jesus ? The darkness 
of the human mind, and the strength of unholy passion is such, even 
in real Christians, and the causes of error are so various and power- 
ful, and some of them so latent, that it can never be deemed safe to 
trust the interests of religion implicitly in the hands of any man. 
No fertility of genius ; no extent of learning ; no metaphysical acu- 
men ; and no degree of piety, as it exists in the present world, can 
be relied upon as affording full security. Formerly, when I turned 
my thoughts towards particular ministers of the gospel, and particu- 
lar Christians, I was ready to think it impossible, that they should 
ever abandon any of the truths of revelation, or embrace any hurt- 
ful error. But what I have seen of the human mind during more 
than thirty years in the ministry, and more than twenty in my pre- 
sent office, has led me to entertain other views on this subject, and 
has impressed my mind with a serious conviction, that there is no 
teacher of religion in our churches, or in our Seminaries, no, not 
one, who can think himself free from the danger of error, or who 
has not reason to apprehend that a deceived heart may turn him 
aside. And if, in these days of adventurous speculation, any of 
those, who are called by divine providence to instruct in our theolo- 
gical schools, should wholly, or in part renounce the doctrines of 
revelation, and become advocates of error ; it would only be a repe- 
tition of what has often occurred in past ages. 

Suffer me now to offer a few suggestions as to the proper use of 
these remarks. 

If every man, however learned and pious, however important or 
sacred his station, and however many safeguards may be placed 
around him, is in fact liable to error ; then surely we ought to be 



LETTER I. 9 

aware of this, and to offer up fervent prayer to God, that he would 
give us a sound mind, and guide us into all the truth. We ought 
also to crave it as a privilege, that our Christian brethren would 
watch over us, and by their fraternal freedom, and their admonition, 
when necessary, and especially by their prayers, would help to se- 
cure us against the wrong tendencies of our minds, and to establish 
our hearts in divine truth. 

Our acknowledged liability to error should lead us to check all 
undue confidence in our own opinions, and to hold ourselves ready 
to be instructed and corrected by others. It is no very uncommon 
thing for a man to manifest such reliance upon the strength of his 
own mind, and the correctness of his own reasoning, as clearly im- 
plies, though he may be unwilling to avow it in words, that he 
thinks himself infallible ; at least, that he thinks himself much 
nearer to a state of infallibility, than others. Let us keep ourselves 
at a great distance from every thing like this; and in all our rea- 
sonings, especially if we ever venture on ground which lies beyond 
the range of common belief and common investigation, let us pro- 
ceed with slow and cautious steps. And if at any time the friends 
of Christ, apprehending that we have begun to wander from the 
right way, suddenly raise the cry of alarm ; instead of complaining 
of their want of confidence in us, or indulging any suspicions as to 
the motives which govern them ; we ought to bless God that he has 
given them a heart to feel so lively an interest in the cause of truth, 
and to take so quick an alarm at the sight, or even the apprehension 
of danger. We ought moreover to keep in mind, that however 
strong our persuasion may be that our present views are right, and 
the views of those who differ from us, wrong ; a little more time ; 
more careful and patient inquiry ; a farther exercise of a modest, 
humble, and pious temper ; and a higher degree of divine teaching, 
may alter our convictions, and may show us that we have been 
standing on slippery places. 

After the remarks, which I have now made, and which I can- 
not but consider to be of special importance to those who are con- 
cerned in preparing young men for the ministry ; I shall proceed to 
my particular object, which is, to express to you some of the doubts 
and difficulties which I feel respecting your recent publications. 
Allow me then to lay aside all hesitation and reserve, and to give 
utterance to my thoughts just as they arise in my own mind. 



10 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

I shall, in the first place, take the liberty to make a few remarks 
as to the general aspect and tendency of what you have published. 
I refer particularly to your Concio ad Clerum, and to the several 
numbers in the Christian Spectator, which are understood to come 
from your pen, on the means of regeneration. 

Though the design of these letters does not require me to re- 
mark with the same freedom on what is excellent in your publica- 
tions, as on what I deem faulty ; yet my esteem for you and my re- 
gard to justice require me to say, that I have been gratified in no 
common degree with the clear and impressive illustrations you give 
of various important truths, and with the powerful and conclusive 
arguments which you urge in their support. And I would hope 
that the friends of evangelical truth and the friends of free inquiry 
generally, will not overlook what is valuable in the productions of 
your pen, because on some important points they are constrained to 
dissent from you. I take pleasure also in acknowledging, that I 
have derived real benefit from the free discussion of subjects in the 
private correspondence I have recently had with you. 

In regard to the general aspect of your publications ; I have se- 
rious doubts, whether the prominence which you give to what is 
called the philosophy of the Christian religion, is adapted to pro- 
mote the interests of the church, 

I know not that I differ from you as to what constitutes the 
philosophy of religion. I understand by it something which is 
aside from the simple doctrines and facts which are set forth in the 
Scriptures : something which maybe omitted without detracting any 
thing from the doctrines or facts themselves, or fi-om their practical 
influence. It is that view of the subjects of revelation, which is 
suited to gratify the love of abstruse, metaphysical speculation, or 
what may be called, the curiosity of intellect. If a single example 
will be of use, I would refer to 1 Cor. 15. The Apostle affirms the 
simple, momentous truth, that men will be raised from the dead by 
the power of God. The objector inquires, " How are the dead rais- 
ed up ?" He was looking after the philosophy of the doctrine. He 
wished to understand the manner, — the quomodo. The Apostle re- 
buked him for such a question, though he took occasion from it to 
give important instruction. Locke and the Bishop of Worcester 
went into a formal investigation of the doctrine of the resurrection, 
and furnished a very striking specimen of free discussion on the 
philosophy of a Christian doctrine. 



LETTER I. 11 

I could illustrate the meaning I give to the phrase by another exam- 
ple. The Scriptures teach that it is the influence of the divine Spirit 
and that alone, which sanctifies the heart. Now if a man attempts to 
explain metaphysically the manner in which the Spirit operates 
upon the mind, and how his influence is consistent with our ac- 
countableness, and with the laws of our intellectual and moral na- 
ture ; he enters on the philosophy of the doctrine of regeneration ; 
— the very thing which our Saviour seems to have discouraged in 
his conversation with Nicodemus. If I were to select one of the 
most striking instances of dwelling on the philosophy of Christian 
doctrines, I should fix upon some parts of your Concio ad Clerum, 
and of the other publications of yours above referred to. It may 
in many cases be difficult to draw the line exactly between a Chris- 
tian doctrine itself, and the philosophy of that doctrine. But that 
there is a difference between the one and the other is a fact, which 
you yourself have been forward to affirm as of essential consequence. 

I have one more remark by way of explanation ; namely, that 
there is a wide difference in point of clearness and importance be- 
tween what would be called the philosophy of evangelical doctrines 
in one case, and in another. In one case, the investigation may re- 
late to facts in man's intelligent and moral nature, or to principles 
in the divine government, which are certain and obvious. In an- 
other case, it may relate to what is uncertain, conjectural, or ob- 
scure ; — in a word, to what lies beyond the limits of our intelligence. 
I consider Edwards's metaphysical treatises to be, generally, of the 
former character. And it would be easy to name various works, 
both ancient and modern, which are of the latter character. Be- 
tween these two modes of philosophizing, there is a vast difference 
in respect to utility. 

You will perceive from these remarks, that I would not by any 
means indiscriminately proscribe every form and degree of philo- 
sophical investigation on the subjects of religion. I readily allow 
that such investigation, particularly of the former character above 
named, may, if rightly directed, and kept in its proper place, be of 
real use to ministers, and especially to Theological Professors, and 
may enable them to attain to more profound and consistent views of 
the doctrines of Christianity, and to illustrate those doctrines more 
clearly, and defend them more ably and successfully, than they 
could without it. But every man who applies himself with ardor to 



12 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

the philosophical investigation of Christian doctrines, will probably 
find it more difficult than he was previously aware of, to confine 
himself to that investigation which is of the right kind, to give it a 
right direction, and to keep it in its proper place. He will constant- 
ly be in danger of carrying it to an extreme ; and of forming such a 
habit of mind, that the most essential truths, if stated simply in a 
scriptural manner, will have no power to give him pleasure. Who 
that is fond of contemplating the doctrines of religion metaphysical- 
ly, has not frequently been conscious of a tendency to this faulty 
habit of mind ? If I mistake not, the circumstances of the present 
day, particularly the opposition made against the doctrines of reve- 
lation on the ground of philosophy, expose us to this danger in a 
more than ordinary degree. We may deem it a sacred duty to meet 
our opponents on the ground which they have chosen. And while 
performing this duty, we may, as a natural consequence, fall into 
a philosophical manner of thinking, and a philosophical manner of 
stating and defending the doctrines of the Bible. And we may 
come at length to make philosophy the main business of the pulpit, 
both on ordinary, and on special occasions. Now should this in 
any measure prevail, it would, certainly prove^a calamity to the 
souls of men. Just as it would be a calamity to persons, who came 
hungry to a feast to which they were invited, if instead of receiving 
wholesome food, they should be entertained with a philosophical 
discourse from the master of the house on the chemical properties 
of food, or on the theory of digestion. Should the practice I have 
named prevail generally, and should there be a reign of metaphysi- 
cal instead of scriptural Theology ; of a truth famine and desola- 
tion would spread through the churches of the land. 

A minister of distinguished excellence in Connecticut told me, 
near the close of his sacred work, that during the first years of his 
ministry, he was in the practice of preaching metaphysically. At 
length he was led to make some particular inquiry as to the usefiil- 
ness of his public instructions. To his surprise and grief he was 
informed, that his preaching was universally unintelligible and un- 
profitable, both to the old and the young. He therefore determin- 
ed that henceforth he would confine metaphysical investigation to 
his study, and would make it his object to preach the gospel of 
Christ. This determination, and a correspondent practice, was 
followed by the most happy consequences. 



LETTER I. 13 

He who spake as never man spake, has given us a perfect pat- 
tern of the manner in which he would have us inculcate and defend 
the truths of his gospel. And to this is added the example of his 
apostles. Now if Christ and his apostles had deemed the philosophy 
of religion of any special consequence, they certainly would have 
suggested this to us. But did they suggest it ? Did they recom- 
mend what I call the philosophy of Christian doctrines, as holding 
a place among the means to be employed for the salvation of men ? 
Instead of recommending it, did they not, in several instances, di- 
rectly discountenance it ? If then the ministers of religion at the 
present day should cease to receive the simplicity of divine truth, 
just as it is exhibited in the Bible, or cease to love it and be satis- 
fied with it, and, in their public and private instructions, should 
give Christianity a metaphysical, instead of a scriptural aspect ; 
would they not show that they had forgotten the example of their 
Lord and Master, and of his inspired Apostles ? And as the conse- 
quence of this, should we not witness a decay of vital piety, and a 
dark and ominous cloud spreading over the churches of Christ ? 

Whitfield preached the truth with uncommon simplicity and di- 
rectness, and kept at the greatest distance from philosophical dis- 
cussion ; and with what unparalleled success is well known to the 
world. It is indeed true that some very impressive and successful 
ministers have much to do with the philosophy of Christianity. But 
in my opinion, this circumstance detracts greatly from the degree 
of their usefulness. If we could consult the sober experience of 
the most devout Christians, we should be satisfied that the success 
of ministers is, under God, owing to the simple truths of the Bible 
which they preach, and to the spirit of benevolence and piety which 
they manifest. Whatever they introduce into their ministrations 
which is abstruse, or metaphysical, or directly polemic in its nature, 
is generally very unwelcome to the hearts of those who are spiritual- 
ly minded, and proves a serious hindrance to their growth in grace. 
Many a Christian, I doubt not, complains to God in secret, that 
although he is blessed with an able and orthodox minister, he is so 
seldom fed with '* the sincere milk of the word." And would it 
not be well for us, and for other ministers, to inquire, whether this 
has not been the case with some active, devout Christians, who 
have been placed under our ministry 1 

Here, my Brother, we see our high responsibility in relation to 
3 



14 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

the particular work which divine providence has assigned to us. It 
is a responsibility which may well make us tremble, and which 
should excite in us an unremitting watchfulness against whatever 
would injure the piety or usefulness of the rising ministry. God re- 
quires us to train up those, whose studies we are called to superin- 
tend, to be preachers, not o^ philosophy or metaphysics, but of the 
Gospel. And in doing this, our chief business must be to teach 
them the truth in all its scriptural plainness and purity, making the 
word of God our standard both as to the matter and manner of our 
instructions. If this is neglected, whatever else is done, our Sem- 
inaries will certainly fail of accomplishing the great object for which 
they were founded. If our love for the Bible, or for divine truth 
as set forth in the Bible, declines ; if we begin to think that Chris- 
tianity must be invested with the costume of philosophy ; especially, 
if we begin to take more interest in this philosophical costume, than 
in Christianity itself; there will be inevitable loss and injury to that 
precious cause which it is our first duty to promote ; the God of 
Zion will be offended ; and it will soon be said of our sacred Sem- 
inaries, if not of ministers and churches, — the glory is departed. 

Suppose we had good reason to 

expect, that at the close of each Academic year, the Blessed Jesus 
would travel through the land, as he travelled through Judea and 
Galilee eighteen hundred years ago, and would visit each of those 
Seminaries which have been consecrated to him. What influence 
would such an expectation have upon our feelings and conduct ? 
Would it not in all probability occasion some visible changes in the 
direction of our studies, in the use of our pens, in our instructions, 
and in our prayers ? Amid our high and holy efforts to prepare 
ourselves and our pupils for such a Visitant, would not some of the 
investigations which we so fondly pursue, and some of the opinions, 
for which we are apt so warmly to contend, lose their hold upon our 
minds ? And would not some other things which we are prone to 
overlook, quickly rise to infinite importance in our view ? 

The supposition I have made, is one of very serious import. 
But all which is implied in it, and much more, is, virtually, a reali- 
ty. For the Blessed Saviour, instead of visiting us once in a year, 
is in spirit continually present with us ; and continually says to us, 
" I am he who searcheth the reins and the hearts." All that we 
do in study and conversation, all that we teach, and all that we 



LETTER I. 15 

write, is under his eye. Oh ! then, what vigilance and zeal should 
we exercise in taking care of the precious interests which he has 
committed to our trust ! With what pious docility and diligence 
should we endeavour to know the mind of God in his word ! And 
how earnestly should we prosecute the great business of preparing 
our pupils to preach the unsearchable riches of Christ ! When I 
dwell on these reflections, I become conscious that I have bestowed 
too much time and attention on some subjects of speculation, which 
have little or no connexion with the spiritual interests of Christ's 
kingdom. And let me inquire, whether the circumstances in which 
you have been placed have never betrayed you into the same mis- 
take ; and in particular, whether you have never been led to attach 
too much importance to the mere philosophy of religion ? It is my 
sincere opinion that you have. Even if your philosophical views 
were all unexceptionable in the matter of them ; it would, I think, 
be evident, that you have assigned them too high a place. And al- 
though the essential doctrines of the Gospel may continue, amid 
your boldest speculations, to maintain a commanding influence 
over your own mind ; this I fear will not be the case generally with 
those, who shall adopt your philosophical mode of thinking and 
speaking on the subjects of religion. They will be likely either to 
hold the peculiar doctrines of the gospel loosely, or indistinctly ; or 
to pass over them as comparatively unimportant; or to explain and 
defend them merely on philosophical principles. Those who do the 
last of these must, to be consistent, practically adopt the maxim, 
that the meaning of Scripture must bend to their philosophy, and 
not their philosophy to Scripture. And thus they will cease to make 
the Bible the only and sufficient rule of their faith ; and by whatev- 
er name they may call themselves, or their metaphysical theories, 
they will not in the end be far from the confines of infidelity. 

There is still another evil to be apprehended. Is it not proba- 
ble that the practice, to which you have given the sanction of your 
example, of laying out so much zeal on the philosophy of religion, 
will occasion unhappy diflferences and dissensions among those who 
have heretofore been of one mind as to the doctrines of the gospel? 
The Apostle Paul would have ministers charged before the Lord^ 
that they strive not about ivords to no profit ; and he shows a decid- 
ed disapprobation of those who dote about questions and strifes of 
words, whereof cometh envy and strife. Who will assert that the 



16 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

instructions and precepts of the Apostle in regard to this subject are 
in no sense applicable to ministers at this day ? Could the Apostle 
be now personally present with us, are we sure that he would not 
charge us to cease contending about words to no profit, and to de- 
sist from questions and discussions which gender strife among the 
friends of Christ, instead of promoting godly edifying ? To give 
prominence to abstruse, metaphysical speculation, is the direct and 
certain way to foster division. Good men may agree, and substan- 
tially do agree, so far as the essential principles of Christianity are 
concerned. But as to the philosophy of religion, there is no pros- 
pect of their being agreed. Now it is certainly of vast moment at 
the present day, that the friends of evangelical religion should be of 
one mind and one heart in opposing the common enemy, and in en- 
deavouring to advance the essential interests of Christ's kingdom. 
With these great interests in view, who of us can be inclined to 
agitate subjects, which are of such a nature, and which lead so far 
beyond the common bounds of thought, that neither ministers nor 
Christians can be expected to come to an agreement respecting them 1 
Especially, who can think it adviseable or safe to do this, when the 
disagreement which will thus be produced in regard to things of 
little value, will be likely, according to the known principles of hu- 
man nature, gradually to extend its influence to things of greater 
Value, and ultimately to show itself in relation to the fundamental 
doctrines of the Bible ? However praiseworthy the motives which 
may have influenced you in your late publications; I apprehend that 
the nature of some of the discussions you have introduced, and 
your mode of conducting them, are suited to occasion the evils 
above hinted at. Indeed have not those evils already begun to ap- 
pear ? And is there any way to check these evils, and to promote 
the peace and prosperity of the churches, but by refraining from ab- 
struse and unprofitable speculations, and confining ourselves to the 
great business of understanding, obeying, and teaching God's holy 
word? 

If we examine the history of the church of Christ in past ages, 
we shall find that a prevailing taste among the clergy for abstruse, 
metaphysical speculation, and the practice of mixing human philo- 
sophy with divine truth, has been a source of constant strife among 
the followers of Christ, and of endl«;ss mischief to the interests of 
feis kingdom. When those who have stood foremost among the 



LETTER I. 17 

ministers of Christ, and who have been possessed of distinguished 
powers of mind, have shown a dislike to the beaten track in which 
the excellent of the earth have walked, and a thirst for innovation 
or distinction ; especially, when they have had a spirit to defy re- 
sistance, and to press on, reckless of consequences ; then have the 
churches been torn asunder by the violence of strife ; then has 
Christianity itself been wounded by the disputes and contentions of 
its teachers and its friends. And ought we not, with great humili- 
ty and fear, to remember the dreadful fact, that scarcely any perni- 
cious error has ever prevailed in the Christian church, which did 
not originate with ministers of the gospel ? 

These remarks are by no means intended to discountenance free 
inquiry, or to fetter theological investigation. My only v*'ish is, to 
show the importance of conducting free inquiry and unfettered in- 
vestigation on right principles, and of forming a habit of thinking 
soberly and justly on the subjects of religion. And it has become a 
leading principle with me, that to think soberly and justly on the 
subjects of religion, is to conform exactly to the inspired writers, — 
to go as far as they go, and no farther. Now the philosophical spe- 
culations, on which you have bestowed the greatest zeal, and which 
contain the points of difference between you and your brethren, are 
speculations which manifestly lead beyond the instructions of the 
Bible. You yourself consider them as distinct from " the funda- 
mental doctrines of the gospel ;" and while you differ from most 
orthodox ministers in New England in regard to these speculations, 
it seems you are " not aware of any departure in any article of doc- 
trinal belief," from what they commonly hold. For it is well known 
that they commonly hold the doctrines of the gospel, as these are 
stated by your revered Instructor, Dr. Dwight, and with whom you 
also profess to agree in every article of doctrinal belief. The sub- 
jects of disagreement, then, you yourself consider to be aside from 
the doctrines of the Gospel, and additional to them, relating chiefly 
to the mode of stating and explaining them. And yet does not the 
degree of zeal which you expend on these subjects naturally imply, 
that they are in your view more important, than those doctrines of 
the Gospel in which you agree with others ? 

Afler expressing to you so frankly and decidedly how little im- 
portance comparatively I attach to the mere philosophy of religion, 
and how many evils will in my view be occasioned by giving a phi- 



18 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

losophical aspect to the doctrines of revelation, especially in discours- 
es intended for popular instruction ; I may perhaps be charged 
with inconsistency, when I proceed, according to my present de- 
sign, to a discussion of some of the most abstruse, metaphysical sub- 
jects, which ever employed the pens or the thoughts of men. But I 
have the plea of necessity. For I am persuaded not only that you 
have made your philosophical speculations too prominent, but that 
your speculations themselves are, in some important instances, very 
incorrect ; that your philosophy is not only excessive in degree, but 
erroneous in some of its principles. And as these erroneous princi- 
ples have in my view, an unfavorable and dangerous tendency as to 
those doctrines of revelation to which they relate ; I cannot but 
deem it important, that they should be subjected to a fair examina- 
tion. And this examination must require any one who undertakes 
it, to investigate those very philosophical questions which you have 
introduced. As to myself — I have been induced to take a part 
in this examination, because 1 have confidence in those distinguish- 
ed servants of Christ, far and near, who have expressed their opinion, 
that it is a duty which I owe to the cause of truth. If I know my 
own heart, I undertake this work from a regard to that cause. 
And if, in the execution, I should be betrayed, as I may be, into the 
commission of any offence against the laws of Christian love, or 
Christian propriety ; I should consider it as a fault not to be excus- 
ed, but as deserving faithful admonition from you, and humble con- 
fession from me. 

Permit me to say, that I have often attempted to account for it, 
that you have come to entertain those philosophical opinions, against 
which I am now to object. And I have sometimes thought it pos- 
sible these opinions may have arisen from the very circumstance 
above referred to, that you have bestowed upon them a dispropor- 
tionate attention. It is indeed true in regard to most subjects, that 
they cannot be well understood without long and patient study, and 
that the want of this is a fruitful source of mistakes. But it is al- 
so a well known fact, that we are sometimes most liable to err in 
regard to a subject, on which we have expended the most intense 
study, and in which we have felt the most absorbing interest. This 
circumstance may have such an influence, as to disqualify us to judge 
correctly. I speak now of what every one who has been conver- 
sant with human affairs, must have noticed. We may pore over a 



LETTER I. 19 

subject with so excessive an ardor, that our mental vision will be- 
come disordered. In such a case, a just opinion must be expected 
not from us, but from those who have given to the subject under 
consideration only such a degree of attention as its importance will 
justify, and who of course will be able to weigh it with an unbias- 
sed, unperverted judgment. 

But it may be after all, that your views are not what they are 
generally understood to be, and that I and others have been misled 
by what is peculiar in your manner of communicating your thoughts. 
There is unhappily a something, (I would not take upon me to say 
definitely what it is,) which makes it quite necessary for your rea- 
ders generally to go over your pages again and again, and some- 
times leaves them still in doubt whether they have arrived at your 
meaning. Now I love to cherish the hope, that when, by means of 
a more patient search, or by additional explanations from you, we 
shall come to apprehend clearly the sense of what you have written, 
just as it lies in your own mind ; we shall be in a measure relieved 
of our difficulties. But as the case is, we must consider your opin- 
ions as they are exhibited in writing. We must interpret your lan- 
guage in the common way, having no liberty to conjecture that you 
may have any meaning or modification of meaning in your mind, 
except what you have intelligibly expressed. 

In the very free animadversions which I am about to make, I 
shall not indulge myself in the too common practice of discoloring 
or exaggerating the opinions to be controverted ; nor shall I allow 
myself, either from negligence or design, to mistake your meaning. 
But as I shall be liable to this, and well knowing that you have of- 
ten felt it proper to complain of being misunderstood, and appre- 
hending that you may be inclined, in the present case, to repeat this 
complaint ; I have judged it best to adopt the following plan of re- 
marking, — a plan which it is evident will be as just and candid to 
you, as safe for me. 



Plan of remarking. 

In respect to each of the subjects which I shall bring under 
discussion, I will carefully endeavour to ascertain what sentiments 
you have advanced. These sentiments I will make the subject of 
consideration. If I have imputed them to you without sufficient 



20 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

reasons ; while I shall regret my mistake, I shall not consider this 
circumstance as detracting at all from the utility or necessity of the 
discussion. Because, though you may disclaim the sentiments thus 
examined, the arguments you employ, may lead some of your rea- 
ders not only to suppose that you really entertain them, but also to 
adopt them as their own ; and thus may prove the means of diffusing 
error. Accordingly, T shall make it my chief object, not to prove the 
sentiments examined to be yours, but, whether yours or not, to prove 
them incorrect. Still I shall not neglect to advert to the reasons 
which have led me and others to suppose that such sentiments be- 
long to you. On this plan, you will have a fair opportunity 
to correct any misapprehension of mine, or of your readers gen- 
erally, in regard to your meaning ; while at the same time the evil 
consequences to the cause of truth, resulting from the general ten- 
or of your arguments, as commonly understood, may in some measure 
be prevented. 



LETTER ir. 



Passages in the Concio ad Clerura to be considered. — The two common positions. Reasons for 
supposing that Dr. Taylor holds the opposite. Interrogative form no objection. — Second 
position considered. — Meaning of the phrase, Ood could not prevent sin. — Three senses. 
Circumstances which indicate the literal sense. — Second sense adopted by the orthodox 
generally. Third sense inadmissible. 



Reverend and Dear Sir, 

My present design is to remark particularly on some passages 
in the pamphlet containing your " Concio ad Clerum," delivered 
Sept. 10, 1828. The passages, to which my remarks will specially 
relate are contained in the fourth reflection of the Sermon, together 
with the note, pp. 29 — 34. 

[See the Appendix at the close of the Letters, where the passa- 
ges are inserted at large. For the sake of convenient reference, 
the different paragraphs are marked with the figures, 1, 2, 3, &c.] 

Your reasoning in the place referred to is intended to obviate an 
objection against the character of God, arising from the fact, that 
he has given man a nature which he knew would lead him to sin. 
The position which you take in your reasoning I understand to be 
this ; that supposing God to have adopted a moral si/stem, he could 
not have prevented all sin, nor the present degree of it ; or, as you 
sometimes represent it, that God could not have done better on the 
whole, or better, if he gave existence at all, for any individual of the 
human race. The conclusion is, that no one can impeach the wis- 
dom or goodness of God, considering, that notwithstanding the evil 
4 



22 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

which exists^ he will secure the greater good 'possible for him to se- 
cure. 

The positions exploded. 

You say, the difficulties on this subject result in your view from 
*Hvvo very common, but groundless assumptions, — assumptions which, 
so long as they are admitted and reasoned upon, must," you think, 
" leave the subject involved in insuperable difficulties." The first of 
these assumptions is, " that sin is the necessary means of the greatest 
good, and as such, so far as it exists, is preferable to holiness in its 
stead." The second is, *' that God could in a moral system have 
prevented all sin, or at least the present degree of it." 

Now from all you have advanced on the subject, I conclude 
that you mean to hold the opposite positions ; namely, that sin is not 
the necessary means of the greatest good, and as such, so far as it 
exists, is not on the whole preferable to holiness in its stead ; and 
that, in a moral system, God could not have prevented all sin, nor 
the present degree of it. 

I am aware that you do not in so many words directly affirm 
these opposite positions. I am aware also, that the Reviewers of 
Taylor and Harvey, while professedly vindicating your views on 
the subject, say, *' we have no wish to establish the contrary assump- 
tion. We pretend not to assert what was or was not possible with 
God. Our object has been to inquire whether men know as much 
respecting this subject as some have assumed to know." But what- 
ever may have been the language of the Reviewers, I cannot 
think that this is the ground which you take in your sermon and 
note. It is no impossible supposition, that writers may, in a gen- 
eral expression or two, signify that they do not wish to establish a 
particular position ; and yet clearly show by the whole current of 
their reasoning, that the establishment of that position is their fa- 
vorite object. The reasons which lead me to think that you meant, 
indirectly indeed, but really and unhesitatingly, to maintain the 
two opposite positions above stated, I will now offer : though I must 
say, I should rejoice to learn, that your intention was not such as I 
have been led to suppose. 

First. It is evident that you mean to explode the two common 
positions which you lay down at the beginning of your note. You 
call them "groundless assumptions ;" and you think that, "so long 



LETTER II. 23 

as they are admitted, they must leave the subject involved in insu- 
perable difficulties." Besides this, it is manifestly your object 
throughout the note, to confute the common positions, and even to 
make them appear weak and contemptible. Now all this does not 
seem like merely doubting these positions, and merely inquiring 
whether the grounds on which they rest are sufficient, without as- 
serting any thing one way or the other. I can hardly conceive how 
you could express your total rejection of them in a more unequivo- 
cal manner. 

Second. As you reject the common positions, it is doubtless the 
case, that you hold the opposite ones. This I believe, because it 
would be unreasonable to suppose, that a man of your intellectual 
character had no opinion whatever, on a subject which he had stud- 
ied so much ; and because there is really no place where you can 
stand between rejecting what you call the common assumptions, 
and holding the opposite ones. You will find I think, on trial, that 
for a man of such decision as yours, it will be no easy matter to de- 
ny the opinions commonly received, without embracing the opposite. 
Indeed what middle place can there be between denying that moral 
evil is on the whole for the best, and holding that it is not on the 
whole for the best 1 — between denying that it is the necessary 
means of the greatest good, and holding that it is not the necessary 
means ? — between denying that God had power in a moral system 
to prevent sin, and holding that he had not power to do it ? No 
man who thinks regularly and connectedly, can deny the one of 
these, without holding the other. I must therefore conclude, that 
just so far as you deny and reject the common positions above nam- 
ed, you maintain the opposite ones. 

But I have another reason for this conclusion ; which is, that 
the main tenor of your arguments throughout shows, that the sup- 
port of the opposite positions is as much your object, as the rejec- 
tion of the common ones. The chief considerations you offer have 
as much weight in favor of these opposite positions, as against the 
common ones. If they disprove the position, that sin is the neces- 
sary means of the greatest good, they equally prove, that it is not 
the necessary means. There are indeed cases, in which a man may 
call in question the validity of the arguments which are used to sup- 
port a particular proposition, and may be satisiied that they are 
wholly insufficient, without undertaking to defend, and even with- 



24 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

out believing, any proposition which is opposed to it. But they are 
cases quite different from the one now in hand. And when such is 
the state of a man's mind, he will so direct his reasoning as to make 
it appear ; and will leave no room for others to think that, while he 
aims to confute the opinion which he calls groundless, it is equally 
his object to defend the opposite one. 

It cannot surely be thought any objection against the construc- 
tion which I have put upon your arguments, that they are expres- 
sed in the interrogative form. This form is not used in such a case 
to express doubt or indecision, but to give greater force to argu- 
ments. In your reasoning on the subject before us, you make a 
more frequent and more skilful use of interrogatives than is com- 
mon. They occur continually ; and are manifestly adapted to produce 
a high rhetorical effect. I do not by any means complain of this. 
It is often the method of the inspired writers ; and in ten thousand 
cases, it is the most brief, convincing, and impressive manner of 
stating our opinions, and our arguments. Whatever of reasoning 
you have introduced into your note, and into the part of your ser- 
mon connected with it, is made doubly vivid and striking, by being 
exhibited in this form. The fact then that you do not in so many 
words afRrm any thing, but merely make use of questions, is so far 
from implying that you do not wish to maintain the particular opin- 
ions which I have attributed to you, that it shows your determina- 
tion to maintain them, and to inculcate them upon others, to the ut- 
most of your power. 

The two positions maintained. 

In my remarks, then, I shall consider myself as warranted to 
proceed on the supposition, that you hold these two opinions, name- 
ly ; first ; that sin is not the necessary means of the greatest goody 
and as such, so far as it exists, is not, on the whole, preferable to 
holiness in its stead ; — second ; that in a moral system, God could 
not have prevented, all sin, nor the present degree of it. — And if you 
should after all, say, that you do not mean either to defend or affirm 
these positions ; though I might be gratified to know this, I should 
still wish to subject the positions themselves to a careful examina- 
tion. On this last supposition, (which I have made so as to be sure 
not to do you any injustice,) my object would be, not to charge these 



LETTER II. 25 

opinions upon you, or upon others ; but to inquire, whether they are 
true. And then, though neither you nor your associates had ever 
embraced them, yet as some others may be exposed to them, the 
discussion may not be wholly lost. 

But for the present you will permit me to canvass the two opin- 
ions referred to, as though it was your intention to maintain them 
by means of the summary arguments contained in the passages 
quoted from your pamphlet. And in prosecuting my undertaking, 
I shall labor to observe that excellent rule of the Rhetoricians, 
so to express ourselves, that ice not only may he understood, hut 
cannot he misunderstood. I shall at least hope not to cast any 
additional obscurities over a subject, which is in itself sufficiently 
obscure and difficult. 

I shall begin with what I consider your second position. And 
as a proposition is generally true or false according as words or 
phrases are taken in one sense or another ; I shall remark on the 
different senses of the words which relate to power, or the want of 
it ; and shall then inquire in which of these senses the words ap- 
pear to be used in your reasoning. 

A distinction has commonly been made between the literal sense, 
and the metaphorical or moral sense of the words in question. 
This distinction is founded in the nature of things, and no man 
can deny it without involving himself in inconsistency. When I 
use the words in the literal or proper sense, and say, God has pow- 
er to do a thing, or, he can do it ; I mean that he is able or compe- 
tent to do it, if he chooses ; that there is in him no want of ability 
to prevent his doing it, if on the whole he prefers and wills to do it ; 
and I mean too, that if any thing whatever, which is the proper ob- 
ject of povyer, is not done, it is because God does not choose to do 
it, or sees it best not to do it,— -and not because he is destitute of 
the requisite power. 

Thus we say, God has power to raise the dead, and to do it now. 
Tile word power is here used in the literal, proper sense. Accord- 
ingly, if the dead are not raised, and are not raised noio, it is not 
because God is unahle to raise them, or is less able now, than he 
will be at the last day ; but solely because he does not see this to 
be best, and so does not choose it. If, when using words in the 
same literal sense, we should say, God cannot raise the dead ; our 
meaning would be, that if he should, on the whole, sec it to be hcst, 



26 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

and so should really choose and will to raise the dead ; it would still 
fail of being done, and would fail because he had not sufficient po^o- 
er. It would be implied, that if he only had power enough, the 
thing would be done. We do not commonly speak of God as want- 
ing power in this sense, as we believe him to be omnipotent. But 
we speak familiarly of the want of this power in man. If in any 
case, he fails of accomplishing a particular thing which he really 
chooses and wills to accomplish ; we say, he is not able^ — he has 
not sufficient power. 

This I shall call the j^rs^ sense of the words denoting the want 
of power. It is the literal, proper sense. 

Let us now attend to the metaphorical or moral sense of the 
words denoting want of power. When in this sense we speak of in- 
telligent beings as not being able to do a thing, we mean that their 
judgment or inclination prevents them from doing it ; that they 
have in their minds decisive reasons against doing it, or in favor of 
doing something else in its stead. Thus : God cannot lie ; he can- 
not do an act of injustice. Here, that which prevents God from 
doing the thing spoken of, is the perfection of his own nature, — his 
infinite wisdom and goodness, and not, properly speaking, the want 
o^ power. For an act of injustice may be done with as little jwwer^ 
as an act of justice. God had power, in the literal sense, to in- 
flict evil upon Adam and Eve, and drive them out of Paradise, be- 
fore they sinned, as really as after. What hindered him from doing 
it 1 Infinite wisdom, — holiness, — ^justice. And when we say, he 
was unable to do this act, we can mean nothing more than that he 
was totally disinclined. 

But the words which denote inability, or want of power, are 
sometimes used in a sense different from either of those above men- 
tioned ; as when it is said, that God cannot do what is self contra- 
dictory, or absurd, or what is, from the very nature of the case, im- 
possible. For example ; he cannot cause a thing to be and not to 
be, at the same time, and in the same respect. Or, he cannot caftse 
a part of a thing to be greater than the whole of it. The thing is, 
in its own nature, utterly inconsistent. And so it is a case in which 
power, either literal or metaphorical, either natural or moral, has 
nothing to do. A being who has neither power nor goodness, is, 
so to speak, just as able to do the thing proposed, as God is. And 
God, though possessed of infinite power and goodness, is just as 



LETTER II. 27 

unable to do it, as one wholly destitute of power and goodness. 
The fact is, such a thing has, properly speaking, no relation to pow- 
er. It is not an object of power. And when we say, God cannot 
do it, we use the word cannot merely to signify, that it is utterly 
inconsistent and absurd to suppose such a thing. 

I have thus endeavoured to define the three senses of the phrase 
in question, not assuming to be perfectly right in my views of so 
abstruse a subject, but holding myself ready to be corrected by you, 
or by others. 

The position which is now to be examined, and which I have 
understood you to maintain, is this ; that in a moral system God 
could not have prevented all sin, or the present degree of it. 

In what sense then do you speak of the want of power in God re- 
lative to this subject ? There are several circumstances which would 
seem to favor the idea that you speak of it in the literal, proper 
sense. 

This might be naturally inferred from your question at your en- 
trance on the subject. *' Do you say then, God gave man a nature 
which he knew would lead him to sin ? — What if he did ? Do you 
know that God could have done better, better on the whole, or bet- 
ter, if he gave him existence at all, to the individual himself? (See 
Appendix, 1.) The argument, in plain terms, appears to be this; 
we have no reason to complain of God for doing as he has done, be- 
cause he could not have done better, either on the whole, or for any 
individual.* Now had you meant to speak of an inability in the 
second, or moral sense, I should suppose the argument would have 
stood thus : You cannot properly complain of the present system, 
because it is the one which God saiu to be best, and which his infinite 
wisdom and goodness led him to adopt. Or thus : You cannot com' 
plain of God for not adopting another system^ because he saw that 
no other system was on the whoU better than this, and of course he 
could not consistently loith his infinite wisdom and goodness prefer 
any other. To represent the subject thus, would be perfectly hon- 
orable to the character of God. He has done what infinite wisdom 



* I shall every where understand the discussion to relate to a moral system 
as actually existing, or to exist, or to different forms of a moral system ; and not 
to the question whether it would be better for God to create a moral system, 
or not to create, — a question scarcely worthy of a moment's consideration. 



28 



LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 



and benevolence dictated. He has not done differently, because in- 
finite wisdom and benevolence did not permit, or did not lead to it. 
; This is the common theory ; — the theory adopted by orthodox minis- 
ters and Christians generally. But the language you employ makes 
quite a different impression. To say vi^e have no reason to complain of 
God for what he has done, because he could not have done better, eith- 
er on the whole, or for any individual, sounds much like making an 
apology, and is very similar to what we often say in behalf of a weak, 
imperfect man, who is incompetent to the work he has undertaken, 
and, for want of power, fails of doing what he really wishes and en- 
deavours to do. Any being surely ought to be excused, if he means 
right, and does all he can, though not all he would be glad to do. 
Now your language would seem to imply, that you intend to offer 
something like this as a justification of the conduct of God ; and of 
course it would seem to imply that the inability ascribed to God 
was meant to be understood in the first, or literal sense. If this 
was not your meaning, and if you intended to advance nothing dif- 
ferent from the common theory ; then why should you deny the 
positions which exhibit that theory, and use language which would 
be likely to make an impression so different from your wishes. I 
hold, in common with others, that God would have forever exclud- 
ed moral evil from the created universe, if he had seen that such a 
measure would on the whole be most conducive to the object of his 
benevolence. But it would be very strange, and contrary to all 
good usage, to express this by saying, God could not prevent his 
creatures from sinning ; — this is what he wished, but was unable to 
accomplish. No one uses phraseology like this, except to denote the 
want of power in the literal sense. 

But that the meaning which I have supposed may be fairly con- 
sidered as implied in your remarks, will, I think, become still more 
evident, as we proceed in the examination of the passages which I 
have quoted from your pamphlet. 

If then, sin is not the necessary means of the greatest good, and 
is not on the whole for the best ; then it must follow that God does 
not regard it, or any degree of it, as on the whole for the best ; and, 
of course, that he does not choose that it should exist. On the con- 
trary, it must be his desire and choice to prevent its existence, and 
to exclude it forever from every part of the universe. According to 
the supposition, he has the best possible reasons for such a choice. 



LETTER 11. 



29 



and he could not be wise or good, if, all things considered, ilk 
were not his choice. Now any being, whether God or man, will 
accomplish what on the whole he chooses, if he is able. And if he 
is unable, it must be in the literal, proper sense. Moral inability is 
evidently precluded by the very statement of the case. For it is 
not the wisdom of God, nor his benevolence, nor his imll or choice, 
which hinders him from shutting the door against sin, and produc- 
ing universal holiness. According to the supposition, all his moral 
attributes must move him, with an infinite urgency, entirely to pre- 
vent the existence of sin. And when you say, he covld not have 
prevented it, I should conclude your meaning must be, that he was 
literally unable ; that he had such a want of power, as keeps an m- 
telligent being from doing what he really, and on the whole, desires 
and chooses to do. 

If you should say, you have expressly declared that you do not 
mean to speak of God's inability to prevent sin in the literal, proper 
sense^ and that such a declaration of yours ought to be received 
as satisfactory ; to this I could only reply, — that the general cur- 
rent of your writings leaves a different impression on my mind ; 
and that, as I know of no rule, which should lead me to gather your 
opinion from a single affirmation, rather than from the general as- 
pect of what you have written ; I see no alternative, but either to 
admit that your language fails altogether of expressing your mean- 
ing, or to believe that you had one meaning in your mind at one 
time, and a different one at another ; — a mental fluctuation certain- 
ly not impossible in uninspired men, and, where the nature of the 
subject is complex, not even improbable. 

As to the third sense of inability above spoken of, a single re- 
mark will be sufficient here. If we say in this sense, that God 
cannot do a thing, it is the same as to say, the thing is, in its own 
nature absurd and impossible. Such a thmg is in no way the 
object of power. This I have already stated. I now add, that 
it is not, and cannot be, the object of desire or choice. Who can 
suppose that such a being as God, or any intelligent being, desires 
or chooses any thing which he knows to be, in its very nature, in- 
consistent and impossible. And as several of your expressions 
clearly imply that you consider the exclusion of sin from the moral 
world as a thing which God on the whole desired and preferred, 1 
see not how you^ can regard it as a thing wholly inconsist and( nt 



30 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

preposterous. But if it is your opinion that God did not on the 
whole desire and prefer the utter exclusion of sin from the moral 
system, but permitted, or willed its introduction, as on the whole 
for the best ; then you agree with others ; and if, with this view, 
you should say, God could not prevent all sin, or the present degree 
of it ; you would use the word in the second, or moral sense, and 
the meaning would be, he could not do it consistently with his wis- 
dom and goodness ; or, his wisdom and goodness prevented him 
from doing it ; or, which is the same thing, he did not see it to be 
best. And this is the common position. 



LETTER III. 



Does the nature of things make it impossible for God to prevent sin i Meaning of the phrase. 
Nature of created beings. The case of the father and his sons. Analogy supposed does not 
exist. Does the nature of moral agency limit the power of God; Representation of the Re- 
viewers. Opinions of the orthodox as to the existence of moral evil compared with Dr. Tay- 
lor's. His theory implies the independence of moral agents. Reasoning as to the nature of 
moral agency. Moral agency the same in all. Want of motives. 



Reverend and Dear Sir, 

I now proceed to examine the more particular representations 
you make, on the subject introduced in the preceding letter. You 
inform your readers that the impossibility of God's preventing all 
sin, or the present degree of it, arises, in your view, from the nature 
of things. 

Now by the nature of things I have been accustomed to under- 
stand either the nature of God, or the nature of created beings, or 
both. I am unable to think of any thing else which can be con- 
sistently intended by the phrase. I begin with the first of these. 

The nature of God, taken in the moral sense, is the sum of his 
moral attributes. But some of your representations imply, that 
these attributes of God would lead him forever to prevent the exis- 
tence of moral evil, if it were possible for him to do it. These at- 
tributes then, cannot be supposed to hinder him from preventing 
the existence of sin. If any thing in his nature hinders, it must, 
according to your scheme, be the want o^ power, in distinction from 
his moral perfections ; and this I should think must be the same as 
the want of power in the literal sense. 

I will next suppose, that by the nature of things you mean the 
nature of created beings. 

Now all created beinajs are from God. He gave them their ex- 



32 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

istence, their powers and faculties, — their nature. And it must be 
that he gave them such a nature as he chose to give. Here the 
question arises ;— would God give his creatures such a nature, as 
would make it impossible for him to prevent that, which he saw 
would not on the whole be for the best, and impossible to do what 
he saw would be for the best, and what he therefore chose to do ? 
Can we believe that, by giving created beings such a nature, God 
has voluntarily put a hindrance in the way of his adopting and ex- 
ecuting a plan, which he really considers as, on the whole, preferable 
to the one which he has adopted ? If I do not mistake, you con- 
sider a moral system forever excluding sin, as the one which God 
on the whole decidedly preferred ; and the present system, not ex- 
cluding sin, as the one which God felt himself under the necessity 
of adopting, if he adopted any, — and felt himself under this necessi- 
ty, because the nature he was about to give his creatures would be 
such, as to render it impossible for him to accomplish the plan which 
he really preferred. Whether such a view as this can be admitted, 
will be a subject of farther consideration in another place. 

Your reasoning from the case of the father and his sons, (See 
Appendix, 15) is, I think, altogether inconclusive. But it serves to 
explain more clearly the principles contained in your note. The 
analogy between God and a human father is indeed remarkably 
suited to illustrate and impress a variety of practical truths. But 
that it furnishes no foundation for an argument on the question at 
issue, is manifest from this important consideration, that the analo- 
gy is very imperfect, and must be subject to various limitations. It 
is as true in this case, as in any other, that God^s ways are not our 
ways. Your reasoning would be conclusive, were not the relation 
between God and his creatures different from that between a father 
and his children. But it is different ; and different in regard to the 
very points on which a valid argument must be grounded. The de- 
pendence of creatures on God differs, both in its nature and degree, 
from the dependence of children on their father. The infinite God 
has a power over the circumstances, the conduct, and the character 
of all created beings as far above what any father has over the cir- 
cumstances, conduct and character of his children, as the heavens 
are above the earth. Look now at the case you suppose. The fa- 
ther merely knows the propensities of his sons, the tendencies of 
their nature, and the circumstances of the condition designed for 



LETTER III. 



33 



them. He knows these, but has no effectual power to alter them. 
Whereas, if the Bible is true, that Being, " who doeth all things af- 
ter the counsel of his own will," can direct and control, just as he 
pleases, all the tendencies of our nature, all our propensities, and all 
the circumstances of our condition. The hearts of men are in his 
hand, and he turneth them whithersoever he will. " He hath mer- 
cy on whom he will have mercy ;" that is, he converts and saves whom 
he will; and he would exert the same sanctifying influence upon 
others, if he saw it to be on the whole for the best. But the case of 
a father is very different. If he is affectionate and faithful, he does 
every thing he can to make his children virtuous and happy ; 
and if he does not make them so, it is merely for want of ability to 
do what he really wishes and endeavours to do ; that is, for want of 
power in the proper sense ; and his failure is always a source of 
heart-felt grief. Thus, in regard to those very points which are 
most essential in the reasoning, the analogy between the two cases 
fails, and of course the argument grounded upon it fails ; — fails as 
completely as the argument for universal salvation, which is ground- 
ed upon the same analogy. 

We see also that in order to make this case answer your pur- 
pose, it must be implied that the inability which you attribute to 
God is an inability in the literal, proper sense. For if a father in 
such a case could alter the dispositions of his sons, or the state of 
the public Seminary to which he sends them, — if he had power to 
do this, he would do it. It is a grief to him that the propensities 
and circumstances of his beloved sons are not different ; he earnest- 
ly wishes them to be different ; but he cannot make them so. Now 
as your reasoning rests on the supposition, that there is, in this very 
respect, an analogy between the father here exhibited, and God, the 
Governour of the world; it must be implied, that God labors under 
the same kind of inability, or want of power, with this father. As 
I understand your reasoning in this case, I cannot but consider it 
as in a high degree derogatory to the character of God. 

But as you rely so much on the argument derived from the case 
of the father and his sons, and as the subject is so important ; I 
shall express my reflections upon it in another form, and even more 
particularly than might seem suitable in this place, — choosing rather 
to be chargeable with some repetition, as well as digression, than to 
omit any thing which might tend to illustrate the truth. 



34 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

It was the opinion of the Pelagians, and it seems to be the opin- 
ion of some who hold the general principles of orthodoxy at the 
present day, that God has no influence over the human mind, ex- 
cept merely in the way of moral suasion. This is often called moral 
injiuence ; by which I understand the influence of rational consid- 
erations presented to the mind. This opinion has been opposed 
by the ablest evangelical writers from the Reformation to the pre- 
sent age, and is, in my view, wide of the truth. So far as I can 
judge, the opinion has arisen from the supposition of an analogy 
which does not exist, between human power, and divine power ; — 
between the influence of man, and the influence of God. This 
mistaken supposition may be accounted for in this way. It is a 
matter of experience, that we can have no influence over the minds 
of our fellow men, either in the way of convincing or persuading 
them, except by presenting considerations to their minds. From 
this some men have concluded, that it must be so with God. But 
in this conclusion, they have overlooked the most striking peculiari- 
ty of that influence which the Scriptures ascribe to the Supreme 
Being. I maintain, what I think may be proved from Scripture 
and from facts, that the analogy above supposed does not exist. In- 
deed the thing becomes obvious on a moment's reflection. God is 
the Creator of the mind. '' He made us, and not we ourselves." 
And he has so constituted us, that we can have access to the minds 
of our fellow men in no other way, than by the use of words, and 
other sensible signs. But does it follow from this, that it must be 
so with the infinite God 1 As well might we say that, because 
we cannot create minds, therefore God cannot. He on whom the 
mind depends for its existence and all its faculties, must have access 
to it at all times, and, if he pleases, without any use of those means 
to which we are confined. In how many instances has God, with- 
out any instrumentality whatever, caused men to know at once, what 
they could never have learnt by natural means ! The cases I refer 
to are indeed miraculous. But they are none the less adapted to 
prove, that God can act directly on the mind, and that his influence 
over its state is not subject to the limitations and imperfections, by 
which our influence is circumscribed. And as we see that even 
the most uncommon and miraculous operations of divine power in 
the human mind are consistent with its nature, and its relations to 
God ; we surely cannot doubt that this is the case with that influ- 



LETTER III. 35 

cnce, which renews the heart, and without which no one can be sav- 
ed. — All the power we possess over sinners, consists in the exhibi- 
tion we make to them of divine truth. And both Scripture and ex- 
perience teach, that we should always use this power in vain, were 
it not for a power distinct from ours, and altogether superior to it. 
"When we have, in different ways, presented the truth to the minds 
of sinners for their consideration, we have done what is in our pow- 
er ; and if the thing stops there, they will continue to be dead in 
sin, and enemies to the truth. Now when God finds them in this 
very state, looking at the truth, but hating it ; he can give them a 
heart to love it ; and can do it instantly, all external circumstances 
remaining the same as before. So God promises to take away the 
heart of stone and give a heart of jiesh. We cannot promise this. 
Or if we should be so presumptuous as to promise it, we could not 
perform it. Believers are born of God ; not of man ; — *' not of the 
will of the flesh, nor of the will of man ;" — '' not of him that willeth, 
nor of him that runneth." But God, " of his own will, begat us." 
As to the production of this spiritual change, man's power is exclud- 
ed, and God's power is alone. When the Apostle says to some be- 
lievers, " I have begotten you through the gospel ;" he does indeed 
attribute to himself an agency in their conversion ; but it must be 
understood as merely an instrumental agency, the success, and even 
the exercise of which depended wholly on God. The Apostle's 
agency was not like the agency of God. He takes special pains to 
point out the difference. " Neither is he that planteth any thing, 
nor he that watereth ; but God that giveth the increase." Had not 
God a power over the heart exceedingly different from what we pos- 
sess, no sinner could ever be regenerated. To renew the heart is 
quite another thing, than presenting motives. Man can do this. But 
that is the work of omnipotence. The power which first created 
the soul, and that which new creates it, is the same, and is equally 
distant from man's power. 

I have dwelt so long on this point, because I apprehend that 
those, who think the power of God over moral agents limited, ground 
their opinion on a supposed analogy, which does not exist, between 
the manner and extent of divine influence, and human influence. 
If the supposition of such an analogy is given up, as I am sure it 
must be ; then the case of the father and his sons, stated in your 
note, fails of answering the purpose for which you produce it. That 



36 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

your reasoning from the case may be valid, you must make it ap- 
pear, that the power of God over the heart is of the same nature, and 
subject to the same limitations, with the power which a father has 
over the feelings and conduct of his sons, even while they are absent 
from him. 

Leighton, who stands among the best of uninspired writers, has 
some passages in his Expository Lectures on the first Epistle of Pe- 
ter, which are so appropriate to the present subject, that I shall take 
the liberty to quote them. 

" To contest much, how in this regeneration, God works upon 
the will, and renews it, is to little purpose, provided this be granted, 
that it is in his poiotr to regenerate and renew a man at pleasure. 
And how is it possible not to grant this, unless we will run into that 
error to think, that God hath made a creature too hard for himself 
to rule, or hath willingly exempted it ? And shall the works of the 
Almighty, especially this work, wherein most of all he glories, fail 

in his hand ? No : no sinner so dead, but there 

is virtue in his hand to revive him If his sove- 
reign will be not a sufficient principle of this regeneration, why 
then says the Apostle James, of his own loill begat he us ?'' Lect. 
on 1 Pet. 1: 23. 

He says, the word is the means of effectual calling, " when the 
Spirit that speaks in the word, works in the heart, and causes it to 
hear and obey." — " The word calls, but the spirit draws.'' — " The 
strongest rhetoric, the most moving and persuasive way of discourse, 
is all too weak ; the tongue of men and angels cannot prevail with 
the soul to free itself, and shake off all that detains it. Although it 
be convinced of the truth of those things which are represented to 
it ; yet still it can and will hold out against it." — *' Only the Father 
of spirits hath absolute command of the souls of men, to work on 
them as he pleaseth, and where he will. This powerful, sanctifying 
spirit knows no resistance ; works sweetly, yet strongly. It can 
come into the heart ; whereas all other speakers are found to stand 
without. The still voice within persuades more than all the loud 
crying without." — " There is a secret but very powerful virtue in a 
word, or look, or touch of this spirit upon the soul, by which it is 
forced, not with a harsh but a pleasing violence, and cannot choose 
but follow it." 1 Pet. 1: 2. 

I have thought it proper thus far to inquire whether the nature 



LETTER III. 37 

of things can be supposed to limit the potoer of God^ as you repre- 
sent, so that he could not prevent all sin, or the present degree of it. 
But I have by no means intended to overlook the more specific view 
which you exhibit in regard to the subject before us. To this I 
shall now particularly attend. 

Your position is, that the power of God is limited by the nature 
of moral agency ; that such is the nature of free agency that he 
could not wholly prevent its perversion. 

Of course you would not expect us to admit this without evi- 
dence. Many things have been asserted to be impossible ; but it 
is always proper for us to inquire for the proof of what is asserted ; 
especially in cases in which the salvation of souls is concerned. If 
either from the nature of moral agency, or a deficiency of power in 
God, the hearts of men are not perfectly in his hand, and he cannot 
make them what he would have them to be ; then evidently they 
depend for salvation not upon him, but upon themselves : — a precari- 
ous dependence indeed ! 

In the Review of Taylor and Harvey in the Christian Specta- 
tor for 1829, p. 379, it is said ; " So far is Dr Taylor from opening 
a new career of rash and fruitless speculation, that his object is to 
recall past speculations to greater truth and soberness." Again, p. 
384, the Reviewers, who seem every where to take pleasure in 
showing that they are united as parties and associates with you in 
this controversy, say ; " we pretend not to assert, on this subject, what 
ivas, or was not possible with God. Our object has been to inquire 
whether men know as much respecting it, as some have assumed to 
know." Now my impression has been widely different from this. 
It has seemed to me that on this subject, you and those agreeing 
with you, instead of being, as the Reviewers think, less presuming, 
less forward to assert and decide, than orthodox ministers and wri- 
ters generally, have gone far beyond them. The orthodox general- 
ly regard the existence of sin under the divine government, as a pro- 
found mystery. They resolve it into the unsearchable wisdom of 
God ; and pretend not to be able to obviate the difficulties which 
attend the subject, in any other way than by saying, that the in- 
comprehensible God, for reasons which lie beyond human intelli- 
gence, taking a perfect view of his own attributes, and of the whole 
system of created beings, saw it to be best not to prevent the exis- 
tence of moral evil ; that in his inscrutable counsels he chose to ad- 
6 



38 



LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 



mit it into the universe ; that in ways known only to himself and by 
a power which he only possesses, he will make it the means of glory 
to his name, and good to his kingdom ; — that when he converts 
some sinners and leaves others in impenitence, he acts according to 
his own sovereign will, — implying that the reasons for this conduct, 
which he has in his own mind, and w^hich are perfectly satisfactory 
to his infinite wisdom, he has not made known to us, nor made us, 
in our present state, capable of discovering ; — so that we can only 
bow down in humble submission and adoration, and say, Even so^ 
Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight. When we say, God saw 
the existence of moral evil to be on the whole for the best ; we say 
it, because we believe that all things depend ultimately on his will, 
and because we are confident, that the system which he has seen fit 
to adopt must be in the highest degree wise and benevolent. If we 
consider sin as the means of promoting the glory of God's character, 
and the good of his kingdom ; it is because we learn from his word 
and providence, that he uses it as such. Thus we resolve it all into 
the infinite perfection and the holy government of that Being, of 
ivhom, and through whom, and to whom are all things ; and the posi- 
tions we maintain result directly from our implicit confidence in 
his wisdom and goodness. We should naturally be inclined to think 
that God would prevent the existence of sin ; but he has not done it. 
Now we content ourselves with saying, he has not done it, because 
in his unsearchable wisdom he judged it best not to do it. This I 
consider to be the sober theory of the orthodox. — But you undertake 
to assign the specific reason why God has not prevented the exis- 
tence of sin. You are not satisfied with saying, he did what he saw 
on the whole to be for the best — he did not exclude moral evil, be- 
cause he judged it best not to exclude it — he chose and adopted 
the present system, which includes sin, because, all things consider- 
ed, he regarded it as adapted in the highest degree to promote the 
the glory of his perfections and the sum of created happiness. You 
are not satisfied with this view. But you undertake to go to the 
bottom of the subject, and to show particularly, why God did not 
prevent the existence or the present degree of sin. You hold, that 
he did not do it, because he could not ; that if he created a system 
of moral beings at all, it must be a system in which moral evil 
should exist. You undertake to affirm, that there were only two 
things which a God of infinite wisdom and power could do ; that 



LETTER III, 39 

there was no possibility of his taking any course, except one of 
these, — either not to create a moral system, or to create one which 
should include sin ; that he had no election between different sys- 
tems, but only between this system, and no system. You hold that 
such is the nature of moral agency, that it was utterly impossible 
for God to prevent its perversion ; that if moral beings existed, it 
was unavoidable that some of them should sin ; and that omnipotence 
itself could not exert an influence upon them sufficient to prevent 
this. Let God create moral beings in any way he pleases; let 
him place them in the most favorable circumstances, exert upon 
them the highest possible influence, and extend over them the most 
constant and most powerful protection ; let him watch them with 
his omniscient eye, and shield them with his omnipotent arm ; still, 
according to your theory, they will — at least some of them, fall into 
sin. You think there is, in moral agency itself, a power so resist- 
less, that it is impossible for God himself, however strong may be his 
desire, to prevent the existence, or even the present degree of sin. 

I have thus given a somewhat dilated view of what I understand 
to be your theory, in distinction from the common theory. And if 
I have understood you right, I think it must appear, that you have 
gone beyond the limits of sober judgment. You have undertaken to 
determine that God had no choice, and could have no choice, be- 
tween different systems of different degrees of excellence, and that 
there was nothing for his wisdom to consider, but the single question, 
whether he should have a system including sin, or no system at all. 
Instead of leaving the reason why God chose the present system, as 
an inscrutable mystery ; you have boldly undertaken to remove at 
once all the difficulty and all the mystery attending the subject, and 
to assign the particular and only reason of the divine choice. So 
that, whatever may be the opinion of the Reviewers, it is evident 
that you do not hesitate at all " to assert on this subject what zcas 
or was not possible with God." 

Your readers, I think, cannot avoid the impression that such as 
I have described is the ground you take. And the whole aspect of 
your note, the interest you manifest, your illustrations, your forcible 
and rhetorical interrogations, — all convey the idea, that the theory 
you exhibit is a favorite one with you, and that the views you ex- 
press are the settled conviction of your own mind. 

Respecting this particular theory, I have several things to offer. 



40 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

I will just remark at the outset, that it seems to me, that you^ 
have not supported it hy any valid proof , and that the reason you 
give why God has not prevented the existence of sin, is no reason at 
all. What there is in moral beings, which renders it impossible for 
God to preserve them in a state of holiness ; or what there is in the 
very nature of moral agency which puts it out of the power of God 
to influence and control its operations, you have not shown. In a 
word, I^ee not that you have done more than to introduce an un- 
supported hypothesis. If you say, it is not your object to maintain 
this theory, but only to suggest that it may be true ; then how shall 
we account for the decided tone with which you reject the common 
theory 1 And how shall we account for it, that you manifest such 
confidence in this theory, as one which relieves all your difficulties ? 
Who was ever relieved of his difficulties on any subject, by means of 
a theory which he did not believe ? 

But before I enter on a particular examination of your reason- 
ing, I shall suggest one thing more, namely ; that the peculiar theo- 
ry which I understand you to maintain, seems to imply that moral 
agents, as such, — that is, moral beings in the exercise of their moral 
agency, are not dependent on God. To say, that moral agents, as 
such, are dependent on God, is, according to the common under- 
standing, the same as to say, that it depends on God's will, wheth- 
er their moral agency shall be exercised in one way or another. It 
implies, that he has power over their moral faculties, and can ex- 
cite or influence them to act right, if he chooses ; that he can, if he 
pleases, make them holy, and keep them holy. On the other 
hand, to say, that moral agents as such are not dependent on God, is 
only saying, that it does not ultimately depend on God what their 
moral actions shall be ; that they are not so under his control, that 
he can influence them, as moral agents, to feel and act right, when he 
pleases ; and that it would be destructive of their moral agency, if 
he should thus influence them. Thus I apprehend that the real 
independence of man in regard to his moral actions will be found to 
be necessarily implied in your scheme of thought. I know not how 
far you may avow this sentiment. But I will take the liberty to say, 
that I could not adopt your language, or the theory which in my 
view it evidently implies, without denying what the Bible every 
where teaches, what all Christians practically believe, and what en- 
lightened philosophy has always admitted, — the doctrine that man 



LETTER III. 41 

is entirely dependent on God, — dependent particularly as to his 
moral character and actions. 

I now proceed more particularly to inquire into the truth of your 
position, that the nature of moral agency limits the poiver of God, 
and renders it impossible for him to prevent the existence or the pre- 
sent degree of sin. 

To assert that a thing is impossible is quite different from prov- 
ing it to be so. Many have asserted that it is impossible for God 
to create ; but they have not proved it. We believe the opposite ; 
and for the support of our belief, we refer to the fact, that God has 
created. As to the position, that the nature of moral agency ren- 
ders it impossible for God to prevent all sin or the present degree 
of it ; I maintain that the nature of moral agency occasions no such 
impossibility ; that moral agents are in a state of perfect dependence 
on God ; that he has power to make them holy, and to preserve them 
holy, just as far as he chooses ; and that, when he does not make 
or preserve them holy, he is not hindered by want of power ; that 
he is not prevented by any uncontrollable necessity, nor by any 
thing too hard for him in the nature of moral agency ; but that, 
w^hile he acts with a power to which nothing can present an obsta- 
cle, he has suffered his creatures to fall into sin, and suffers many 
of them to continue in sin, for reasons which exist in his own in- 
finite mind, beyond the reach of human intelligence. 

Now what is meant by the phrase, a thing is impossible in its 
own nature, or its nature is such as to make it an impossibility ? 
By this I understand what was pointed out as the third sense of the 
words inability, cannot, etc. It is a case where to suppose the 
thing done is a contradiction, or an absurdity. Thus, that a part 
of a thing should be greater than the whole, or the whole smaller 
than a part ; or that a thing should be and not be at the same time ; 
or that an effect should be produced without a cause ; or that sin 
should be holiness, or holiness sin ; or that there should be bounds 
to what is strictly infinite, — is in itself an impossibility. To sup- 
pose such a thing would be preposterous. In regard to every case 
of this sort, the impossibility or absurdity is perfectly manifest to all 
who understand the terms employed. No proof is wanted ; because 
nothing can be more certain. It is true also, in regard to things of 
this kind, that the impossibility exists universally. It is not the fact, 
that while the thing is impossible in some instances, it is not in oth- 



42 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

ers. It is equally impossible in all instances. In all cases, to sup- 
pose the thing is self-contradictory and absurd. 

Now if you affirm that the very nature of moral agency ren- 
ders it impossible for God to influence moral agents in such a man- 
ner as to preserve them from sin ; you must, I should think, af- 
firm it to be so universally, and in every instance. If, as you hold, 
the very nature of moral agency is such that God cannot prevent its 
perversion, that is, cannot prevent the commission of sin ; then this 
must be the case in every instance in which moral agency exists. 
So that we must say in regard to this and that individual, and to 
every individual among moral beings, it is impossible for God to 
preserve Mm from sin. If, as you think, this impossibility arises 
from the very nature of moral agency ; then, if any individual being 
has moral agency, the impossibility of course relates to him. If 
you had supposed that this impossibility arises from any particular 
circumstances ; then you might consistently say that, as these cir- 
cumstances vary in regard to different individuals, it may be possi- 
ble for God to prevent sin in some instances, though not in others. 
But as you seem to make the impossibility to consist entirely in the 
nature of moral agency, the impossibility must be the same where- 
ever moral agency exists. But according to the Reviewers before 
mentioned, your scheme of doctrine, as well as the common one, 
implies, that in a moral system God could have prevented each 
sin, individually considered. Now all the sins in the universe are 
individual sins. There is no such thing as general sin, except 
what is made up of particular, individual sins. If then, as your sys- 
tem is said by the Reviewers to imply, God could have prevented 
each individual sin, or '' each sin individually considered ;" then I 
should suppose he could have prevented all sins. For if each sin 
was prevented, what sin could there be which was not prevented ? 
But to prevent each individual sin, is the same as to prevent 
each individual agent from sinning. As therefore, according to 
what your system supposes in the judgment of the Review- 
ers, God could have prevented each sin, individually considered, 
he could have prevented each moral agent, individually consider- 
ed, from sinning, — these being one and the same thing. Thus 
the same Reviewers allow that " God might doubtless have pre- 
vented the access of the tempter to our first parents, or have un- 
veiled his true character, or by a divine influence have prevented 



\ 



LETTER III. 



43 



their yielding to his insinuations," p. 381. And yet, what must ap- 
pear not a little strange, you seem to think there is that in each in- 
dividual moral agent, which renders it impossible for God to pre- 
vent his sinning ; and this ground of impossibility you have said, is 
the very nature of moral agency ; which of course belongs to every 
moral agent. And I would have it remembered, that this ground 
of impossibility belongs equally to all moral agents; — belongs to one 
as much as to another ; and to each moral agent as much as to a 
moral world. It exists as perfectly in each, individually consider- 
ed, as in all collectively considered ; and relates as much to " each 
sin individually considered," as to all sins considered collectively. 
So that I see not how to avoid the conclusion, that if, from the 
very nature of moral agency, it was impossible for God to prevent 
sin in the moral world, it was impossible for him to prevent it in any 
instance whatever ; and to speak of God as actually preventing sin, 
would be inconsistent. The same as to the conversion and salva- 
tion of sinners. You hold that the nature of moral agency makes it 
impossible for God to convert all sinners. The nature of moral 
agency you consider to be the only obstacle in the way. Be it so. 
This insurmountable obstacle exists in relation to each and all alike. 
So that if there is reason to assert in regard to any sinners, (say 
those who will continue impenitent,) that God cannot convert them; 
there is the same reason to assert it in regard to all others. The 
impossibility relates to every sinner on earth. And to speak of 
God's actually converting any, would be to speak of that which, in 
the nature of things, is impossible. 

But perhaps, after all, you will not adhere to the idea, that the 
nature of moral agency is the sole ground of the impossibility which 
you affirm. You may suppose, as your reasoning in some places 
seems to imply, that in order to prevent sin, or to convert sinners, in 
particular cases, God must have the advantage of motives possessing 
a certain degree of power ; and that, in some circumstances, God 
must have motives of greater power, than in others. You often re- 
fer to a particular kind of motives as having an influence, without 
which God could not preserve moral agents holy. And probably 
you will maintain the opinion, which I shall bring particularly un- 
der examination by and by, — that God may preserve moral beings 
in a state of holiness for a time, by means of less powerful motives, 
than he will find necessary in order to preserve them afterwards. 



44 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

According to this view of the subject, the nature of moral agen- 
cy is not the only thing, which operates to render it impossible for 
God to prevent moral beings from sinning ; but besides this, there 
is the hindrance which arises from the want of sufficient motives, or 
from the occurrence of temptations. And so, if this be indeed your 
belief, the whole of your system on this point would, I apprehend, 
require to be stated thus. ' Such is the nature of moral agency, and 
such are the circumstances of some moral agents, that God cannot pre- 
vent their sinning. But, though the nature of moral agency remains 
the same; the circumstances of other moral agents are such, 
— in other words, such are the means which God has to influence 
them, that he is able to preserve them from sin : — as he preserved 
the angels who kept their first estate.' According to this, the dif- 
ference of God's influence over some moral agents from what it is 
over others, is really owing to the difference of circumstances. But 
then, to what is this difference of circumstances owing ? Could God 
have ordered circumstances in another manner ? Could he have 
placed those who sinned in such circumstances, as would have 
made it possible for him to prevent them from sinning ? If he 
could ; then, after all, it was in his power to prevent. If he could 
not ; then his power is limited in this respect, as well as the other ; 
so that he is not almighty in his providence ; and when we say, that 
God has a perfect control over all the circumstances of his creatures, 
we say more than the truth.* 

I maintain that in all the circumstances in which moral agents 
exist, God has power to make and preserve them holy ; that if the 
motives to holiness which are set before them are sufficient to put 
them under obligations to be holy ; God is able, by those motives, 

* The following passage from Fenelon happily expresses the general views 

of evangelical Christians upon this subject. 

" We should be so far from dishonorably seeking for the cause of the voli- 
tions of God, in his foreknowledge of future conditional events, on the different 
plans which he had sketched for his work ; that, on the contrary, we should 
look for the cause of these events, and of the very foreknowledge which he has of 
them, in his icill alone, which is the sole reason of every thing. — No, my God, 
thou hast not consulted many plans, to which thou wast constrained to subject 
thyself. For what could constrain thee ? Thou dost not prefer one thing to 
another, because thou foreseest that it must he; on the contrary, it cannot 
be, unless thou wiliest it so to be. Thy choice does not servilely follow on, 
after that which must liappen ; but it is thy sovereign, almighty, productive 
choice, which makes every thing to be what thou ordainest." Vol. II. p. 251. 



LETTER III. 



45 



to influence them to holiness. The power of God to make men ho- 
ly does not, in my view, necessarily depend on the external circum- 
stances in which they are placed, or on the variety or comparative 
strength of the external motives presented before their minds. And 
to prove this, I refer to what God has actually done. Under the 
former dispensation, the circumstances of men were comparatively 
unfavorable ; and the external motives which urged them to holiness, 
much less various and powerful, than under the gospel dispensation. 
Fewer truths were revealed, and those which were revealed, were 
revealed less clearly, and understood less perfectly. And yet in 
those unfavorable circumstances, God converted many sinners. He 
made men holy in some instances, where their outward condition 
seemed to cut ofl" all prospect of their salvation. It is a thought 
which I love to cherish, that when men are left destitute of the ad- 
vantages of the word of God, and when only those few truths, which 
are obscurely made known by the light of nature, or by a traditiona- 
ry revelation, are within their reach ; still God can save them, and, in 
some instances, actually does save them, by means of those few 
truths, no less than by means of those higher truths contained in 
the Christian Scriptures. Several passages in the Bible evidently 
imply this. Now if God does in fact convert sinners in those less 
favorable circumstances ; he certainly can do it. And if he can do 
it; then neither the nature of moral agency, nor the want of more 
powerful motives, nor both united, constitute any such impossibility 
as you speak of And if they constitute no impossibility in these 
cases, they cannot be supposed to do it in other similar cases. And 
so, after all, notwithstanding the moral agency of sinners, and not- 
withstanding any unfavorable circumstances which may attend them, 
God has power to convert as many of them as he pleases. Even in 
a state where but little light shines, and but few truths are under- 
stood, God can have mercy on whom he will have mercy, just as he 
can under the clear light of the gospel. 

Perhaps it may be thought that certain representations in the 
Bible are at variance with these views. Christ said, if the inhabi- 
tants of Tyre and Sidon had enjoyed the advantages which the in- 
habitants of Judea enjoyed, they would have repented ; implying that 
better means, — that more powerful exhibitions of truth were neces- 
sary, and would have been effectual, where inferior means failed. 
I allow that Christ said what implied this ; and that the common 
7 



46 



LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 



method of God's gracious administration confirms the same view. 
And so our conclusion must be, that God has determined to convert 
sinners most frequently where the best means are enjoyed. But can 
we infer from this, that God was not able to proceed in a different 
way, and to convert as many sinners where there were but few ad- 
vantages, as where there were many ? Not at all. Christ does not 
say, that God had not ^J02^;er to convert sinners in Tyre and Sidon 
without those better means of which he spake ; but only that if they 
had enjoyed those better means, they would have repented. Now 
we must conclude, that the method which God in the exercise of 
his mercy generally pursues, is the one which he sees to be wisest 
and best ; — but not that he was unable to pursue a different method. 

But let us see how it is now under the gospel dispensation, and 
in a Christian land. Here there are means and motives in abun- 
dance. So far as the influence of means and motives is necessary 
to the success of what God undertakes, there is surely no deficien- 
cy here. In these circumstances, there can be no want of what 
some call '' moral power" in God. How much soever his ^^ moral 
potver" may fall short in other circumstances ; here certainly he has 
sufficient. And so it must be true, that, in these circumstances, 
and armed with this high " moral power," he can convert sinners. 
He certainly does convert some. This proves that he can convert 
some, and that the nature of their moral agency does not make it 
impossible. Now why has not God the same power to convert oth- 
ers ? Their moral agency is the same thing ; their circumstances 
are substantially the same ; God's power is the same ; evenliis " mor-- 
al power" is the same. Now if you say that, although God can 
convert some, (namely, those that he does convert,) he cannot con- 
vert others ; I ask, what hinders ? What renders it impossible ? Is 
it the nature of moral agency ? But that is the same in all. Is it 
the want of means and motives ? There is no such want here. Is 
it the want of '' moral power ?" We have seen that in such cir- 
cumstances, this cannot be. What then is the hindrance 1 — If you 
allow that God has power to convert other sinners, as well as those 
whom he does convert, and that his not doing it is, as the Bible rep- 
resents, owing to his sovereign will, and not to any supposed im- 
possibility in the nature of things ; then we have no more contro- 
versy on this point. 

Let me say here, what has already been intimated, that many 



LETTER III. 47 

facts mentioned in Scripture, such as the conversion of Abraham, 
and the piety of a great muhitude of his posterity, and some of them 
in times of gross darkness, and the piety too of a considerable num- 
ber among the gentile nations, where the light of truth shone very 
dimly, and a series of similar facts in modern times, clearly show, 
that the renewal of the hearts of men has no necessary dependence 
on the degree of light which they enjoy, or on the number or strength 
of the external motives presented to their minds ; but that it depends 
ultimately on the will of God. 

I pray you, Brother, to inquire, whether your scheme of thought 
does not tend towards a denial of all divine power and divine influ- 
ence in the conversion of sinners, except merely such a kind of pow- 
er and influence as we have over the minds of our fellow men. And 
it ought to be a subject of serious consideration, whether such a deni- 
al would not stand in direct opposition to the declarations of Scrip- 
ture. If I do not entirely misunderstand the word of God, he claims 
a power which is, in its nature, peculiar to himself; — which entirely 
distinguishes the Creator from his creatures, — a power which is in- 
finite, and which extends to all the faculties and acts of the human 
mind and heart, as well as to outward circumstances ; and this pow- 
er of God over the intellectual, and especially over the moral acts 
of men, and over every thing which goes to constitute their charac- 
ter, is, in its operations, subject to no restrictions, except from the 
dictates of his holy will ; and it is directed and regulated wholly 
and exclusively by his unerring wisdom. The opinion, by whom- 
soever advanced, that because we can have no direct access to the 
hearts of our fellow-men, and no influence over them except mere- 
ly by presenting motives to their view, therefore God cannot, I 
consider to be an error of the most dangerous tendency. And al- 
though that peculiar, efficacious power, which God claims and ex- 
ercises directly over the inmost soul of every one whom he converts, 
creating the heart anew, and influencing every thought and affec- 
tion as his infinite wisdom dictates, — although this direct and per- 
fect power over the heart, which God claims as one of his preroga- 
tives, is at the present day often, but very erroneously, called physi- 
cal power ; still it is none the less a reality for being misnamed, and 
none the less important to the glory of God and the salvation of 
men. 

I add one thought more. If God is unable to direct and con- 



48 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAVLOR. 

trol moral agency, as he pleases ; it plainly follows that he is una- 
ble to direct and control those events which depend upon it, or are 
involved in it. Now nothing is more evident, than that the general 
course of events in the moral and civil world are inseparably con- 
nected with the dispositions and characters of men, and result from 
them. To assert, then, that God cannot govern the dispositions, and 
form the characters of men according to his will, is to assert, that 
he cannot order eveJits according to his will. And it will be easy 
for any one to perceive, that to assert this, is to set aside the truth 
of the Bible. 



LETTER IV 



Dr Taylor's reasoning on the supposed impossibility arising from moral agency. — Nature of 
the subject. Can it be proved that a being who can sin, will not sin .' The actual occur- 
rence of any thing depends on appropriate causes. God has a perfect control over human 
beings. Argument from facts as to God's being able to prevent sin. Influence arising from 
the existence and punishment of sin not absolutely necessary. God's not preventing sin re- 
solved into his unsearchable wisdom. Common theory does not limit the goodness of God. 
Whether God's creatures have a power which he has not. 

Reverend and Dear Sir, 

It is due to you, that I should attend more particularly to the 
reasoning you have introduced on the subject under consideration. 

The question before us is, whether the entire prevention of sin 
in moral beings, or the prevention of the present degree of it, is pos- 
sible to God in the nature of things ; or, whether God was able to 
prevent the existence of sin, or the present degree of it, without de- 
stroying marCs moral agency. 

In your reasoning on the subject, you refer to two sources of ev- 
idence; the nature of the subject^ 2Jidi facts. 

The nature of the subject. 

You say, " the prevention of sin by any influence which destroys 
the power to sin, destroys moral agency. Moral agents must there- 
fore possess the pmver to sin." And then you'ask ; *^ who can prove 
a priori, or from the nature of the subject, that a being who can sin, 
will not sin ?" And I ask, who can prove that such a being will 
sin ? You ask ; " How can it be proved a priori, or from the na- 
ture of the subject, that a thing will }iot he, when for aught that ap> 
pears, it may be ?" And I ask as to the same thing,~how it can 



50 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

be proved that it will be, when for aught that appears it may not 
be? The bare possibility of a thing is no proof at all, either that 
it will be, or will not be. 

But the question seems to be a favorite one with you ; and per- 
haps this reply does not exactly meet the design of it. I will there- 
fore consider it farther. You ask with emphasis ; " who can prove 
a priori, or from the nature of the subject, that a being who can sin, 
will not sin ?" — Now, according to your manner of using words, I 
suppose you would say of the supreme Being, that he can sin. You 
certainly consider him to be a moral agent ; and you consider the 
power to sin as necessarily belonging to moral agency, so that there 
can be no moral agent without it. According to the principles then 
which you adopt, here is an instance in which it can be proved with 
perfect clearness, that a being who can sin, will not sin, — and proved 
too from the nature of the subject, that is, from the nature of the 
being referred to. It results with absolute certainty from the na- 
ture of God, that he will not sin ; though in your sense of the word, 
he has power to sin. 

But perhaps you would confine your remarks on this point to 
created moral agents. Be it so. You doubtless hold that Satan 
is a moral agent, and of course that he has power to love God. But 
may it not be certainly proved, from his very nature, I mean his mor- 
al nature as it now is, that he will not love God ? 

Whether a thing which is possible, will actually take place or 
not, depends, I have said, not on the mere possibility of it, but on 
other considerations. There are appropriate causes of action. In 
other words, there are things within and without a moral agent, 
which prove excitements to action, and to action of a particular 
kind. These causes, or excitements are in some cases such, that 
the moral agent will do right; and in other cases such, that he will 
do wrong. The causes which act in or upon a holy angel are such, 
that he certainly will act in a holy manner. The causes, or influ- 
ences, human and divine, under which a regenerate man acts, are 
such, that, as you and I believe, he certainly will persevere in ho- 
liness. The causes or influences, under which an unregenerate 
man acts, are such, that, so long as he continues in a state of unre- 
generacy, he certainly will sin. A moral agent's acting right or 
wrong, is an effect, depending, not on the bare possession of power, 
(which can never account for his acting in one way rather than 



LETTER IV. 51 

another,) but on those peculiar causes, whether external or internal, 
which are adapted to influence him to act in this or that particular 
manner. And it is very obvious in itself, and a matter of common 
experience, that just so far as we have power over the causes under 
which a moral being acts, we can influence him to act right or 
wrong, as we please. The only thing which limits our influence in 
this respect is, that we have only a limited or partial power over the 
causes of action. 

Here we find one of the great points of difference between God 
and man. We are taught both by reason and Scripture, that God 
has a perfect, unlimited power over all the springs and occasions of 
action in human beings, — over every thing which has the nature of 
a motive or excitement to action ; and especially over the disposition 
of the heart. This appears to me so clear and certain, that 1 should 
no more expect that any man would deny it, than that he would de^ 
ny the principle of gravitation, or even the divine existence. Now 
as God has such power over the dispositions, hearts, and circum- 
stances of men, — overall that moves to action; he can influence 
them as he will, and can determine in every instance, what their 
moral affections and actions shall be. If in any instance he cannot 
influence them to act as he pleases, it must be because there are 
some causes or occasions of action over which he has not a perfect 
power. You will understand of course that I refer not to causes of 
a physical nature, which indeed have no relation to the subject, ex- 
cept as they come into contact with moral causes, and through 
them, excite moral affections, and lead to moral actions. 

If then it is, as I have endeavoured to show, that God is the 
cause of all causes ; if he has a perfect power over every thing with- 
in and without the mind, which can prove an excitement to moral 
action, and consequently over moral action itself; there would seem 
to be no great difficulty in answering the following question of yours 
(Appendix, 13); " Had God prevented the sins of one human being to 
the present time, or had he brought to repentance one sinner more 
than he has ; who can prove that the requisite interposition for the pur- 
pose would not result in a vast increase of sin in the system, including 
even the apostacy and the augmented guilt of that individual ?" I 
answer: The apostacy of the sinless man, or of the penitent, here 
supposed, could be very easily prevented, if God pleased, by his con- 
tinuing so to direct the causes of action, that holy conduct should 



52 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

be the result. As he can make a moral agent holy at one time as 
well as at another, — to-morrow as well as to-day ; so doubtless he 
can ensure his holiness for a longer, as well as for a shorter time, — 
forever, as well as for a single moment. While he continues to be 
. God, he can accomplish whatever he pleases. Instead then of re- 
quiring proof, that apostacy and increased guilt would not result 
from God's interposition in converting moral agents, or in preserv- 
ing them holy, and that his own work would not thus fail in his hands ; 
would it not rather be incumbent on you to show reasons for a sus- 
picion so derogatory to his infinite perfections ? 

Argument from Facts. 

You say, (Appendix, 13,) " Facts, so far as they are known to 
us, furnish no support to the assumption that God could in a moral 
system prevent sin, or the present degree of it. For we know of no 
creature of God, whose holiness is secured without that influence 
which results, either directly or indirectly, from the existence of sin 
and its punishment. How then can it be shown from facts, that 
God could secure any of his moral creatures in holiness without this 
influence ; or to what purpose is it to allege instances of the 
prevention of sin under this influence, to prove that God could pre- 
vent it without this influence ?" 

On this subject, I appeal to fact, as well as you. The im- 
portant fact I refer to, is the case of moral agents before the first 
apostacy in heaven. They then existed in a state, in which there 
was no sin, and no punishment of sin, and in which, of course, they 
could be brought under no influence arising from such punishment. 
They were moral agents then, as much as afterwards ; and their 
being so implied that they acted under the influence of motives. The 
motive arising from the existence and punishment of sin, was want- 
ing. But, without this, there were effectual motives to holiness. 
It is not fear of punishment, that can be supposed to prompt new- 
created seraphs to love that Being, from whose infinite goodness 
they have just proceeded. In their own holy hearts, and in the 
holy character of their God, they find all the inducements they need 
to gratitude, love, and praise. Neither '' directly nor indirectly" 
can the existence and punishment of sin be necessary to inspire 
their purest devotions. And surely he who gave them their holy na- 
ture, and placed them in those favorable circumstances, could so in- 
fluence that nature, and so control those circumstances, that they 



LETTER IV. 



53 



should continue to love and obey him for the same reasons, as at 
first. It is a fact, that he did, for a time, preserve them from sin, 
without any influence derived from the existence and punishment 
of sin. He preserved them by giving efficacy to the existing mo- 
tives to holiness, and by rendering any temptations to sin abortive 
and povterless, — that is, he so influenced their minds, that they 
complied with the one, and rejected the other : — for, in my view, 
the divine influence, in every such case, acts upon the mind itself; 
in other words, upon man considered as an intelligent, moral being ; 
and not upon any object distinct from the mind, and presented be- 
fore it as an inducement to action. Such is my deliberate view of the 
subject, though I wish not here to make it a matter of discussion. 

But I propose a farther examination of your argument from /ac^. 
The argument, as we have seen, is substantially this : As God has 
not, so far as we know, actually secured the holiness of any moral 
agent, without the influence arising from the existence and punish- 
ment of sin ; we have no reason to suppose that he could have done it. 

But do you adopt it as a general principle, that God coidd not 
have done that which he has not done 1 or, that his not having done 
a thing, is a proof that he was not able to do it ? For example ; is 
the fact, that God did not make the planet which we inhabit as 
large as Jupiter, or that he did not give to men as high a degree of 
intelligence, as he gave to angels, a proof that he could not '? God's 
not having done a thing does indeed prove, that he judged it htst 
not to do it, or that he had good reasons for not doing it. Does it 
prove an thing more ? 

But I return to your question again. If God could prevent 
all sin, — why lias he not done it ?* And may I not put the follow- 
ing questions, as equally proper ? — If God could send the gospel 
to all nations, why has he not done it ? If he coidd have sent 
legions of angels to protect Jesus from the malice of his ene- 

" The manner in which you put the question here seems to make a kind of 
solecism, not very unlike what you charge upon some imaginary opponents, 
(Concio, p. 7.) — " If God could prevent all sin without this influence," (i.e. 
the influence of sin actually existing,) " why has he not done it?" Do you 
mean to imply, that he could prevent all sin loith this influence .'' But how 
could he prevent all sin by means of sin ; when the very existence of the 
means would imply that all sin was not prevented ? I suppose your meaning 
is, that God could not prevent the existence of sin in any part of the creation, 
without tho influence of its existence and punishment in some other part. 
8 



54 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

mies ; why did he not send them ? — To all such questions, Jesus 
has taught us to reply: ^^ Even so, leather; for so it seemed 
good in thy sight''' — This I deem a sufficient reply to your 
question. God did not prevent all sin nor the present degree 
of it, because it seemed good in his sight not to prevent it. This 
answer is all that is necessary, and all that the case admits. In ten 
thousand instances, the reasons of God's conduct are unsearchable 
to us ; but they are none the less weighty and none the less satis- 
factory for that. God is infinitely wise and good ; and whatever he 
does is right. What if the reasons for it are unknown to us ? Who 
are we, that we should expect to find out the Almighty to perfec- 
tion ? Implicit confidence in the Supreme Being, when the reasons 
of his conduct are unknown, is an exercise of faith which is 
altogether suitable for us, who are of yesterday, and know nothing. 
It is in the exercise cf such faith, that the mind of man finds its 
sweetest repose. 

You seem to think it quite honorable to God to say, he 
would have prevented sin, but could not. And you ask, whether 
" be who is startled at your supposition," as though it limited the 
powtr of God, " does not limit the goodness of God ?" But how 
does it limit the goodness of God, to say, he governs his conduct by 
the highest reasons, and refrains from doing what he sees to be on 
the whole best not to do ? 

You make a suggestion, which I shall notice more particularly 
in a subsequent Letter : namely ; that God's creatures had power to 
prevent sin, but that he had not. (See Appendix 13.) *' Had his 
creatures done what they could, then indeed there had been more 
holiness, and less sin." To creatures, then, you attribute a power, 
which you deny to the Creator. But from whom did they derive 
this power ? Was it not from God 1 And in what does this power 
consist, but in the exercise of the nature which he has given them ? 
Now is it true, that God has endued his creatures with a power, 
which he does not possess ? Is it true, that his great work as Gov- 
ernour of the world, is, to follow on after the movements of this in- 
dependent power in his creatures, and to remedy, as far as in him 
lies, an evil which he could not prevent ? Is it true, that he has 
created a sovereignty in his universe, over which he has no control, 
and which may therefore prostrate his benevolent designs ? And 
is it true, that the Psalmist was so much mistaken, when he said, 
*' Whatsoever the Lord pleased, that did he in heaven and in earth ?" 



LETTER V< 



The reasoning from moral agency farther examined. The supposition, that God could not whol- 
ly prevent its perversion without destroying it. Dr. Dvvight's views. The more specific 
position, that God could not do better for any individual sinner. It has uo proof either from 
facts, or from the nature of the subject. Groundless apprehension of what would result 
from the interposition requisite for the conversion of more sinners. — Direct proof that God 
is able to convert more sinners. 1. From his omnipotence. 2. From what he has done. 3. From 
the requisition of prayer. 4. From the representation of Scripture, that God converts mea 
according to his will or pleasure. 



Reverend and Dear Sir, 

In the preceding Letter I began an examination of the argu- 
ments which you urge in favor of your theory, from the nature of the 
subject, and from facts. You have perceived that on this whole 
subject our views are radically different ; and that, in my judgment, 
you have failed in both the arguments, by which you attempt to es- 
tablish your hypothesis. I consider it an obvious mistake in you to 
suppose, that there is any thing either in the nature of the subject, 
or in facts, which furnishes the least evidence against the common 
orthodox theory. But as the subject before us is remote from com- 
mon apprehension, and requires, above most others, a patient and 
thorough examination ; I would not pass over it in haste. I rath- 
er prefer to recur to the same topics again and again, and to subject 
myself to the charge of repetition, than to leave any form or aspect 
of your reasoning unnoticed, or any of the heights or depths of your 
theory unexplored. And I would hope that, in consequence of a 
free and candid examination, whatever is true and important in 
your peculiar views may be discovered and embraced, and that what- 
ever is erroneous and delusive may be exposed and rejected. 



56 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

The argument, on which you mainly rely, is the one you derive 
from the nature of moral agency. With this argument your theory 
must stand or fall. 

You evidently think it reasonable and proper " to suppose, that 
such is the nature of/ree agency that God could not wholly prevent 
its perversion ;" (see Appendix, 10 ;) which I understand to be the 
same as to suppose, that God could not prevent all sin, without de- 
stroying moral agency. But the divine influence, even the most ef- 
ficacious divine influence upon our moral nature, is the very last 
thing in the universe, which I should suppose could destroy or in- 
jure it. From the moment in which God created a moral world, he 
has been exerting his influence upon it in every conceivable manner, 
and in the highest degree. He preserved angels in holiness, when 
their fellows apostatized. He has renewed sinners, who have been 
at the greatest remove from goodness ; has given purity of heart to 
the most polluted, and subdued the most obstinate and rebellious ; 
and has preserved his people from apostacy, when it could be done 
only by the exertion of great power, as well as love. But in any of 
these innumerable cases, in which the power of God has been effec- 
tually exerted among angels or men, has it in the least infringed upon 
their moral agency ? Was an angel, or a redeemed sinner ever con- 
scious that the divine power exerted upon him prevented moral ac- 
tion ? Do we hear any complaints from holy beings of that benign 
and sanctifying influence which made them what they are ? Do 
they regard the spirit of God as an object of fear and terror, calcu- 
lated, by his almighty operations, to reduce them from the rank of 
free moral beings ? Do they not rather look for it with strong de- 
sire, and seek it with fervent prayer? — The reason, if I mistake 
not, why you suppose that God could not prevent all sin without des- 
troying moral agency, is, that you suppose he could not prevent all 
sin, without destroying i\ie power to sin? (see Appendix, 12.) But 
does the whole history of moral agents furnish a single instance, in 
which the divine influence has been felt to abridge or destroy their 
proper power ? On the contrary, the consciousness of every one 
who has been renewed by the spirit of God may be cited as evi- 
dence, that the highest exertions of the divine Spirit are consistent 
with our moral nature, and harmonize entirely with our voluntary 
powers. The energy of God in the soul of man does not compel 
and degrade, but heals and elevates. When he moves the mind 



LETTER V. 57 

most powerfully and effectually, he still does it, not with an unwel- 
come force or violence, but with a kind, gentle, attractive influence, 
" congruous to the essential nature of the soul," and coalescing per- 
fectly with our intellectual and moral faculties. In short, the pow- 
er which God exerts in the prevention of sin, so far from destroying 
our proper agency, only directs and secures it ; and the power which 
he exerts in recovering from sin, so far from infringing our moral 
faculties, only restores them to health and vigor. Charnock says, 
" God, who knows how to make a will with a principle of freedom, 
knows how to work upon the will without intrenching upon or al- 
tering the essential privilege he bestowed upon it." "At what time 
God doth savingly work upon the will, to draw the soul from sin — 
it doth with the greatest willingness, — follow after God. Draw me, 
toe will run after thee. Drawing signifies the efficacious power of 
grace ; running signifies the delightful motion of grace : the will is 
drawn, as if it would not come; it comes, as if it were not drawn. 
His grace is so sweet and so strong, that he neither wrongs the lib- 
erty of his nature, nor doth prejudice his absolute power. — The 
Spirit glides into the heart by sweet illapses of grace, and victori- 
ously allures the soul, not by crossing, but changing the inclina- 
tion, by the all-conquering charms of love. — The power of the 

Spirit is sweet and irresistible. An inexpressible sweetness al- 
lures the soul, and an unconquerable power draws the soul." 

Your theory, my dear Brother, supposes, that there is something 
in moral agency, which renders it impossible for divine power to 
control it. But what this something is, you have no where told us. 
I beg you now to look at the subject again ; and then tell us, what is 
that something, — that mysterious attribute of moral agency, which 
thus frees it from its dependence on God ? Who created moral 
agents ? Who sustains them ? Who governs the world, and directs 
all events, even those which flow directly from the character and ac- 
tions of intelligent, moral beings 1 From some of your remarks, 
moral agency would seem to be a thing so extremely delicate and 
frail, as to be in danger of being spoiled by the most gentle, skilful 
touch of the divine hand ; while, from other remarks, it would seem 
to be so extremely obstinate and unmanageable, that the po\ver 
which created worlds, cannot move it. 

In regard to the point here at issue, 1 have the satisfaction of 
referring you to the views of that excellent man, your " revered iu- 



58 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

structor in theology," whose name you so highly respect, and with 
whom you claim the honor of agreeing in every article of doctrinal 
belief* He says, one of the methods of accounting for the intro- 
duction of sin, is, that God could not prevent his creatures from sin- 
ning, without destroying their free agency. But he states it as an 
unanswerable objection to this, " that God has actually preserved 
some of the angels from falling, and that he has promised to pre- 
serve, and will therefore certainly preserve the spirits of just men 
made perfect, and that this has been, and will be done without in- 
fringing at all on their moral agency. Of course he could just as 
easily have preserved Adam from falling without infringing on his 
moral agency."* 

In the previous discussion I have meant to attend chiefly to 
that prominent point in your system, namely, that God could not 
prevent all sin. But I have considered you as also maintaining the 
more specific position, that God could not prevent the present degree 
of sin, and that he could not have done better than he has done for 
any individual. By this last, you doubtless mean, that he could 
neither have prevented any individual sinner from sinning, nor have 
caused him to sin less than he has sinned. For had God done eith- 
er of these for any individual, he surely would '' have done better 
for him.". 

It will, I think, conduce to the object of this discussion, and 
help us to test one of the great principles involved in your theory, 
if we now turn our attention for a while to this more specific posi- 
tion. I have indeed occasionally remarked upon it in connexion 
with the more general position, that God could not prevent all sin. 
But I wish to examine it now more thoroughly, and to express my 
views of it more fully. 

But I am reminded here, that you not unfrequently deny the po- 
sitions, which your readers understand you to hold ; and that you 
may perhaps in the present case affirm, that you neither maintain 
nor admit the doctrine, just stated as yours. Should you do this, 
your brethren might be happily relieved of a part of their difficulties. 
But even then, as your language is obviously liable to the construc- 
tion I have given it, and thus may lead to views which I apprehend 
to be erroneous on a very important point ; I could not regard the 



* See Preface to Concio ad clerum. 
i D'vight's Theology, Serm. 27. 



LETTER V. 59 

present discussion as needless ; but should consider myself as re- 
quired to exhibit at length, according to the proposed plan of re- 
marking, the objections which I feel to the above mentioned posi- 
tion, — whether you hold it or not. 

In general, I do not admit that God could not have prevented 
any individual sinner from sinning, or caused him to sin less, 
because such a position has no proof. 

First ; I say of this more specific position, as I did of the gen- 
eral one, it has no proof from fact. God's not having converted 
particular sinners, or caused them to sin less, is no proof that he 
had not power to do it ; considering that, in a thousand cases, God 
may have, and actually has reasons for not doing what he could do 
if he would. 

Secondly ; there is no proof of the position which we are now 
considering, from the nature or circumstances of sinners. One who 
is not converted, has the same nature, the same laws of mind, 
the same principles of moral agency, and the same corrupt disposi- 
tions, with those who are converted. As to his depravity ; can it 
be supposed to exceed the depravity of all who are converted ? Are 
the laws of mind, or the principles of moral agency more difficult to 
be managed in him, than in them ? And as to free will too ; — is it 
any more corrupt, any more obstinately biassed against holiness, 
any more hard to be subdued, in him, than in them ? And if not ; 
why should his conversion be thought impossible to God, while 
theirs is allowed to be possible ? 

In agreement with the best divines in New England, and in the 
Reformed churches generally, I hold that God, being infinitely pow- 
erful and good, would convert more sinners than he does, yea, all 
sinners, if he saw it to be on the whole for the best ; or, if it seem- 
ed good in his sight. But the reasons of his conduct in this case, 
as in many others, are known only to his own infinite mind. As to 
us, — we see through a glass darkly ; we know only in part. But 
what we know not now, we may know hereafter. The develope- 
ment of the divine character which will be made during the ten 
thousand ages to come, will cast a clearer light on the divine plan, 
and help us more adequately to understand its wisdom and good- 
ness. Let us modestly suspend our judgment, and wait till that 
clearer light shines. 

But you seem to apprehend certain dreadful consequences, if 



60 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

God should convert one sinner more than he does. You say, (Ap- 
pendix, 13,) '' Had God prevented the sins of one human being to 
the present time, or had he brought to repentance one sinner more 
than he has ; who can prove that the requisite interposition for the 
purpose would not result in a vast increase of sin in the^system, in- 
cluding even the apostacy and augmented guilt of that individual?" 
You ask, who can prove that it would not result in this ? And I 
ask, who can prove that it luould 1 What shadow of reason is there 
to suppose that it would ? " The requisite interposition" seems to 
you to be something dark and terrific, — something v.-hich might 
prove exceedingly dangerous to the order and happiness of the 
moral world. But in sober truth, what is that divine interposition, 
of which you have such apprehensions ? It is merely this ; that 
God, in great mercy, and by the effectual operation of his Spirit, 
should turn the sinner from darkness to light, should make him pure 
in heart, and incline him to love and obey the gospel. This is the 
interposition which has been requisite in the case of every sinner 
who has been converted. Now has this divine interposition ever 
produced such an effect as you apprehend ? Has it resulted " in a 
vast increase of sin in the system, and in the apostacy and augment- 
ed guilt of the individual converted ?" I hold that the infinite grace 
of God in converting sinners never has produced, and never has had 
the least tendency to produce such a result, but the contrary, — di- 
rectly the contrary. Is not the conversion of every sinner insepara- 
bly connected by the appointment of God, with his perseverance in 
holiness, and his final salvation \ And has it not an obvious ten- 
dency to check the progress of wickedness in the world ? As then, 
in all the instances in which God has converted sinners from the 
beginning of the world to the present time, " the requisite interposi- 
tion" has led to no such result ; what reason have you to suppose 
that it would lead to such a result in any other case, and that God 
is prevented from converting more sinners than he does, because he 
sees, (or perhaps more properly, because he fears,) that their con- 
version would result in a vast increase of sin in the system, includ- 
ing the apostacy and augmented guilt of those very individuals 1 
And as in every instance of conversion in past times, the result has 
been contrary to this ; what reason have you to doubt that it might 
be so in every other instance ? 

I will just remark, that if God had only the kind of power which 



LETTER V. 61 

man has, and if he could effect no more radical change, than the 
fear of punishment or the desire of happiness can produce ; then 
indeed might his interference be ineffectual, and saints might apos- 
tatize and perish, notwithstanding all he could do to prevent. 

Thus far the view I have taken of the subject is chiefly negative. 
But I shall not stop here, as there is, if I mistake not, direct, posi- 
tive, and conclusive proof, that God has power to convert and save 
any one, or any number of those sinners, who will in fact perish in 
impenitence. This proof I shall now adduce. 

First. God is omnipotent. This implies, that he can do all 
his pleasure ; that he can accomplish whatever he wishes to accom- 
plish ; that he can direct, as he pleases, all the external circumstan- 
ces of moral beings, and all the springs of action within them, and 
can form their characters according to his Vv^ill.* The omnipotence 
of God implies, that he can do every thing which is an object of 
power, every thing to which power appertains, or to the accomplish- 
ment of which power is to be applied. 

That the conversion of a sinner is an object of power, and that 
to the accomplishment of it power is and must be applied, there can 
be no room for doubt. To this divine attribute the renewal of the 
heart is ascribed in the Scriptures. And this power, though some 
may choose to call it physical, is real and necessary. It is that 
power which certainly produces the effect intended, that is, gives 
the sinner a new heart and a nexo spirit ; and surely the name does 
not alter the thing. That this effectual power of God in the renew- 
al of a sinner does not violate moral agency, is, I should think, suf- 
ficiently apparent from the broad fact, that in all the instances in 
which it has accomplished this gracious work, moral agency has 
been entirely uninjured and undisturbed. God has frequently made 
very high and glorious displays of his pov/er in the renovation of 
sinners, — a power which has subdued the most violent enmity, has 
overcome the most obstinate resistance, has melted the greatest 
hardness ; a power like that which raises the dead. And yet, in 
all this, there never has been the smallest degree, no, nor the small- 
est appearance of any injury to moral agency. And if God has thus 
effectually exerted his power in all instances of conversion, in a 
manner perfectly suited to the intellectual and moral faculties of 
man, and without any infringement of the principles of moral agen- 
cy ; I am quite unable to see why he cannot do the same in any 
9 



62 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

other instance, when he pleases. And I cannot but think there 
are special reasons, why moral agency, the operations of which are 
so important, yea, so essential to the interestsof the universe, should 
not be placed beyond God's control. 

But in regard to the question, whether the conversion of sinners 
is properly an object of power, I shall appeal directly to the Scrip- 
tures, and inquire how the inspired writers treat the subject. 

The following passage, (Ephes. 1: 15 — 20,) is worthy of special 
notice. The Apostle says to the Christians at Ephesus ; " I cease 
not to give thanks for you, making mention of you in my prayers, 
that the God of our Lord Jesus Christ — may give you the spirit of 

wisdom, etc. — that ye may know what is the hope of his calling 

and what is the exceeding greatness of his power toward us who be- 
lieve, according to the working of his mighty power, which he 
wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead, etc." The 
Apostle here signified, that very great divine power had been exer- 
cised towards believers, i. e. in renewing them and bringing them 
to believe ; — a power which he compared to the working of that 
mighty power which raised Christ from the dead. And another 
Apostle teaches, that believers are " kept by the power of God 
through faith unto salvation." 1 Pet. 1: 5. Thus both the com- 
mencement and the continuance of holiness in the redeemed is ef- 
fected by divine power, and the former of these by the exceeding 
greatness of divine power. 

I shall refer to one passage more (Mark 10: 27). Jesus had re- 
presented the salvation of the rich, as exceedingly difficult. His 
disciples, greatly astonished at the representation, said, " who then 
can be saved ? But Jesus, looking upon them, said; with men it 
is impossible, but not vvith God : for with God all things are pos- 
sible." He said this, it will be observed, in reference to the salva- 
tion of sinners, — of those whose salvation was most difficult, — of 
those too, who generally were not saved. Jesus declared, as you 
will observe, that it was possible for God to save, or that he could 
save even rich sinners, (though but few of them were actually sav- 
ed,) and that he com/c? save them, because he was omnipotent ; or, 
as Christ expressed it, '' because all things were possible with him." 
Being omnipotent, he was able to save those referred to, whether 
they were saved, or not. 

I think you cannot but notice here some difference . between 






LETTER V. 63 

what our Saviour taught, and the doctrine of your note. Your doc- 
trine is, as I understand it, that it is impossible for God to save one 
sinner more than he does. But Christ, speaking of a class of men, 
who generally are not saved, says, it is not impossible for God to 
save them. Again, you say ; " Had God's creatures done what 
they could, then indeed there had been more holiness and less sin. 
But what could God have done to secure such a result ?" Christ 
said, such a thing was impossible with rnen^ but possible with God. 
Whereas you say, it is possible with men^ but impossible with God. 

My second argument to prove that God has power to convert 
those sinners who are not converted, is derived from the plain fact, 
that God has converted others. — Take sinners of the ordinary char- 
acter, to whom salvation is offered, but who will in fact remain im- 
penitent and perish. Is God able to convert them ? Can he do it ? 
This is the question. I suppose you hold the negative. If you do 
not, your language does not clearly express your views. I shall 
maintain the affirmative, and shall do it here by this short and sim- 
ple argument, namely ; God has converted other sinners ; therefore 
he has power to convert these ; — ^just as we prove that God has pow- 
er, when he pleases, to raise the dead, from the fact that, in va- 
rious instances, he has done it. As to the power of raising the 
dead, this proof from fact is perfectly conclusive, unless there is 
some hindrance to the resurrection of those whom God might wish 
to raise, which did not exist in the case of any who have been rais- 
ed, and unless this hindrance is so great, that omnipotence cannot 
overcome it. The same in reference to the case now before us. 
That the unchangeable God can convert the sinners above suppos- 
ed, is perfectly evident from the fact that he has converted others ; 
unless the conversion of these is attended with some difficulty, 
which has never attended the conversion of others, and which om- 
nipotence itself cannot overcome. But what can this new difficul- 
ty be 1 Difficulties many and great have been overcome. Pride, 
selfishness, hardness of heart, yea, sin of every kind, and every de- 
gree, (with only one exception,) has, in numberless instances, been 
subdued by the power of God's Spirit. And can it be supposed, 
that the sinners now in view have greater pride, selfishness, or hard- 
ness of heart, than any of those whom divine grace has saved ? 
Have not some of the chief of sinners been converted l And is not 
that Almighty Spirit, which converted ^/fc/w, able to convert these? 



\ 



64 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

There can be no doubt in the present case as to the sufficiency 
of the means, (spoken of by some as God's moral power). For God 
has the same means of converting these sinners, as of converting 
those who are saved. And in particular, he has that which you 
consider so important and efficacious, namely, " the influence aris- 
ing from the existence and punishment of sin." For thousands of 
years sin has existed, and been openly punished ; and the more 
dreadful punishment, which awaits it in another world, has been 
clearly revealed. This mighty influence, together with the influ- 
ence of the whole system of truths made known by the Scriptures, 
God has perfectly at command, and can use, according to the good 
pleasure of his will, for the conversion of all who enjoy the light of 
the gospel. He has, in thousands of instances, found a small part 
of these means sufficient. -And where they are all enjoyed, can it 
still be, that God is unable to convert sinners for want of " moral 
power ?" 

My third argument to prove, that God is able to convert sinners 
whom he does not convert, is, that we are required to prat/ for their 
conversion. 

All rational prayer evidently implies, that we believe in God's 
power to do what we ask him to do. Should we consider God as 
unable to do a particular thing, or even doubt his ability to do it ; 
how could we consistently make it a subject of prayer ? In such a 
case, our prayer would at best be like the request of the man, who 
brought his distressed child to Jesus, and, with a sad mixture of un- 
belief with faith, said ; " If thou canst do any thing, have compas- 
sion on us, and help us." We may indeed ask God for many things 
which are in themselves desirable, though we may not know that he 
can grant them consistently with his infinite wisdom. So Jesus 
prayed that his Father would take away the cup, if it were possible ; 
that is, if it could be done consistently with his holy will. Asking 
God to do what is not expressly promised, with an ultimate refer- 
ence of our request to his sovereign will, is an expression of filial 
confidence. But with what a timid, half-despairing spirit should 
we pffer up our petitions to God, if we thought he might not have 
power to grant them ? After the Apostle Paul had asked for the 
most precious blessings for the Ephesians, his exalted views of the 
divine character led him to conclude thus : " Now unto him who 
is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think 



LETTER V. 65 

— unto him be glory in the church." But such views as you seem 
to entertain, would lead us to fear, that we might ask for more than 
God was able to perform, and when we had freely expressed our 
desires to him, to add, instead of the joyful ascription of the Apos- 
tle, the discouraging qualification ; — Grant these desires, O Lord, 
if tliou canst ; save the sinners around us, if thou hast sufficient 
moral power ; turn them from sin and give them a new heart, if 
thou art able. With such a chilling apprehension as this, — with 
the doubt resting on our minds, whether God had power to accom- 
plish what we might most ardently desire, and what he too might 
desire and know to be on the whole best ; how could we attain to 
that spirit of prayer, and that high confidence in God, exhibited by 
Prophets and Apostles ? 

My fourth argument in support of the same position, is, that the 
sacred writers often speak of the conversion of sinners as depending 
on the WILL, counsel, or pleasure of God, but never as depending 
on the condition of his having sufiicient power to convert them. 

The Apostle Paul, in his epistle to the Romans, says ; *' God 
hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he 
hardeneth." Not a word signifying that God had no power to do 
otherwise, or that the only thing he could do, was either not to cre- 
ate moral agents, or to leave such a part of them to perish in sin. 
If the Apostle had imbibed such an opinion as yours, this, I should 
suppose, would have been the very place for him to declare it. As 
he found it necessary to meet the objection which unbelievers urg- 
ed against the conduct of God in saving some and leaving others to 
perish ; how natural and convenient might it have been for him to 
say ; who can complain of God on this account, when he has done 
all that he could for the salvation of every human being ? But the 
Apostle treats the subject very differently, and makes the impression 
strongly on our minds, that God's having mercy on some and not on 
others, was a matter of sovereign choice ; that he proceeded in this 
concern according to his own loill. Instead of questioning the pow- 
er of God, he takes pains to illustrate that power, and God's right 
to use it as he pleased, by a striking similitude. " Hath not the 
potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel to 
honor and another to dishonor ?" — implying that God's converting 
or not converting sinners depends on his sovereign pleasure. The 
Apostle in other places teaches, that God calls and saves men ac- 



66 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

cording to the counsel of his own will. But when does he intimate 
that God is prevented from converting sinners by want of power ? 
— that he would convert them, if he could 7— ox that he does not re- 
new them by the Holy Spirit, because he cannot 1 It seems to me, 
that your theory, as commonly understood, must lead those who em- 
brace it, to differ widely from the Scriptures in their manner of treat- 
ing the divine administration in regard to the conversion of sinners ; 
and, as I suggested before, to offer just such an apology for God, 
as we sometimes make for a weak, imperfect man, when he has 
done all the good he could^ though not so much as he wished. 



LETTER VI. 



Farther notice of the question, whether God coxLld have secured the holiness of any moral be- 
ing without the influence of moral evil. The doctrine of moral necessity applied to the sub- 
ject. — The position, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, particularly con- 
sidered. — A contradiction. Proper inference from the fact, that God makes use of sin as a 
means of preserving moral beings in holiness. Same reasoning in regard to the other phrase, 
i.e. sin so far as it exists preferable to holiness in its stead. Meaningof the expression, sia 
is, in respect to divine prevention, incidental to the best moral system. 

Reverend and Dear Sir, 

I have a few additional remarks to offer on a subject which has 
already been brought into view in the preceding Letters. You say, 
(Appendix, 13,) " We know of no creature of God, whose holiness 
is secured without that influence, which results — from the existence 
of sin and its punishment." In reply to this, I have referred to the 
" first estate" of the angels who fell, which was a state of holiness. It 
appears then that those angels who are now happy in heaven, were, 
for a time, preserved in holiness, without the influence arising from 
the existence and punishment of sin. Even at the very time when 
others fell, they were preserved without that influence ; for, evident- 
ly, that influence must have followed both the existence and the 
punishment of sin. My argument is, that as he did this for a sea- 
son, he could have done it longer, even to the present time, had he 
judged it on the whole best. And the argument I think conclu- 
sive, unless we are at liberty to suppose something in their charac- 
ter or state, which rendered it more difficult for God to preserve 
them holy afterwards, than during the first period of their existence ; 
and so much more difficult, that omnipotence itself could not pre- 
serve them, without the help of additional means. But is any thing 



68 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

like this supposeable 1 Can we imagine that their character or 
state after a while became such, and that God could not prevent its 
becoming such, as to render higher power, and more efficacious 
means necessary to their preservation ; a power too which God him- 
himself could not exercise, and means which he could not com- 
mand ? Is there any reason to think that the experience they had 
of the goodness of God and the happiness of serving him, rendered 
them less inclined to serve him ? — that the exercise of love weaken- 
ed the habit of love ? — that by their residence in heaven they be- 
came less and less attached to the place, and at length came so near 
to a state of disaffection, that the Almighty himself had no way to 
hold them to their allegiance, except by resorting to a new set of 
means, and displaying before them the terrific consequences of sin ? 

Say, if you please, that in the progress of the moral system, new 
circumstances of temptation might arise. But could not God either 
prevent those circumstances from occurring ; or keep his exposed 
servants at a distance from them ; or shield their minds effectually 
against an influence which endangered their purity ? Could he not 
have done as much in relation to them, as your Reviewers say he 
could have done in relation to our first parents ; that is, prevented 
the access of temptation, or by a divine influence prevented their 
yielding to it? (Christian Spect. 1829, p. 381.) 

Be it so, that God saw it to be on the whole best, to make use 
of the influence arising from the existence and punishment of sin, 
in preserving and increasing the holiness of angels. Does this prove 
that he had not power to do it without that influence T Because the 
way which God has actually chosen to promote the holiness of his 
creatures is the wisest and best, are we hence to conclude that it is 
the only way possible ? 

It is a part of the doctrine of ?no7'aI necessity, as taught by Ed- 
wards and others, that moral actions are effects resulting from their 
proper causes ; that these causes and the manner of their operation 
depend ultimately on God ; and that, in perfect accordance with 
the laws of moral agency, he can excite moral beings to such affec- 
tions and actions as he pleases. According to this doctrine, the 
connexion between cause and effect is as certain and uniform in the 
moral world, as in the natural ; (although the nature of cause and ef- 
fect in the one case is totally different from what it is in the other.) 
In both cases, where all the causes or previous circumstances are per- 



LETTER VI. 69 

fectly the same, the effect will be the same. This principle, which [ 
think intuitively certain, may supply a proper answer to the following 
question in your Concio ad Clerum (p. .30). You say to the person 
whom you address ; — '^Suppose God had made you just like Adam, or 
even like Lucifer, and placed you in similar circumstances ; do you 
know that you would not have sinned as he did ?" The answer I 
give to this question is, that any one would undoubtedly have done 
as Adam or as Lucifer did, had he been made just like him, and 
placed in circumstances perfectly similar. But why confine the sup- 
position to such a case 1 Instead of making the being in question 
just like Adam or Lucifer, suppose God had made him just like Ga- 
briel, and placed him in precisely the same circumstances, and un- 
der the influence of the same causes : can any one doubt that he 
would have acted as Gabriel did 1 And may not the individual, 
whose objections you have attempted to remove, still demand of you 
the reason, why a God of infinite benevolence did not give him such 
a nature, and place him in such circumstances, as to secure him 
from apostacy ? 

You have seen that I do not undertake to solve the various dif- 
ficulties, which have been found to attend the existence of moral 
evil. And when I consider that this subject has in all ages perplex- 
ed the minds of the greatest philosophers and theologians, and has 
often been acknowledged by the most intelligent men to be involv- 
ed in inscrutable mystery ; 1 confess myself slow to believe that it 
can be so easily cleared up, as some imagine. I should certainly 
think it presuming in me to suppose, that I had discovered or could 
discover a solution, Vvhich had escaped so many distinguished and 
patient inquirers ; and still more presuming, to confide in any theo- 
ry of my own as perfectly valid, which stood in opposition to the 
faith of the great body of ministers and Christians through the 
world. Whether the theory which you have introduced is valid, 
and affords a satisfactory solution of the difficulties attending the 
subject, is a question which I have endeavoured to examine^ and on 
which the public will decide. 

The two positions, which you call " very common but groundless 
assumptions," have already been stated. I have particularly attend- 
ed to the second of these, and to the position which I have consider- 
10 



70 



LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 



ed you as maintaining in opposition to it. I now proceed to the 
consideration of the other position. 

You regard it as a very common, but groundless assumption, 
that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, and that as 
such, so far as it exists, it is preferable on the whole to holiness in 
its stead. As you reject the position that sin is the necessary 
means of the greatest good, you doubtless hold that it is not ; and 
accordingly you suggest a variety of reasons to support this position, 
and to confute to common one. 

It would be uncandid in me to suppose, that there was any thing 
designedly enigmatical in what you have written on this point ; or 
that in addition to a meaning which is obvious, you have an- 
other which is concealed, or almost concealed. In my remarks, 
therefore, I shall proceed on the supposition, that the meaning 
which your words have conveyed to my mind, and to the minds of 
others generally, is the meaning you intended to convey. 

And here the first thing which must occur to the minds of your 
readers is, that in the latter part of your note, you assert and take 
pains to prove the very point which in the former part you deny. 

In my reasoning on this subject, I shall not in every instance 
repeat the whole of what you call the first groundless assumption ; 
because this would be unnecessary and cumbersome ; and because 
the different phrases are of nearly the same import ; and your own 
method is, to take one or the other of them, as the turn of thought 
or expression seems to render convenient. 

The position to which I now refer, and which I suppose you to 
deny in the first part, and affirm in the second part of your note, is, 
that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good. 

You say, (Appendix, 13,) " We know of no creature of God 
whose holiness is secured without the influence which results, either 
directly or indirectly, from the existence of sin and its punishment. 
How then can it be proved from facts that God could secure any of 
his moral creatures in holiness without this influence ?" Now to 
say, that no creature of God is or could be preserved in holiness 
without the influence arising from the existence and punishment of 
sin, is clearly the same as to say, that the existence and punish- 
ment of sin is the necessary means of securing any one in holiness. 
So, if we should sa}'^, there is no man who could live without the 
influence of air, our meaning would be, that air is the necessary 



LETTER VI. 71 

means of human life. — The next step is equally sure. If, as you 
maintain, the existence and punishment of sin is the necessary 
means of preserving any of God's creatures in holiness; then the 
existence and punishment of sin is the necessary means of the 
greatest good : for the greatest good most certainly requires, that 
some of God's creatures should be preserved in a state of holiness. 

Thus your reasoning in the latter part of the note, is really a 
confutation, — and if it were only from another writer, I should say, 
a direct and studied confutation, of what you advance in the former 
part. You first maintain that sin is not the necessary means of the 
greatest good ; and then you maintain that the holiness of intelli- 
gent creatures, which you certainly regard as involved in the great- 
est good, could not in any instance, no, not even by the power of 
God, be preserved without the existence and punishment of sin. 
There, sin is not the necessary means of the greatest good ; Aere, 
sin, by its existence and punishment, is the necessary, indispensable 
means of that holiness of God's creatures, in which the greatest 
good essentially consists. 

But my conclusion does not depend on the single passage above 
quoted ; but on the language and the argument extending through 
a great part of the paragraph. You ask, " Do not all known facts 
furnish a strong presumption to the contrary?" — that is, a strong 
presumption against the supposition, that God could prevent sin in 
any of his creatures without the influence arising from its existence 
and punishment in others. This is as much as to say, and to say 
emphatically, that all facts prove the existence and punishment of 
sin to be the necessary means of preserving any of God's creatures 
in holiness, and so, of course, the necessary means of the greatest 
good. You say too ; " If God could prevent all sin without this in- 
fluence, why has he not done it ?" The question clearly shows 
what was in the mind of the writer, namely ; that if God had not re- 
garded the existence and punishment of sin as the necessary means 
of preventing sin in the great body of moral beings, and so of pro- 
moting the greatest good ; he would have done without it. " If he 
could prevent all sin without this influence, why has he not done 
it?" Again, in the next sentence, you ask ; " Who is competent to 
foretell the consequences of the least iota of change in the present 
system of influence to produce holiness and prevent sin ?" — clearly 
intimating that the influence arising from the existence and punish- 



72 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

ment of sin, which you consider an essential part of the present sys- 
tem of influence, is the necessary means of guarding against the 
most fearful consequences, and of accomplishing the best ends ; and 
so tliat the least change of the system of influence in this respect 
would be of fatal tendency ; that is, sin, yea, all the sin that exists^ 
(for there must not be the least iota of change,) is absolutely neces- 
sary to the greatest good. 

The Reviewer of Taylor and Harvey, (Christian Spectator for 
June 1829,) appears to concur in the same opinions. He says, (p. 
330,) " If they" (that is, moral beings) " are kept from sinning, it 
is not because they cannot sin, but because obedience is their 
choice. Do we know that there must not, in the nature of the case, 
be a display of the feelings and determinations of God in regard to 
sin, as actually committed, in order to the exertion of that moral in- 
fluence, by which alone creatures who can sin, will, in all the cir- 
cumstances of their being, remain obedient ? We do know that the 
only wise God has taken occasion from sin to accumulate the influ- 
ences of his moral government upon the minds both of angels and 
men, ever since time began. — The existence of this evil is presup- 
posed in the system by which God is displaying himself in his 
brightest glories, to the view of both angels and men, and bringing 
the whole weight of his cliaracter to bear ujwn their minds, to se- 
cure their obedience. — And do we know of any other way in which 
the apostacy of the subjects of a moral government coidd have been 
prevented ?" 

" These thoughts," continues the Reviewer, " are not new. Dr 
D wight says, ho to far the fall and punishment of some moral beings 
may, in the nature of the case, be indispensably necessary to the 
persevering obedience of the great body, cannot be determined by us." 

I have not introduced the view^s expressed in these passages, for 
the sake of controverting them ; for I consider them for the most 
part correct ; but for the sake of confirming the construction which 
I have put upon the expressions quoted from your note. It would 
be difficult for me to conceive of any language, which would more 
clearly set forth the necessity of moral evil in order to promote the 
greatest good, than that which I have now cited from the Review. 
First, it is signified, rather cautiously, and by implication, that there 
must be a display of God's feelings in regard to sin, as actually 
committed^ in order to the exertion of that moral influence which is 



LETTER VI. 73 

necessary to preserve moral agents in a state of obedience. But 
cautious as the language is, it shows satisfactorily that the Review- 
er considers the existence of moral evil as the nesessary means of 
promoting that obedience of intelligent creatures, which is certainly 
implied in the greatest good. But he proceeds to say ; *' The exis- 
tence of this evil is presupposed in the system by which God is dis- 
playing himself in his brightest glories, etc." This clearly is as 
much as to say, it is presupposed in the system by which God will 
secure the greatest good. The Reviewer finally waxes bolder, and 
says ; " do we know of any other way in which the apostacy of the 
subjects of a moral government could have been prevented ?" — im- 
plying that the existence of moral evil is, so far as we know, the 
necessary and only effectual means of preserving moral beings in a 
state of holiness, and of course, the necessary means of promoting 
the greatest good. And the quotation is made from Dr. Dwight 
for the very purpose of giving countenance to the idea, that the ex- 
istence of sin may be indispensably necessary to that persevering 
obedience of the great body of moral beings, which constitutes so 
essential a part of the highest good of the system. 

The contradiction would, I think, be equally striking, should 
we take the second clause of what you consider the first groundless 
assumption, and compare it with what you have written in the lat- 
ter part of your note. T understand you in the first place to deny, 
that sin, so far as it exists, is preferable on the whole to holiness in 
its stead ; and my allegation is, that after denying this, you impli- 
edly affirm it, and represent sin, so far as it exists, as preferable on 
the wliole to holiness in its stead. When you speak of sin so far as 
it exists, I suppose you speak of it in reference to the particular in- 
stances in which it has actually occurred. Now all the sin which 
exists in the universe, so far as we know, is the sin of a part of the 
angels, and the sin of man. This therefore we may properly call, 
sin so far as it exists. Concerning this actually existing sin, we 
are to inquire, whether it is on the ivhole prfercd}le to holiness in 
its stead. Your representations imply that it is. In various ways 
you show it to be your opinion, that it was impossible ibr any be- 
ings, and certainly for the great body of moral beings, to be preserv- 
ed holy, witiiout the influence of sin. It is implied in your state- 
ments, that if man, and the angels who sinned, had been preserved 
from sin, a dreadful rebellion nm^L have broken out in some other 



74 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

part of the universe. The fair question would then be, whether it 
is better on the whole, that sin should exist in that part, that small 
part of the moral creation, where it has taken place, and be made 
the means of effectually preserving all the rest ; or that God, by a 
peculiar effort of his omnipotence, should prevent sin in that small 
part, and thereby expose the rest, that is, the great body of moral 
beings, to certain ruin ; or perhaps, according to your views, ex- 
pose the whole to certain ruin, in the end : for you hold that none 
could be preserved from apostacy without the influence arising from 
the existence and punishment of sin. Now you doubtless think, as 
your remarks imply, that as sin, which is in itself a great evil, must 
exist in a moral system, it is very important that it should be con- 
fined within as narrow limits as possible, and that it is far preferable 
it should exist with all its dreadful consequences, in a small part of 
the system, that is, just " so far as it does exist/' than that holi- 
ness should in the same part exist in its stead, and sin and perdition 
reign, as you think they would, through all the other parts, and 
finally through this part too, of God's mighty empire. You think 
it very important, that God should secure the greatest degree of holi- 
ness j and the least degree of sin, which is possible. And as the sin 
which has actually occurred in a part of the system is, as you hold, 
an indispensable means, under the government of God, of preserv- 
ing the great body of moral beings in a state of holiness; this sin 
(that is, " sin so far as it exists") will, under the divine government, 
have such an influence, as to secure in the end the greatest degree 
of holiness and the least degree of sin. Whereas, if God had in- 
terposed to prevent the sin which now exists in a part of the system, 
and to secure holiness in its stead ; the result would have been, — 
certainly might have been, exceedingly hurtful to the universe ; be- 
cause on supposition of " the least iota of change in the present 
system of influence," and especially on supposition of such a change, 
God might, according to your scheme, have been unable to secure 
the greatest degree of holiness and the least degree of sin which was 
possible in the nature of things. And this is the same as saying, 
that the sin which now exists, or sin so far as it exists, being the 
necessary means of the greatest good, is, in that view, preferable 
to holiness in its stead. And it is clearly your apprehension, if 
your Reviewer has understood you right, that this preferableness of 
sin in a part of the system, considered as a means of guarding 



LETTER VI. /O 

against a larger amount of sin in the whole, was the very reason 
why God did not interpose to prevent it. For, according to the Re- 
viewer, your scheme " supposes that in a moral system, God could 
have prevented each sin, individually considered ;" which implies, 
that he could have prevented the sin of each angel, and the sin of 
each man. But he says, your scheme supposes also, that the arrange- 
ment which would have been necessary to accomplish this '' might 
have been connected with a greater amount of sin in the general 
result ;" — as much as to say, that in the particular instances in 
which sin actually exists, it is preferable to holiness in its stead, as 
it will be the means of preventing a greater amount of sin in the 
general result ; and that God, regarding it in this light, and know- 
ing what an arrangement was necessary to preserve men and an- 
gels from committing it, did not make that arrangement ; though he 
would have decidedly chosen to make it, had he not apprehended 
such an unhappy result. 

Here consider a moment how all this is consistent with that re- 
markable passage in your note ; " Had God's creatures done what 
they could, then indeed there had been more holiness and less sin. 
But the question is, what could God have done to secure such 
a result ?" Suppose now God's creatures had done what you sig- 
nify they could have done, and had all chosen to be holy. What 
then? why then, they would all have been holy, and been so 
without the influence of sin, and would thus have proved that to be 
possible which you say is impossible, and would have proved too, 
according to your theory, that God's creatures can do, what he 
cannot. 

This then appears to be the true state of the case. In one part 
of your note you reject the position, that sin is the necessary means 
of the greatest good ; in another part of the same note, you main- 
tain this position ; laboring with great zeal, to show that sin is the 
necessary means of the greatest good, as no moral agents could be 
preserved in a state of holiness without its existence and punish- 
ment. And this is confirmed by the Reviewer, who holds, in per- 
fect accordance with your note, that there must be a display of God's 
feelings towards sin, as actually existing, in order that his creatures 
may, in all the circumstances of their being, be influenced to re- 
main obedient. 

But I have here a few additional remarks. That the Gover- 



re 



LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 



nour of the world does actually make use of moral evil as a means 
of preserving his creatures in a state of holiness, is a fact which I 
admit as fully as you do. What I intend to say is, that this is one 
means among mani/. And when we find that God actually makes 
use of this means ; what is the just conclusion ? That he had not 
poiver to influence them to obedience by other means? This does 
not follow at all. What then does follow from the fact that God makes 
use of moral evil as one means of influencing moral agents to obedi- 
ence ? It follows, that God saw it to be proper to do so ; that it was 
a mode of influence which in the exercise of his wisdom he chose, — 
chose in preference to using other means of influence exclusively of 
this, — chose, not because he was unable to preserve his creatures holy 
by other means without this, but because he saw it to be wisest and 
best, on the whole, to make use of this means in connexion with oth- 
ers. It follows, that making use of moral evil, in connexion with other 
means, was a mode of government, which God, taking all things in- 
to view, judged to be better than any other, — more honorable to his 
character, and more conducive, on the whole, to the good of his uni- 
versal kingdom. This I think is the just, and the only just conclu- 
sion from the fact. AVhen God does a thing, we know that thing 
to be right. When he does a thing in a particular way, we 
know that way to be wise and proper. When he does it in that 
way in preference to other ways, which might appear to us desira- 
ble ; we conclude, not that he was unable to do it in those other 
ways, but that, for good reasons, unknown perhaps to us, he judged 
this to be a better way. 

It is undoubtedly the case that God will, on the whole, promote 
a higher amount of holiness and happiness in his moral empire by 
means of moral evil, than could have been promoted without it. 
But this does not imply, that God was unable to exclude sin entire- 
ly from a moral system, and that he was, as you seem to think, ab- 
solutely shut up to the alternative of having no moral system, or the 
one which now exists. The infinite mind of God might surely con- 
ceive of systems beyond our power of numbering, all possible to his 
omnipotence, and all good in higher or lower degrees ; and many of 
these might be systems which should exclude all sin, and con- 
tain certain degrees of good, unmingled with evil. And even in 
respect to a system originally constructed like the present; might 



LETTER VI, n 

it not be possible in God's view, that it should be so managed, or be 
under such an administration, that it should be wholly free from 
natural and moral evil, and in this way secure a certain amount of 
holiness and happiness ? Might not many methods of administra- 
tion in such a system as this originally was, be equally possible to 
God, and equally possible in themselves ? And so, humanly speak- 
ing, might not God have a choice among a great variety of ways in 
which he was able to manage such a system, all of which ways 
might be in different degrees good ; and might not God see that 
the particular mode of proceeding which he actually adopted, was 
better than any other ; — that it was suited to make a more glorious 
display of his attributes ; and though it would not entirely exclude 
evil, would ultimately raise his kingdom to a higher degree of holi- 
ness and happiness, than any other ? In this view might not God 
actually prefer it, and fix upon it? And would not this be a choice 
worthy of God ? 

There is a particular expression in your note, to which you seem 
to attach more than ordinary consequence. You say, God may 
''purpose sin though wholly an evil, considered as incidental, so 
far as his poiocr of prevention is concerned, to the best moral sys- 
tem." So in the sermon, you speak with approbation of the '' sup- 
position, that the evil which exists is, in respect to the divine preven- 
tion, incidental to the best possible system." Not a few have found 
this language to be of difficult interpretation. I shall here endeav- 
our to ascertain its meaning. 

To say that a particular evil is incidental, or incident, to a man, 
is to say, that it may happen to him, unless prevented by special 
means ; that he is liable to it ; is exposed to suffer it, if a natural 
evil, — to commit it, if a moral evil. Thus we say, disease or pain 
is incident to human nature at every period of life, — not imply- 
ing that it certainly icill come upon human nature at every period of 
life, or that it cannot possibly be prevented ; but that human na- 
ture is such as, in ordinary circumstances, to be liable to it. It is 
often the case that evils which are incident to man, are in fact pre- 
vented. Their being incident to man, is one thing ; their actual 
occurrence, another. When therefore it is said, " sin is incidental 
to the best moral system," I suppose the meaning must be, that the 
best moral system is liable to it, and that, unless specially prevent- 
ed, it may take place. Its being incidental, cannot mean that it 
11 



78 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR, 

certainly will occur. The very phrase seems to imply that it may 
not take place ! and so that its taking place ; or not taking place, 
will not prevent the moral system from being the best. 

We come now to the other phrase, " so far as God's power of 
prevention is concerned." I might here ask, why you speak of 
God's power of prevention, when you maintain that he has no such 
power at all ? I have sometimes thought that, instead of the lan- 
guage, " sin is incidental to the best moral system, so far as God's 
poioer of ijrevention is concerned,'^ the expression might have been, 
that sin is incidental, notioithstanding any power in God to prevent. 
But then the question would arise ; to prevent what ? The natural 
construction would seem to be, to prevent sin /rowi being incidental. 
But this cannot be your meaning. From the current of your remarks 
I conclude, that God's power of prevention must be intended to re- 
late, not to sin's being incidental, but to its actual occurrence. 
And if so, the sense intended might perhaps be conveyed in some 
such language as this ; the best moral system is liable to sin, and 
the omnipotence of God cannot prevent its occurrence, — or, it may 
actually take place notioithstanding his omnipotence. I am con- 
firmed in this construction by various things in your note. 

Now it is desirable to make every subject as plain and simple as 
possible, and for this purpose to lay aside whatever needs no discus- 
sion. The fact that sin is, in a general sense, incidental to moral 
beings in a state of trial, or that they are liable to sin, is admitted 
by all. This therefore may be laid out of the question. The ques- 
tion, and the only one which claims attention here, is, whether God 
has power to prevent moral beings from actually committing sin. 
And to this I have particularly attended in the previous discussion. 

I have one remark in addition. If you are here speaking of that 
which is in itself contradictory, and which is not an object of pow- 
er ; then why should you say any thing about God's power of pre- 
vention 1 In respect to any subject which involved a contradiction, 
you surely would not speak in this manner . You would not say, 
the whole of a thing is greater than a part, so far as God's power of 
prevention is concerned, or notwithstanding any power in God to 
prevent. Nor would you say, holiness is different from sin, or hap- 
piness is different from misery, so far as God's power of prevention 
is concerned. Or if you should speak in this manner, it would be 
dif!iculi to know vour meaning. 



LETTER VIL 



Whether the common position is consistent with the fact that sin is forbidden, and punished ; 
and with the sincerity of God. Can a person sin with a benevolent intention ! Case of the 
Canaanites. Objection of the caviller, Rom. III. Dr Taylor's scheme does not remove difficul- 
ties. Virtue founded in utility. Intimation that the orthodox consider sin to be excellent 
in its nature. Whether the common scheme admits of sorrow for sin. We must regard sin 
as it is in itself. Distinction between God's agency and man's. Benevolent intention of the 
einner. Intention of the sinner and of God distinguished. Conduct of Joseph's brethren, 
and death of Christ. Results of the theory in relation to Christ's death. 



Reverend and Dear Sir, 

In the present Letter I shall go into a brief examination of your 
reasoning respecting what you call the first common but groundless 
assumption. (See Appendix, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.) 

The object of your remarks in the part of your note here refer- 
red to, is, to make it appear that the common position of the Ortho- 
dox is inconsistent with the benevolence and sincerity of God, with 
his commands and invitations, and with the duty of sorrowing for sin. 

In your remarks on these subjects I feel a very deep, and, I 
must say, painful interest, on account of their practical nature and 
tendency. It affords me however some satisfaction to learn, that not 
a few of those, who have been inclined to favor your speculations on 
other points, dissent from you on this, and look upon your reason- 
ing as without any force, and of dangerous tendency. 

It is obviously your opinion, and one in which all orthodox 
Christians will readily unite with you, that the prohibition and pun- 
ishment of sin is necessary to give it a salutary influence in the moi- 



80 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

al world. Sin in its own nature is evil, and as such must be pro- 
hibited by the divine law, and, if committed, must be punished. 
Its being prohibited by law, and punished according to law, is all 
that gives it a salutary influence, or makes it the occasion of good. 
Unlike holiness, which, in its own proper nature, is ?ood and of 
salutary tendency, sin, in itself, is evil, and directly tends to evil, and 
becomes the means or occasion of good only indirecVif^ from the 
manner in which it is treated, that is, its being forbidden and pun- 
ished. To this view I have no doubt you will fully assent. Now 
God's lato respects sin, as it is in itseJf, or in its own nature and 
tendency. He forbids it, because it is a lurong and hurtful thing in 
a moral agent. As sin is in truth totally wrong, hateful, and perni- 
cious ; God would not treat it according to truth, he would not 
treat it according to his own feelings respecting it, he would not 
treat it sincerely, if he did not forbid it by his law, or if he did not 
punish it, when committed. It must be evident then, that when- 
ever we represent sin as on the whole for the best, or, according to 
your manner of speaking, as having an influence by which moral 
beings are preserved in a state of holiness ; we represent it, not as 
it is, taken by itself, but as treated in the divine goveimmcnt , — as 
forbidden, frowned upon, pwiished. When let alone, or left to it- 
self, its whole influence and tendency is directly and violently op- 
posed to the good of the universe, or to the holiness and happiness 
of moral beings ; and it is only when condemned by God's holy 
law, and controlled and punished by his almighty providence, that 
any good can come out of this essential and destructive evil. It is 
God's righteous government respecting sin, which counteracts its 
natural tendency, and prevents the pernicious effects which it would 
of itself produce. 

To all this I should have supposed you would entirely agree, 
did you not seem to oppose it by various objections. You say, *' If 
such is the nature of God, of man, etc. that sin is the necessary 
means of the greatest good ; ought it not to be made the subject of 
precept— would it not be, by a benevolent moral Governour ?" By 
this I understand you to mean that if the common theory is true^ 
sin ought to be required ;~=~2in objection to the common orthodox 
theory which 1 have often heard from the adversaries of the truth, but 
never before from an orthodox minister. 

With regard to this reasoning of yours, 1 remark, that if sin 



LETTER VII. 81 

were required, it could not be the means of the greatest good ; since 
all which now makes it so, would then be wanting. In this objec- 
tion to the common theory, do you not overlook the great and obvi- 
ous difference between the proper tendency of sin, considered in its 
own nature, and the influence which it is made to have by the di- 
vine government which opposes it ? Do you not overlook the broad 
distinction between the intention of the sinner, who means sin only 
for evil, and the intention of God, who means it for good, and who, 
by his righteous administration, brings good out of it?' (See Gen. 
50: 26.) What validity then is there in the objection ? 

You next suggest a difficulty, — and you make it a very plausi- 
ble one, — as to the sincerity of God in forbidding what he sees to 
be on the whole for the best, and requiring what he sees would not 
be on the whole for the best. But, while I admit that sin, under 
the divine government will on the whole be for the best ; I hold 
that God could not possibly be sincere if he did not forbid it, and re- 
quire the holiness which is opposed to it. For what is it to be sin- 
cere 7 Is it not to speak and act according to one's real feelings ? 
And if God really looks upon sin as in its own nature a wrong and 
hateful thing, and if he really disapproves and hates it ; then, to 
maintain the character of sincerity, he must shoio his disapproba- 
tion and hatred of it, both in his law and administration ; that is ; 
he mutii forbid it, and punish it. His seeing that under his right- 
eous government it will on the whole be for the best, and his deter- 
mining to use his power and wisdom to make it so, do not alter its 
intrinsic nature, nor his views of it. Now sin is, in truth, a lorong and 
hateful thing ; and God will overrule it for good by making it ap- 
pear to the universe, that it is what it is. Certainly, the God of 
heaven sees, that sin is an evil and abominable thing, and hostile to 
the interests of his kingdom, and as such, he forbids it in his law, 
and punishes it in his administration. His law can neither regard 
it nor forbid it in any other light. It cannot be, that the law should 
forbid the good which the divine government will cause to result 
from the existence of sin. This is entirely another matter. In his 
law God addresses us as moral beings, and requires or forbids parti- 
cular actions as good or bad in their own nature ; shows us our pro- 
vince, as intelligent creatures ; points out our proper work, and our 
only work. It does not belong to us to assume the office of govern- 
ment, and guide the affkirs of God's empire. He doeb. not call u^ 



82 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

to come up, and sit with him on the throne, to deliberate and judge 
as to the best system of the universe, to wield the sceptre, and by 
an act of omnipotence, to enduce good from evil. This is a work 
which God reserves to himself What he requires of us is duti/y — 
right feelings, and right actions. And in all this, is he not sincere 
and true 1 Does he not say what he means ? Does he not in his 
own mind consider that to be our duty, which in his law he enjoins 
upon us as our duty ? Does he not mean to require what he re- 
quires in his word ? And does he not mean to reward or punish us, 
exactly according to his declarations ? And if so, is he not sincere 
in the requisitions of his law ? — But while God in his law, marks out 
the work which he requires of us, he does not tell us, that neither 
the highest glory of his character, nor the highest interest of his 
kingdom can possibly be promoted without our obedience. He does 
not tell us that our disobedience cannot be so overruled by his al- 
mighty providence, that, in its final results, it shall occasion great 
good to the universe. He does not tell us, as if conscious of weak- 
ness and dependence, that if we refuse to glorify him by our obedi- 
ence, he must give up his glory as unattainable ; or that, if we neg- 
lect to promote the good of his kingdom, that kingdom must be in- 
jured and ruined. Not a word of this. He does indeed plainly in- 
form us how he requires us, as moral agents, to promote his glory 
and the good of his kingdom, that is, by loving and obeying him. 
This is the work which I have said he assigns to us. And he com- 
mands us to seek our own welfare and that of others, by accomplish- 
ing this work, and in no other way. But does this prove that he 
himself will not so treat sin in his government, as to make it on the 
whole for the best ? How does it prove this ? Suppose that he does 
make it the occasion of the greatest good? Is this to the credit of 
sin ? Can this take away the evil of sin, and render it our duty to 
commit it, and make it proper that God should require us to commit 
It ? That is, in a w^ord, does God's holy act in opposing sin and 
demonstrating to the universe its evil and hatefiil nature, take away 
Its evil nature, and make it a proper thing to be required as a duty ? 
At the final consummation, this subject, I apprehend, will be 
placed in a very clear light. It will then appear, that God's law, 
which pointed out our duty, was holy, just, and good ; and that we 
were under the highest obligations to glorify his name and promote 
the welfare of his kingdom, by unceasing obedience And it will 



LETTER VII, 83 

then be equally apparent, that, notwithstanding our disobedience^ 
he took care to provide for his own glory and the good of his king- 
dom, and that he even made our disobedience a means of promot- 
ing that great object. It will then appear, that in order to accom- 
plish his sovereign purpose to bring good out of evil, he did not 
judge it necessary or proper to contradict himself, to bend his law, 
and require us to do evil that good might come, — to sin that he 
might be glorified. And it will then appear too, that that mysteri= 
ous administration, which caused the wrath of man to praise God, 
and made sin the means of the greatest good, resulted wholly from 
the wisdom and power of Jehovah, and that the undivided glory of 
it belongs to him forever. 

But there is still another view to be taken of this subject. If we 
should be required to commit sin, because it is on the whole for the 
best, or because it is the necessary means of the greatest good ; we 
must evidently be required to sin, and must commit sin, /or the pur- 
pose of promoting that good ; that is, we must be required in com- 
mittiyig sin, to aim at that good. Accordingly, when you are speak- 
ing of the person who commits sin, and who is apprised that sin will 
on the whole be the means of the greatest good, you inquire hovv^ it 
would appear that he does not perform the did from a henevoltnt in- 
tention. Now could any thing be more singular, than such an in- 
quiry ? — Hoio does it appear, that the person who commits sin in 
such circumstances, does not perform the act from a benevolent in- 
tention 1 — Why, to say that we are required to sin, or that we do 
sin, *' with a benevolent intention," that is, with a desire to promote 
the good of God's kingdom, is the grossest of all absurdities. It is 
the same as to say, we are required to promote or that we aim to pro- 
mote an object, by opposing it ; to seek to honor God by seekins" 
to dishonor him ; to show our love to God by hating him ; to en- 
deavour to advance the good of the universe by endeavouring to de- 
stroy it. 

In illustration of what you say respecting our being required 
to commit sin, and committing it with a benevolent intention, you 
refer to the destruction of the Canaanites by the children of Israel. 
And I acknowledge the illustration would be in point, if the act of 
destroying the Canaanites had been required of them as sin, or if it 
had been in itself sinful. But as the fact was altogether different 
from this, the illustration entirely fails. And so it must be with ev- 



84 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

ery example intended to illustrate so manifest an absurdit)'. Where- 
as numerous examples, such as the selling of Joseph into Egypt, the 
crucifixion of Christ, the martyrdom of the apostles, and other events 
of a similar kind, clearly illustrate the truth, that God overrules the 
sinful actions of men, which they intended only for evil, for the 
good of his kingdom, and that he suffered them to take place for this 
purpose. 

Entertaining the views which I have above expressed on this 
subject, I know not how to account for it, that you should advance 
the opinions on which T have above remarked. I know not how you 
should adopt, or seem to adopt the views commonly entertained by 
those who hate the truth, and should signify, as you do, that if the 
existence of sin is on the whole for the best, God must require it in 
his law. In drawing this conclusion from the common doctrine, do 
you not take part, though I trust unintentionally, with the cavilling 
objector, noticed by the Apostle, Rom. iii. ? The Apostle's doctrine 
evidently was, that the unbelief of some would not defeat the bene- 
volent purpose and promise of God respecting his people, and that 
whatever men might do, he would vindicate his own character, and 
would even take occasion from their sins to glorify his truth and all 
his perfections the more. Now mark how the opposer reasons from 
this. " But if our unrighteousness commend the righteousness of 
God," that is, puts the greater lustre upon it, or displays it (o great- 
er advantage, — " what shall we say ? Is not God unrighteous who 
taketh vengeance?" — that is; is not God unjust in punishing us 
for that sin, v/hich serves as a foil to set off the glory of his right- 
eousness, and gives occasion for brighter manifestations of his grace ? 
— But the cavilling Jew, as the Apostle represents, pursues his rea- 
soning still farther, and says : " If the truth of God hath more 
abounded through my lie unto his glory ; why yet am I also judged 
as a sinner?" That is; if the veracity of God hath displayed itself 
to greater advantage by means of my unbelief; where is the justice 

of my being punished for it 1 — " And not rather, let us do evil 

that good may come ?" That is, why should I not feel myself allowed 
and even justified in committing all manner of wickedness, to the 
end that more good may be done by bringing more glory to re- 
dound to God ? 

If the interpretation which I have given of these passages is cor- 
rect ; (and it agrees with that given by the most learned and pious 



LETTER VII. 85 

Expositors, and is indeed the only one which admits of any rational 
support ;) then, so far as I can see, the case stands thus ; the cavil- 
ler objects, that if, according to the doctrine of Paul, sin conduces 
to the glory of God, (and so to the greatest good,) it is unjust that 
he should be condemned or punished for it ; and you, on your part, 
object to the common doctrine of the orthodox, which I take to be 
the same as that of the Apostle, and you say, or seem to say, that 
if the sin of man is on the whole for the best, it ought not only to be 
exempt from punishment, but even required by the divine law. 
(See Appendix, 3 — 7.) 

I find that I have met the objection which you urge against the 
common doctrine in somewhat the same manner with Scott. In 
his note on Rom. 3: 5 — 8, he says : " God will take occasion from 
the rebellion of all fallen creatures to display his own glorious per- 
fections to the greater advantage ; though the intention of trans- 
gressors and the natural tendency of their conduct are both diamet- 
rically contrary to it." He then represents the objector as reason- 
ing thus : " Suppose the truth of God should be more abundantly 
manifested to his glory by any man's telling a lie ; why should the 
liar be punished for giving occasion to the display of God's glory ?" 
" Yet," he says, " every one must see that the lie thus told, was di- 
rectly contrary to the truth of God, and merely the occasion of his 
displaying it ; and the event could not deduct from the malignity of 
the lie." Again, he says : " The blame of men's sins belongs only 
to themselves ; the honor of the good done by occasion of them, to 
God alone." 

You have doubtless noticed the manner in which the Apostle 
meets the objection of the captious Jew. So far from allowing it 
to have any force, he seems scarcely to think it deserving of a sober 
refutation ; and instead of spending time upon it, he dismisses it at 
once, after having put upon it the seal of absurdity and blasphemy. 

I am well aware that you attach special importance to your 
scheme of thought, because you suppose that, by means of it, you 
avoid objections and difficulties. But I am unable to see how 
you avoid them. The same objection may, I think, be urged 
against you, as you urge against others. You hold that the exist- 
ence and punishment of sin have an influence, without which no 
moral beings could be preserved in a state of rectitude, — an influ- 
12 



Ob LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

ence indispensable to the persevering holiness of any intelligent 
creatures, and of course indispensable to the highest good of the 
universe. The objector may say ; if so, then why does not a benevo- 
lent God require sin in his law 1 — You hold, *^ that God decrees all 
actual events, sin not excepted ;" that " he really purposes the exis- 
tence of sin." The objector says ; if so^ then why does not God re- 
quire it of his creatures 1 Why does he not require of at least a 
part of them, that which, for wise and good ends, he purposes shall 
exist ? Why does he not require it in the same sense in which he 
decrees it ? And why does he not require us to execute that bene- 
volent decree which appoints sin, by committing sin ? To these 
questions, which are nearly of the same import with those which 
you suggest respecting the common theory, you will, if I mistake 
not, find it quite as difficult to give an answer on your scheme, as 
we on ours. 

As to the opinion which seems to hold so prominent a place in 
your mind, that if God considered the existence of sin to be on the 
whole for the best, he could not consistently with his sincerity for- 
bid it ; — it is clear that you may just as well say, if he considered 
sin to be on the whole for the best, he could not consistently punish 
it ; — (because he makes the same expression of his mind in punishing 
sin as he does mforbidding it.) Whereas, according to your own state- 
ment, the salutary influence of sin results from its punishment. But 
it results as really from its being forbidden, as from its being pwi- 
ished. And its being forbidden is so far from having any inconsis- 
tency with its being on the whole for the best, that it cannot be for 
the best, — cannot possibly have the good influence which God in- 
tends it shall have, without being forbidden, any more than it can 
without being punished. 

You say, (Appendix, 5,) '' It is extensively maintained that vir- 
tue is founded in utility ; i. e. that such is the nature, relations, and 
tendencies of things, that greater happiness will result from virtue 
or holiness, than from vice or sin. How then can sin in the nature 
of things be the necessary means of the greatest good?" — But as 
various representations of yours imply, that sin is the necessary 
means of the greatest good ; it belongs to you, as much as to your 
brethren, to show how it can be so. But the sentence above quot- 
ed overlooks a point of special importance. When we represent sin 
to be the means of the greatest good ; the representation cannot be 



LETTER VII. 87 

supposed to relate to the good of the individuals who commit it and 
endure its penalty, but to the good of other beings, who are benefit- 
ted by witnessing its effects upon those individuals. Your ques- 
tion then appears to have no force. For suppose it to be the 
case, as it certainly is, that more happiness will result from ho- 
liness to those who are holy, than from sin to those who are sinners ; 
may not the loss of sinners in such a case be the means of good to 
other moral beings who witness it ? But you and your Reviewer 
have said so much as to the vast importance and the indispensable 
necessity of this kind of influence in a moral system, that I need 
not enlarge upon it here. 

Let me here suggest again, that it certainly becomes us, weak 
and ignorant as we are, to remember that this is a profound and 
mysterious subject, and to guard against hastily embracing any 
views of God's character and works, different from those which 
have been embraced by the wisest and holiest of men in all ages. 
I cannot but feel, that my best views of the eternal God are exceed- 
ingly obscure, and fall infinitely below his supreme majesty and 
glory, and that I have great reason to make it my daily study and 
prayer, that I may rise to clearer and worthier conceptions of his in- 
visible and incomprehensible excellence. Oh ! come the blessed day, 
when the light of the knowledge of the glory of God shall shine 
more clearly in our hearts ! 

There is one passage in your note, (Appendix, 16,) at which I 
have been not a little surprised and grieved. In reference to those 
who embrace different opinions from yours, and in justification of 
your own theory, you say : " God may as really purpose sin, though 
wholly an evil, considered as incidental, so far as his power of pre- 
vention is concerned, to the best moral system, as purpose it consid- 
ered as so excellent in its nature and relations, as to be the necessa- 
ry means of the greatest good." Now, Dear Brother, who holds 
the opinion which you here oppose, and contrast with your own ? 
Who among all the ministers and friends of Christ, especially among 
the orthodox ministers and Christians in this country, ever enter- 
tained an opinion so impious and shocking, as that God considered 
sin as " excellent in its nature and relations,'^ or purposed it as 
such 1 Such a sentiment, I am bold to say, can be found in no 
orthodox writer, and must be instantly repelled by every pious 
heart. Why then, 1 ask, do you use language which certainly 



so LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

implies, that this opinion is held by those, from whom you differ ? 
If you really mean to convey this impression, then I am constrained 
to say, that no calumniator of the orthodox ever charged them more 
injuriously. 

If you justify yourself by urging, that the opinion or rear<oning 
of those from whom you differ, implies that sin is *' excellent in its 
nature and relations," and that God considers it as such : my reply 
is, that their opinion or reasoning no more implies this, than yours. 
The only ground you can have for supposing that our opinions im- 
ply, that sin is excellent in its nature and relations^ is our belief 
that, under the divine government, it is made the means of the 
greatest good. But this is clearly a belief which you entertain, or 
seem to entertain, as, really as any of your brethren, and which you 
express more strongly and absolutely, than is common with them. 
Where is the justice then, of the language, against which I have 
above protested ? As it now stands, we feel it to be a total and 
very wounding misrepresentation. 



Whether sorrow for sin is consistent with the common doctrine of the ortljodox. 

You ask, (Appendix, 6,) " If sin is the necessary means of the 
greatest good, who can regard the commission of it with sorrow, or 
even regret ?" To this I reply, that sorrow for sin is as consistent 
on the common principle, as on yours ? You think that sin is in- 
cidental to the best moral system ; that no moral beings could be 
preserved in holiness without the influence arising from it ; and 
that God purposes its existence considered in this light. On this 
ground you are met by the opposer with the same objection, which 
you urge against the common doctrine. If sin is incidental to the 
best system, and if, without its influence, no moral beings could be 
preserved in holiness ; who then, he says, can regard the commission 
of it with sorrow, or even with regret ? *' What benevolent be- 
ing, duly informed, can ingenuously regret, that in sinning he 
has" done that which was incidental to the best moral system, and 
has put it into the power of God to produce an influence, without 
which he could not secure the holiness of any moral beings ? Sure- 
ly the act of sin, considered simply as incidental to the best system, 
and as having an influence so essential to the continued holiness of 



LETTER Vll. 89 

moral beings, " is not a matter of regret," this being the very rea- 
son why God is supposed to " purpose it." 

The difficulty too of reconciling sorrow for sin with the doc- 
trine, that God purposes its existence, is as great on your scheme, 
as on the one you oppose. If, for any reasons whatever, God has 
purposed the existence of sin ; why, the objector may say, should we 
regret its existence ? Why not be satisfied with it for the very 
same reasons, which induced God to purpose it? 

But I can see no real difficulty of this kind on either plan. 
And if by undue and misguided speculation, any one should so far 
obliterate the distinction between good and evil, as to regard them 
both in the same light, and with equal approbation, because God 
makes them both conduce to the same end ; let an appeal be made 
to his moral nature, which, unless strangely perverted, must lead 
him to approve of what is right, and, in spite of any speculations to 
the contrary, to disapprove of what is wrong. Before any one could 
look upon it as ^' a matter of grateful praise that he had sinned," 
his conscience must be wholly subverted. And if any one should 
put your question, '' If sin be the necessary means of the greatest 
good, who can reasonably regard the commission of it with sorrow 
or even regret ;" I should think it sufficient to refer him to the law- 
written on his heart. — Equally convincing must be an appeal from 
so baseless a speculation to the divine government. For what God 
forbids in his law, he punishes in his administration. — Now when 
the sinner feels, in his inmost soul, that sin is " an evil and bitter 
thing," and condemns it as " exceedingly sinful ;" and when he 
finds his judgment of it confirmed by the word and providence of 
God ; he will be in no danger of thinking it " a matter of grateful 
praise that he has committed it," even though he should be appriz= 
ed that God will make it the means of the greatest good. The 
knowledge of the fact, that God will accomplish good by means of 
sin, could not in the least alter his judgment respecting its intrinsic 
nature. 

If we would act like reasonable bemgs, we must regard sin as 
it is in itself. God regards it in this manner, as we learn from his 
law and government. First, he forbids it ; then punishes it. As 
moral and accountable beings, we are to look upon sin, and are con- 
cerned with it, just as it is exhibited in God's law, and in his moral 
administration. And in both these it ig exhibited, as unspeakably- 



90 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

criminal and hateful. The good secured comes not properly from sin, 
but from God; not from the sinner's act in committing it, but from 
God's act in punishing it ; not from the violation of the law on 
man's part, but from the vindication of it on God's part. The fact 
that God accomplishes good by means of sin, is a matter of joy to 
all holy beings. But his agency in overruling sin for good is en- 
tirely different from the sinner's agency in committing it. The one 
is holy ; the other is unholy ; and they are thus, in their nature and 
tendency, totally opposite. So that we cannot approve of God's 
agency in accomplishing the good, without disapproving of the sin- 
ner's agency in committing the evil. If we love the good accom- 
plished, we must abhor the sinful conduct which was intended to 
oppose it. And no ingenuous, unsophisticated mind could ever 
feel less sorrow for having transgressed the law, because he knew 
that it would be vindicated by its divine Author, and even honored 
the more by occasion of his transgression. The feelings of sorrow 
here mentioned must, I am sure, be acknowledged by all to be just 
and proper. And it must be equally just and proper that, from the 
depths of humiliation and penitential sorrow, we should lift up 
our eyes and admire the perfect government of God. When 
true believers see that he treats sin in such a manner, as to show its 
evil nature, and his infinite abhorrence of it ; that by his adminis- 
tration, he not only prevents the hurtful consequences which would 
naturally flow from it, but makes it the means of good to the uni- 
verse ; they ought to feel, and do feel, a cordial approbation and 
pleasure. If we are holy, we shall forever rejoice in this benevo- 
lent, almighty government of God, without having our abhorrence 
of sin in the least diminished. 

I cannot but think that the distinction above made is perfectly 
plain, between the agency of God in his righteous government, and 
the agency of man in his disobedience ; between the good which 
directly results from God's perfect administration, and the evil 
which naturally results from sin. And to be consistent, and regard 
things as they are, we must approve of the conduct of God, which 
is holy, and disapprove of our own conduct, which is sinful ; must 
rejoice in the one, and feel sorrow and shame for the other. Hence 
we perceive the obvious consistency of regret and sorrow for sin 
"with the full persuasion that God will make use of it as the means of 
accomplishing the greatest good. 



LETTER VII. 



91 



While speaking of the assumption which you oppose, and 
after remarking that the law of God, according to this assump- 
tion, is no proof, that transgression is not on the whole for the 
best ;" you say (Appendix, 7) ; " Indeed the subject" (the mor- 
al agent, the subject of law) " knows, that all sin will prove 
to be the necessary means of the greatest good ; how then does 
it appear, that with this knowledge he is not benevolent in per- 
forming the deed ?" To so strange a question as this, I hardly 
know how to frame a serious answer. The deed in question is by 
supposition a sinful one, performed, as you concede, with a selfish 
and sinful intention ; and yet you ask, " how it appears that the 
subject is not truly benevolent in performing it ;" which is equiva- 
lent to asking, how it appears that a man is not benevolent in per- 
forming a deed of malevolence. And this is nowise different from 
asking, how it appears that love is not hatred, that holiness is not 
sin, or that any one thing is not its opposite. — The action, I 
repeat it, is, by supposition, selfish and sinful, receiving its 
name from the intention with which it is performed. Now 
what is the reason which leads you to change the denomin- 
ation of the action, and to speak of it as benevolent? Is the 
nature of the action, or any one of its attributes changed? No. Is 
the intention with which it was performed different? No. What 
reason then do you assign for applying to a sinful deed, performed 
with a selfish intention, so unusual an epithet, as benevolent ? 
Why, " the subject is apprized of the utility of the deed," and this 
circumstance makes the difference. A selfish deed, then, if only 
performed with the knowledge of its utility, may properly he denomin- 
ated BENEVOLENT ! — a singular method of denominating moral ac- 
tions ; according to which they would be called good or bad, bene- 
volent or selfish, not from the intention with which they are per- 
formed, but from the knowledge which the agent has of their re- 
sults ! This knowledge of the useful results of a sinful action seems 
in your view to infuse into it a certain quality, which counteracts 
the quality infused by the intention of the agent, and makes a benevo- 
lent deed of a selfish one. Yea, this knowledge of the results of a sin- 
ful action appears in your view to possess such wonderful virtue, that 
it transmutes the intention itself, with which the action is performed, 
from evil to good ; for you very soberly inquire, how it appears, that 
in this action, (this sinful action,) the agent " did 7iot really intend 



92 



LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 



good ?"~Why, methinks it appears from the fact, that lie really in- 
tended evil. 

The distinction between the wicked intention of sinners, and 
the benevolent intention of God to overrule their conduct for good, 
is exhibited in many examples mentioned in the Scriptures. Jo- 
seph said to his brethren, in reference to their envious and wicked 
conduct towards him, "As for you, ye thought evil against me, 
but God meant it for good ;" Gen. 50: 20. 

But this point may be illustrated in the most striking manner by 
the crucifixion of Christ. This was an event which God " deter- 
mined before to be done," and which he had clearly made known 
in his word as the appointed means of the highest glory to his name, 
and of the richest blessings to our race. And yet the act of those who 
crucified Christ, is represented as preeminently sinful. " With 
wicked hands they crucified the Son of God." Of course, their 
conduct was, as Peter represented it, a proper subject of penitential 
sorrow. 

Let me now state, very briefly, what would seem to be the fair re- 
sults of your theory, when applied to this example. If I mistake not, 
you would be led by your views to say, that the crucifixion of Christ, 
being undoubtedly calculated for the greatest good of the universe, 
should have been made the subject of divine precept, and that his 
enemies should have been required to crucify him. If they were 
ignorant of the good to be accomplished by this event ; then you 
would say, the guilt of their sinful deed could not be great, being 
'* occasioned by deception on the part of the Legislator," who had 
neglected to inform them of the happy results of their conduct. And 
i? they had understood, as they ought, what the Scriptures had reveal- 
ed respecting the death of the Messiah as the necessary means of 
salvation to sinners, and so " had been fully apprized of the utility 
of the deed ;" then you would say, " with this knowledge, they 
must have been truly benevolent in performing the deed." So far 
from suspecting that this knowledge would have roused their enmity 
the more, you would think that " their interest and duty would now 
have been coincident ;" that is, that they would not only have been 
instigated by their selfish interests, but bound in conscience, to 
crucify the Saviour. And finally, you would say, that the perpetra- 
tors of the death of Christ, when duly informed of the good to re- 
sult from it, so far from feeling sorrow and regret, ought to make it 



LETTER VII. 



93 



" a subject of grateful praise that they had committed this sin," and 
" thus furnished the necessary means of the greatest good." (Ap- 
pendix, 3 — 7.) 

Permit me to say, in conclusion, that I have no language to ex- 
press what I feel in view of your remarks in this part of your note. 
If by any just explanation, they can be made consistent with the 
word of God, and with the common apprehensions of enlightened 
Christians, I shall sincerely rejoice. 



n 



LETTER VIIL 



Practical influence of Dr. Taylor's theory compared with the common, in relation to the pow- 
er of God, his blessedness, the system of his works, his dominion, the happiness of the good, 
submission, prayer, humility and dependence. Grounds of disquietude. Coincidence with 
Pelagians, Arminians, etc. What ought to be done. Suggestions. Particular things to be 
explained. 



Reverend and Dear Sir, 

I do not consider it proper for me in this place particularly to 
remark upon the passages of Scripture, in which God offers eternal life 
to sinners, and solicits them to accept it. Although I am far from 
agreeing with you as to some of the inferences which you draw from 
these passages ; yet I maintain as fully as you do, the perfect sin- 
cerity of God in all the declarations he makes of his love, and com- 
passion, and willingness to save ; and I deem it of great importance 
to the souls of men, that the obvious views of God's character, which 
are exhibited in the numerous passages referred to, should be most 
seriously and earnestly inculcated from the pulpit. These impres- 
sive and melting representations of the divine goodness, so often and 
so variously made in the Scriptures, I would hold fast for my own 
benefit, and exhibit for the benefit of others, though, in a speculative 
view, they were attended with far greater difficulties than they are. 

Before closing, I have thought it proper to touch upon the prac- 
tical influence of your opinions, compared with the common opin- 
ions of the Orthodox. 

1. As to divine power. The common theory ascribes to God a 
power which is strictly infinite, and which enables him to do all his 
pleasure, — all which on the whole he chooses, or sees to be best. 



LETTER VIII. 95 

But your theory, as we understand it, implies that there is a vast 
amount of good which God on the whole desires and chooses to ef- 
fect, but which he cannot effect ; — that another system is supposea- 
ble, (a system free from evil,) which God greatly preferred to the 
present system, seeing it to be on the whole far better, which yet 
he could not adopt : — an obvious limitation of divine power. 

2. As to the divine blessedness. The common theory represents 
God as perfectly and infinitely happy in the enjoyment of his own 
immutable excellence, and in the accomplishment of a good which 
will fully satisfy his unbounded benevolence. But according to 
your theory, a part of the good which God on the whole desires to 
accomplish, is not accomplished, and so his benevolence fails of be- 
ing perfectly satisfied. Now if an intelligent being can be com- 
pletely happy, who on the whole has strong desires which can nev- 
er be satisfied, or who wishes to accomplish an amount of good 
which he never can accomplish ; then I know not what complete 
happiness is. 

3. As to the moral system. The common theory implies, that 
God's system, considered in its whole extent and duration, is the 
best of all the systems of which his infinite mind conceived ; at 
least, that there was no conceivable system which he considered bet- 
ter than this. But if I understand your language, the highest hon- 
or which you bestow upon the system which God has adopted, is to 
assert, that God saw it to be better than no system at all ; while 
there were many systems conceivable, which should either be en- 
tirely free from evil, or have a less degree of it than the present, all 
of which were really better, and better in God's view, than the one 
he has adopted. Thus the common theory, seems to imply much 
more honorable conceptions of the system of God's works, than the 
theory which you have advanced. 

4. As to the extent of God's dominion. It is the common be- 
lief of the Orthodox, that God's dominion is unlimited; that he 
rules all things in heaven and earth, and directs all events ; that 
without doing the least violence to moral agency, he exercises a 
perfect control over the feelings and actions of moral agents ; that, 
although he is under no obligation to his creatures to preserve them 
in a state of holiness, or to make them holy if they are sinful, he 
can, whenever he on the whole chooses, sanctify the unholy, and 
preserve the holy ; and that there is nothing which can hinder him 



96 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

from doing this universally, but the dictate of his own sovereign 
will, or, the determination of his own infinite and unsearchable 
wisdom respecting the great interests of his empire. But your the- 
ory, if I understand it, does not admit that God thus ruleth over all, 
and doeth all his pleasure. It represents God's control over moral 
agents, which is infinitely the most important part of his dominion, 
to be limited, so that he cannot influence them to do that which on 
the whole he wishes to influence them to do, and which he sees to 
be most for his glory and the good of the universe. It represents 
that the very nature, which God has given to moral agents, neces- 
sarily limits his voluntary power over them, and prevents him from 
giving such a direction to their moral actions as he wishes to give, 
and would give if he could. It will be easy for those who are ac- 
customed to think, to determine whether these views or the com- 
mon ones best accord with what the Bible teaches, as to the unlimit- 
ed and uncontrollable dominion of God over the works of his hand, 
and particularly over moral agents. 

5. As to the happiness of the good. It is the joy of Christians 
that God reigns, and reigns universally and forever ; that he gov- 
erns all things, especially in the moral world, after the counsel of 
his own will. But for them to admit that the operation of God's 
power is in any way restrained, except by his own perfect wisdom 
and goodness, or that his wise and holy sovereignty is by any cause 
whatever so limited, that he cannot accomplish what on the whole 
he wishes to accomplish, would damp their joy. Their feelings 
would agree with the feelings of God in preferring another plan to 
the present, and in regretting that the plan which was really and on 
the whole preferable, could not be adopted. It would be particular- 
ly distressing to them to indulge the thought, that the sovereign 
grace of God is so limited by free agency, that he cannot '' have mer- 
cy on whom he will have mercy," and cannot turn sinners from the 
error of their ways, when it seems good in his sight. 

6. As to sub?nission. According to the common theory, en- 
tire submission to God is a reasonable and delightful duty. We 
know that God doeth all things well, because he doeth all his pleas- 
ure. Our submission is the submission of ignorance to infinite 
knowledge ; of weakness to infi.nite power ; of benevolence which 
is imperfect and feeble, to that which is perfect and boundless. 
Our submission is only a cheerful willingness, that all our affairs and 



LETTER VIII. 97 

the affairs of the world should be conducted as unerring wisdom 
sees to be best. Submission on your scheme may have the same 
character with this, so far as the divine control extends, and events 
are ordered as God sees to be on the whole best. But beyond this, 
there is, on your scheme, a wide range, even the whole field of mor- 
al agency. Here our submission must be mingled with pain and re- 
gret ; because it is submission to a system, which God sees to be on the 
whole less desirable and excellent, than some other, — submission to 
an immeasurable evil, which God, all things considered, wishes to 
prevent, but cannot. Must not submission, regulated by such 
views, arise rather from an unwelcome necessity, than from choice ? 

7. As to prayer. The common theory encourages us to make 
known our requests to God with great freedom, and with the assur- 
ance, that he is able to do all that we ask or think, and more ; and 
that he will grant us our petitions, if consistent with his infinite 
wisdom and goodness. But your theory would give this peculiarity 
to prayer, namely, that whenever we requested God to do any thing 
for us or for others, in the way of sanctifying the heart, and direct- 
ing the moral affections and actions, we should feel that we were in 
danger of asking favors, which God had not power to bestow, how- 
ever he might wish to bestow them. The difference betAveen the 
two theories as to their practical influence in this respect, must be 
obvious to every Christian. 

8. As to humility and dependence on divine grace. The com- 
mon theory leads us to entertain low thoughts of ourselves, especial- 
ly in a moral view, and to feel that we are not of ourselves sufficient 
for any thing spiritually good, and that, for whatever holiness we 
now possess, or may hereafter attain, we are dependent on divine 
grace ; and thus it prepares us for entire trust in God, for constant 
prayer, and fervent gratitude. But your theory, which asserts so 
continually and in terms so emphatical, the doctrine of human pow- 
er, even, as it would seem, at the expense of the doctrine of divine 
power, is likely, if I mistake not, to produce a very different effect. 
In the representations which you and others make on this subject, 
and which are, in language at least, at variance with the Scriptures, 
I cannot but apprehend a tendency to cherish in the heart a 
feeling of independence and self-sufficiency. Would it not be nat- 
ural for us to ask, why we should seek that help of God, which is 
not necessary, and without Avhich we are able to work out our own 



yo LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

salvation, and have in ourselves a sufficiency for all the purposes 
of a holy life ? I do not charge you or those who adopt your theory, 
with having feelings of this kind yourselves, or with designedly pro- 
moting them in others, nor even with having any views in your own 
minds, which would naturally lead to such a consequence. And I 
would by no means have you infer from any remarks I have made, 
that I differ at all from the generality of ministers in New England 
respecting the natural powers and faculties of man, as a moral and 
accountable being, a proper subject of law. But the unqualified 
language which you sometimes employ respecting the natural state, 
the free will and the power of man, the nature and necessity of di- 
vine influence, the manner of regeneration, and other points allied 
to these, is not, I apprehend, in accordance either with the letter or 
the spirit of revelation, and will have an unpropitious influence upon 
the characters of men, upon revivals of religion, and upon all the in- 
terests of the church. But on these subjects I would not enlarge 
in this place, as I have intended to give my views respecting them 
more fully in another way. 

But my Brother, you cannot surely think it strange, that serious 
disquietude and alarm should exist among us in consequence of 
what you have published in relation to these subjects. For you well 
know that Calvinists, though not afraid of free discussion, are sin- 
cerely and firmly attached to their articles of faith, and are not apt 
to be carried about with the changing opinions of others. Whether 
right or wrong, we have been accustomed to consider the controver- 
sy which early arose in the church between the Orthodox and Pe- 
lagians, and which, after the Reformation, was continued between the 
Lutherans and Calvinists on one side, and the Arminians or Re- 
monstrants on the other, as of radical importance. Now how would 
you expect'us to feel, and, with our convictions, how ought we to 
feel, when a brother, who has professed to be decidedly orthodox, 
and has had our entire confidence, and is placed at the head of one 
of our Theological Schools, makes an attack upon several of the ar- 
ticles of our faith, and employs language on the subject of moral 
agency, free will, depravity, divine influence, etc. which is so like 
the language of Arminians and Pelagians, that it would require 
some labor to discover the difference ? And how would it be na- 
tural for us to feel, when such a brother adopts, on several contro- 
verted subjects, the language and the opinions which have been 



LETTER VIII. 9if 

adopted by Unitarians ; and when we find that Unitarians them- 
selves understand him as agreeing with them, and are making such 
agreement a subject of exultation ? Would it not betray an indif- 
ference and remissness in us, which you would think unaccounta- 
ble, if such things excited no solicitude in us respecting the cause 
which ought ever to be dearest to our hearts ? And shall I ask 
again, how would you expect us to feel, and with our dread of er- 
ror, how ought we to feel, when we find a remarkable resemblance 
between your mode of thinking on one of the subjects of the present 
discussion, and that of free thinkers ? Rousseau says ;* " If man is 
active and free, he acts of himself. — Providence does not hin- 
der him from doing evil, either because the evil which so feeble a 
being as man can perform, is nothing in his eyes, or because he 
could not hinder it without restraining our liberty, and thus 
doing a greater evil, by degrading our nature. — We are placed 
upon the earth, and endowed with liberty, tempted by passion, 
and restrained by conscience. What more could divine power 
itself do for us? Could it put contradiction in our nature, and 
pay the price of well-doing to one who had not been able to do ill ? 
What ! in order to prevent»man from being wicked, must God con- 
fine him to instinct, and make him a beast ]" This eloquent 
writer says in another place ;t " Man, be patient. The evils you 
suffer are a necessary effect of nature. The eternal and bene- 
ficent Being would have been glad to exempt you from them. 

The reason why he has not done better, is, that he could not." — 
Again. — " Why wish to vindicate the divine power at the expense 
of the divine goodness ?" And again. " The question is not, 
whether we do or do not suffer ; but whether it was well for the 
universe to exist, and whether the ills which we endure are not in- 
evitable to its constitution." 

I have not adverted to this noticeable agreement in phraseology, 
and in reasoning between you and those I have mentioned, for the 
purpose of stigmatizing your theory, or as a proof that it is erro- 
neous. For Rousseau might have, and, in many respects, evidently 
had very just conceptions on moral and religious subjects. And so 
had the Pelagians and Arminians. But when we find you, on sev- 
eral interesting points, siding with these sects against the Orthodox, 
and siding too with Dr. John Taylor against Edwards on some of 

* Confession of faith in " Emile." 

i Letter to Voltaire respecting his poem on the destruction of Lisbon. 



100 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR, 

the main questions at issue between them ; and when in addition to 
this, we find you on some points coinciding so nearly with the views 
of the French philosophers, and, shall I say, on other points throw- 
ing out the very objections, which we have so often heard from cav- 
illers against orthodoxy ; it would certainly be strange, if none of 
our sensibilities were touched, and no concern or fear excited with- 
in us in regard to the tendency of your speculations. I acknowl- 
edge that on this whole subject we may be mistaken ; and that our 
fear may be groundless. And we will be anxiously looking for ev- 
idence to satisfy us that it is so. To such evidence we will open 
every avenue to our understandings and hearts. But I feel myself 
constrained to say, that the theory which you adopt in contradis- 
tinction to the common theory, appears to me, generally, so far as I 
understand it, to be unscriptural, and of dangerous tendency. And 
the more I examine it, the farther I am from being satisfied with it. 
And this is the case with the Orthodox community to an extent, as 
I have reason to think, far beyond your apprehension. Compared 
v.'ith the whole body of Congregational and Presbyterian ministers, 
there are very few, who embrace your opinions ; and, though my 
knowledge may be defective, yet among all the Professors of our 
Theological Seminaries, and Presidents of our Colleges, I do not 
know of one, whose views coincide with yours. But although 
such has been the case with me and with my brethren in the 
sacred office generally, we have been slow, perhaps too slow, 
to make a public declaration of our dissent. So far have we 
been from acting the part of assailants, that we have been very 
reluctant to come even to the work of self-defence. The attack 
■which you have made upon our faith, and the common faith of the 
Reformed churches in Europe and America, it might have been 
expected we should instantly endeavour to repel. But of any for- 
w^ardness on our part to do this, you cannot complain ; least of all 
can you complain of this in me. I have waited to learn what God 
would have me to do ; and to have the path of duty made plain. I have 
waited to see whether the counsels and entreaties of some of your 
most valued and intimate friends would have any influence to check 
your ardor, and restrain you from what I considered hazardous to 
the peace of the churches. I have waited also to obtain more light 
concerning your opinions, and have hoped that the difference be- 
tween you and your brethren would prove to be rather in appear- 
ance, than in reality, and that the necessity of controversy might 



LETTER VIII. 



101 



still be avoided. In the mean time, you and your associates have 
been intent upon your object, and by preaching, and conversation, 
and pamphlets, and especially by a popular Periodical, have been 
zealously laboring to propagate your tenets. At length, in confor- 
mity with the wishes of many, far and near, I have been induced to 
unite with those respected ministers who have preceded me, not, be 
it remembered, in making an attack upon you, as has been very in- 
cautiously said, but in repelling your attack upon us and our brethren, 
and in defending our common and long established faith against what 
we conceive to be innovation and error. I most heartily regret the 
introduction of a controversy, which may turn off the minds of many 
from the great interests of religion, fill our churches with strife, and 
hinder the spread of the gospel. But for the evils of such a con- 
troversy, who is to be responsible? 

Excuse me. Dear Brother, for the length of these Letters, and for 
the freedom with which I have addressed you. If I have shown 
any want of fairness, or of brotherly love, or have done the least thing 
which can be a just cause of offence to you or to others, I shall re- 
member it with sorrow and shame. If, after all the efforts I have 
made, I have misapprehended the true sense of the passages in your 
serm.on, to which I have attended ; I shall hope for such explana- 
tion from you^ as will effectually correct my mistake. And you will 
keep in mind that the mistake, if there is one, exists among your 
readers extensively. Do you not owe it then to the public, to give 
a clear, unambiguous, and full exhibition of the peculiarities of your 
system, so that there may no longer be any complaint of obscurity, 
or any suspicion of concealment ? If it be true that your system 
agrees with that of Edwards and Dwight, and New England minis- 
ters generally ; the public should be satisfied of this. Or if a new 
system is to be introduced, and a new sect formed, with a new name, 
and new measures to extend itself, and a new and separate interest ; 
then the public ought to have the means of understanding exactly 
what the new system is, and what is to be the new sect. The diffi- 
culty lies not at all between you and me, personally, but between 
you and the Christian community. And if you will in any way sat- 
isfy them, that you do not entertain the views which have been im- 
puted to you ; if you will satisfy them, that you agree in your 
doctrinal belief, as you profess to do, with Edwards and Dwight ; 
I and others shall have nothing more to do, but to testify our joy^ 
14 



102 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

that our mistake has been corrected, and our entire confidence in 
you restored ; and so the whole matter may come at once to a hap- 
py termination. 

But in order to bring about this happy result, there is evidently 
something for you to do. And it is my prayer to the God of truth, 
that whatever you may undertake with a view to such a result, you 
may have his gracious presence and assistance. And as I have an 
utter dislike to controversy, especially with a beloved brother, and 
shall wish to have no further occasion to turn aside from the impor- 
tant and delightful duties of my office to pursue this discussion ; I 
will here, in this closing Letter, open my heart to you without any 
reserve, not to dictate to you, or bring forward any demands, but to 
make a few requests, and to suggest what I think the interests of re- 
ligion require of you, and of every other man, engaged in a public 
discussion like this, and what the Christian community in the pres- 
ent case will feel themselves entitled to expect. 

In the ^rst place, permit me to say a word in regard to the 
symptoms of excitement which you have shown, and your readiness, 
and that of your associates, to make complaints against those fi'om 
whom you differ. I beg you to look, a moment, at the case, just as 
it is. An individual comes forward to express his dissent from sev- 
eral doctrines, w-hich have always been held sacred by the churches 
of the Ueformation, especially by the orthodox in this country. Now 
in what manner should w^e naturally expect him to proceed ? We 
might look for a manly freedom, and even boldness, in the declara- 
tion of his opinions ; and this might entitle him to our respect ; but 
should we look for expressions of uncandidness and severity towards 
his brethren ? We might expect him to state the reasons of his own 
belief clearly and strongly. But should we expect a forwardness in 
him to bring complaints against those who still maintained the com- 
mon doctrines, and to assault them with other weapons, than sober ar- 
gument, and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God? These 
common doctrines, it is well known, are very dear to those who be- 
lieve them, being intimately associated with their most devout affec- 
tions, their hopes, and their joys. Could it be supposed that they 
would readily give them up, as things of no value ? Could it be ex- 
pected, that the sons of the Puritans would quickly surrender to a sin- 
gle assailant those precious truths, which had been so often defended 
against the attacks of an host ? I beseech you, my Brother, to review 



LETTER VIII. 103 

this matter as it has been from the beginning, and consider whether 
you have not, in some respects, erred in judgment, been too hasty in 
your proceedings, too confident of success, and too impatient of con- 
tradiction ; and whether you have not assumed an attitude before the 
public, not altogether befitting you ? In such circumstances, ought 
not every man to take care to cherish and exhibit great caution and 
candor, forbearance and gentleness 1 I hope you will pardon me for 
saying what many have thought, but kw perhaps would be likely to 
express. 

Secondly. As you have been charged with being so unintelligi- 
ble, and readers generally have found it so difficult to understand 
what your theory is ; we wish you to aim at great plainness and per- 
spicuity, and to make every thing you write as intelligible as possible. 

Thirdly. As there is a pretty extensive impression, that you 
have gone beyond what propriety would admit in your professions of 
agreement with Calvinistic writers, and particularly that you have 
made quotations from the writings of Edwards and Dwight in the 
manner of one who has a favorite point to carry, and that your rea- 
soning has too much the appearance of what is called special plead- 
ing ; it would seem very desirable that in what you have further to 
say on this point, you should be sure to exhibit perfect fairness and 
impartiality. And here permit me to say, that the statements made 
in No. 6 of " Views in Theology," will demand your particular 
consideration. Many of your brethren will be somewhat impatient 
to see your reply to the reasoning found in that pamphlet. 

Fourthly. I well know that a man with a mind as active as 
yours, as adroit in controversy, and urged on by as powerful an im- 
pulse, can write as much and as long as he chooses on any subject, 
especially on such a subject as this. But it will naturally be a ques- 
tion with you and with me, how much time men who are busy in 
their callings, will think proper to take from other duties, to exam- 
ine such matters as these. Now instead of carrying this discussion 
into a great variety of pamphlets and Reviews, and spreading it out 
over a long period of time, will it not be advisable for you, the next 
time you write, to make thorough work, and in one publication, hon- 
ored with your name, to bring out the whole to public view 1 

As to the subjects of discussion introduced in these Letters, I 
hope you will take care not to overlook the main points. Whatever 
labor you may bestow upon smaller things, be careful not to pass by 



104 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

those which are of primary importance. You will excuse me, if I 
mention some of these, and suggest to you what I suppose to be ne- 
cessary, on your part, to meet the circumstances of the case, and the 
wishes of the community. 

As to the two positions, then, which you call " common but 
groundless assumptions," I wish to ask, what you take to be real 
sentiments which your brethren mean to express by these positions ; 
and whether you deny them in the sense in which they affirm 
them ; or if not, in what sense you do deny them ; and whether 
you hold the opposite ; or if not, whether your belief really stops 
with the mere negation of the common belief? 

In regard to the second position, my question is, whether your 
theory implies, that God could have prevented all sin, or the pres- 
ent degree of it ? The question relates to moral agents actually ex- 
isting ; and to answer it by saying, yes, God could have prevented 
all sin, or the present degree of it by not giving existence to mor- 
al beings, — would be a mere shuffle. According to your theory, 
was God able to prevent sin in the literal sense, (which is the first 
sense I have given of power ;) that is, was he able to do it, if on 
the whole he had chosen to do it ? 

As you appear to hold that God could not prevent sin, in the 
third sense I have given, will you inform us wherein you suppose 
the impossibility or absurdity consists ? also, whether you consider 
it impossible or absurd in all cases alike for God to prevent sin ? 
and if not ; then what makes the difference ? And if the preven- 
tion of sin is impossible in this sense, that is, absurd and contradic- 
tory ; then in what sense is such prevention of sin an object of God's 
desire or choice ? 

Will you inform us definitely what you mean by the nature of 
tilings, and in what sense and degree you suppose the power of 
God limited by it ? 

As the nature of moral agency is much concerned with this dis- 
cussion ; will you give us your views of it very particularly ? Do 
you consider it to be such, that it is wholly or in part beyond the 
power of God to direct and control it as he chooses ? If you say, 
partly, but not wholly ; then tell us why it is not as really an in- 
fringement upon moral agency, for God to control it in part, as 
wholly? If you hold that God cannot control moral agency in all 
cases, though he can in some ; then, Vvhy not in all, as well as in 



LETTER VIII. 105 

some ? Also, how far does God direct events in the natural, social, 
and civil world ? 

You will gratify us by showing very clearly and particularly, 
what that is in the nature of moral agents, which you suppose makes 
it impossible for God to form their characters and direct their ac- 
tions according to his own pleasure ? Is it any particular faculty, or 
attribute ; or their whole nature taken in one general view '? 

If God can exert no influence on the minds of men, except by 
rational motives, can he make that influence effectual to sway their 
hearts, whenever he pleases ? 

We shall wish to know, whether your theory implies, as many 
have supposed it does, that God has so made moral agents that they 
are independent of him, as to their moral feelings and actions? If 
you hold that moral agents, as such, are dependent on God ; then, 
how far, and in what respects are they so ? 

As this discussion is intimately connected with the doctrine of 
divine influence ; we shall be gratified to know what your theory is 
in respect to that doctrine. You speak of the influence of the Spir- 
it in regeneration, as supernatural. Will you inform us in what 
sense you use the word, supernatural ? why such influence is neces- 
sary ? and whether the Spirit of God in regeneration has a direct 
influence on the mind itself? 

As many have understood you, as agreeing substantially with 
the Pelagians, and particularly with Dr. John Taylor, in regard to 
the natural state of man, free will, and conversion ; will you in- 
form us whether and how far this is the case ? 

And as many have doubted whether you maintain the doctrine 
of divine decrees and divine sovereignty in the sense in which it is 
commonly maintained by the Orthodox ; will you inform us on this 
subject ? 

Is your theory of moral agency the same as that which Edwards 
maintained in his treatise on the Will ? 

I have understood you as holding, that God could not have done 
better than he has for any individual moral agent, and of course that 
he could not have converted any more sinners, than he has convert- 
ed. Have I understood you right? If God pleased, and saw it to 
be on the whole best, could he convert any one, and everyone, who 
is not converted ? If not ; what is the hindrance ? And is that 
hindrance greater here, than has in other instances been overcome 
j^y the power of the Holy Spirit ? 



106 LETTERS TO DOCTOR TAYLOR. 

If you see faults in the reasoning in Letter vi, or if you suppose 
that you have been misunderstood on the points there discussed ; 
you will particularly inform us. — Could God, according lO your the- 
ory preserve any of his creatures in a state of holiness, without the 
influence arising from the existence and punishment of sin ? 

Does your theory imply that the only choice which God had, 
was between the present moral system, including so much evil, and 
no moral system at all ? or does it admit that there might have 
been other systems, and some of them excluding all evil, which 
were conceived by the mind of God, to which he preferred the pre- 
sent system ? 

As the subjects treated of in Letter vii, are of a practical na- 
ture, I hope you will express your views of them with all possible 
plainness, not overlooking the questions found in the paragraph be- 
ginning at the lower part of p. 87. The same as to the several ar- 
ticles in the present Letter, in which I have shown what I apprehend 
to be the natural influence of your theory, compared with the 
common one. 

But it will be quite unnecessary for me to go over the whole ground 
of the discussion in order to show what I consider to be the main 
points. You will see what they are, and will doubtless notice them. 
And I earnestly hope, that you will do all in your power to remove 
the dissatisfaction and disquietude of your brethren far and near, 
and to allay their honest fears in regard to the nature and conse- 
quences of your speculations. 

In replying to these Letters, you may be able to fix upon me the 
charge of some inadvertencies, faults in reasoning, and misconcep- 
tions of your theory. So be it. I make no claim to infallibility, es- 
pecially on subjects encumbered with an obscure and ambiguous 
phraseology, and in some respects involved in deep mystery ; and I 
am much farther from making such a claim, than I was twenty years 
ago. 

But in regard to the subjects now under discussion, it is 
my earnest wish no longer to remain in the dark, and no 
longer to be in danger of contending in the dark. — That the 
common faith of the Orthodox is substantially conformed to the 
word of God, and will stand fast forever, I have no doubt. On the 
other hand, I have no doubt that in my habits of thinking and rea- 
soning on every moral and religious subject, there is more or less of 



LETTER VIII. 107 

darkness and error remaining. And if you, my Brother, or any 
other man, by a clear explanation of the Scriptures, or by an exhi- 
bition of just thought, or of powerful, conclusive argument, will do 
any thing towards chasing away this darkness and error from my 
mind, and helping me better to understand divine truth ; I will re- 
gard it as one of the choicest blessings that can be derived from the 
benevolent agency of man. Truth is from God, and is ordained to 
he forever the sustenance and the joy of his saints. Let us then 
put away all prejudice, and pride, and every hurtful passion, and 
unite our hearts in the fervent prayer, that the Holy Spirit may be 
our teacher, and that, whatever may become of this discussion, or of 
the particular opinions which such short-sighted, erring creatures 
as we are may have wished to defend, what God sees to he truth, 
may prevail. 

I am, Reverend and Dear Sir, with sincere affection and es- 
teem, your brother, 

LEONARD WOODS. 

Theological Seminary, 

Andover, July 30, 1830. 



APPENDIX, 



CoNcio AD Clerum, pp. 28 — 34. 

" The universal depravity of mankind is not inconsistent with the 
moral perfection of God. It is not uncommon to ask, (and I admit 
the facts on which the objection rests) — how could a God of perfect 
sincerity and goodness bring a race of creatures into existence, and 
give them such a nature that they will all certainly sin and incur 
his wrath ? — It is also added, to increase the weight of the objec- 
tion, — why render this universal sinfulness of a race, the conse- 
quence of one man's act — why not give to each a fair trial for him- 
self? I answer, God does give to each a fair trial for himself Not 
a human being does or can become thus sinful or depraved but by 
his own choice. God does not compel him to sin by the nature he 
gives him. Nor is his sin, although a consequence of Adam's sin, 
in such a sense its consequence, as not to be a free voluntary act of 
his own. He sins freely, voluntarily. There is no other way of 
sinning. God, (there is no irreverence in saying it,) can make 
nothing else sin, but the sinner's act. 

1. Do you then say, that God gave man a nature, which he knew 
would lead him to sin ? — What if He did ? — Do you know that God 
could have done better, better on the whole or better, if he gave him 
existence at all, cvmfor the individual himself? The error lies in the 
gratuitous assumption, that God could have adopted a moral system, 
and prevented all sin, or at least, the present degree of sin. For, no 
man knows this — no man can prove it. The assumption therefore is 
whollv unauthorised as the basis of the present objection, and the 
15 



110 



APPENDIX. 



objection itself groundless. On the supposition that the evil which 
exists is in respect to divine prevention, incidental to the best pos- 
sible system, and that notwithstanding the evil, God will secure the 
greatest good possible to him to secure, who can impeach either his 
wisdom or his goodness because evil exists ? I say then that as ig- 
norance is incompetent to make an objection, and as no one knows 
that this supposition is not a matter of fact, no one has a right to 
assert the contrary, or even to think it.* Suppose then God had 
adopted a different system, who is competent to foretell or to con- 
jecture the results, — or even the results of one iota of change in the 
present system ? Suppose God had made you just like Adam or 
even like Lucifer, and placed you in similar circumstances, do you 
know that you would not have sinned as he did ? How do you 
know that had you commenced your immortal career with such ag- 
gravated guilt, God would not have found it necessary to send you 
to hell without an offer of mercy, and that you would not have sunk 
in deeper woe than that which now awaits you ? — How do you know 
that what might have been true respecting yourself, had not been 
true of any other possible system of accountable beings 1 How do 
you know, that had God ordered things otherwise than he has, this 
very world now cheered with the calls of mercy and brightened 
with the hopes of eternal life, yea that heaven itself would not now 
be trembling under the thunders of retributive vengeance ? Man, 
— man in his ignorance, alter the plan and procedure of his God ! 
How dare he think of it ? Beware, ye insects of a day, ye are 
judging Him *' whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain." 

*' Now think of this, fellow sinner. God in adopting the pre- 
sent system with all the sin incidental to it, may have adopted the 
best possible. In giving to you the nature which he has, and in 
placing you in the circumstances in which he has, he may have 
done the best he could even for you." 



* Note. The difficulties on this difficult subject as it is extensively regarded, 
result in the view of the writer from two very common but groundless as- 
surnptions — assumptions which so long as they are admitted and reasoned 
upon, must leave the subject involved in insuperable difficulties. 

2. The assumptions are tJiese ; First, that sin is the necessary means of the 
greatest good, and as such, so far as it exists, is preferable on the whole to holi- 
ness in its stead. Secondly, thai God could in a moral system have prevented 
all sin, or at least the present degree of sin. 



APPENDIX. HI 

In further explanation of the ground taken in answering the above objec- 
tion, the following enquiries are submitted to the consideration of the candid. 

3. Is not the assumption that the degree of sin which exists, or even any 
degree of sin, is on the whole preferable to holiness in its stead, inconsistent 
alike with the benevolence and the sincerity of God ? — With his benevolence. 
If such be the nature of God, of man, of holiness, of sin, of all things, that sin 
is the necessary means of the greatest good, ought it not to be made the sub- 
ject of precept — would it not be, by a benevolent moral Governor? For how 
can it be consistent with the benevolence of a moral governor, to require of 
his subjects that moral conduct which is not on the whole for the best ? 

4. If it be said that it is on the whole for the best that he should require 
it, but not on the whole for the best that theij should 'perform it — what is this 
but to say that it is on the whole for the best that he should practice deception 
on his subjects ? And what then becomes of his sincerity? — Let us take an 
example or two. Who would regard the command of a parent as sincere, it 
being known that he prefers on the whole the disobedience of the child to his 
obedience .? Who would regard the invitation of a friend as sincere, being 
fully apprised that he prefers on the whole its rejection to its acceptance ? — If 
it be said that no subjects of God have such knowledge of God's preference of 
sin to holiness in their own case, then the question is whether their ignorance 
alters the fact ; and whether he is truly sincere, when he would be justly pro- 
nounced insincere if the real fact were known? — Besides, after the commission 
of sin, the fact of such a preference, if there be one, is known. How then 
does the sincerity of God appear, when it is placed beyond a doubt by the event, 
that he did prefer on the whole, the sin committed by the subject to the holi- 
ness required in his law .'' — Is it then possible that God should be sincere in 
his commands and invitations, unless holiness in man be on the whole prefer- 
able to sin in its stead ? 

5. Further, it is extensively maintained that virtue is founded in utility, 
i. e. that such is the nature, relations and tendencies of things, that greater 
happiness will result from virtue or holiness than from vice or sin. How then 
can sin in the nature of things be the necessary means of the greatest good ? 

6. Again, if sin be the necessary means of the greatest good, who can rea- 
sonably regard the commission of it with sorrow or even regret? What bene- 
volent being duly informed, can ingenuously regret that by sin he has put it 
in the power of God to produce greater good, than God could otherwise pro- 
duce ? Ought it not rather to be matter of grateful praise that he has sinned, 
and thus furnished, by what he has done, the necessary means of the greatest 
possible good? Surely the act considered simply in the relation of the neces- 
sary means of such an end, is not a matter for regret ; this being the very rea- 
son, why God himself is supposed to prefer it. 

7. Is it then said, that the intention is selfish and sinful ? Be it so. Had 
the subject however been fully apprised of the utility of the deed, and the real 
preference of God, (as in the case of the destruction of the Canaanites,) his 
own interest and his duty would have been coincident ; and how does it ap- 
pear that in this case he had not performed the act from a benevolent intention ? 
And how great is the guilt of a selfish intention which, for aught that appear!^. 



112 APPENDIX. 

is occasioned by deception on the part of the lawgiver ? Is it said that the sel- 
fish intention is necessary to the action as the means of good ? But where is 
an instance in which the good educed from a sinful action is dependent on the 
selfish intention of the agent? Is it said, that otherwise God could not shew 
mercy in its forgiveness ? Does God then deceive his subjects in regard to 
the true nature and tendency of moral acts, and thus occasion their sin that he 
may have the glory of forgiving it ? Is this the glory of his mercy? Besides, 
how does it appear that the subject did not really intend good ? The law of 
God, according to the assumption, is no proof that transgression is not on the 
whole for the best ; indeed the subject know^s that all sin will prove to be the 
necessary means of the greatest good ; how then does it appear that with tliis 
knowledge he was not truly benevolent in performing the deed? What rea- 
son then for sorrow or regret remains ? 

The second assumption now claims our notice ; viz. that God could have 
prevented all sin, or at least the present degree of sin, in a moral system. 

8. If holiness in a moral system be preferable on the whole to sin in its 
stead, why did not a benevolent God, were it possible to him, prevent all sin, 
and secure the prevalence of universal holiness ? Would not a moral universe 
of perfect holiness, and of course of perfect happiness, be happier and better 
than one comprising sin and its miseries ? And must not infinite benevolence 
accomplish all the good it can ? Would not a benevolent God then, had it 
been possible to him in the nature of things, have secured the existence of uni- 
versal holiness in his moral kingdom ? 

9. Is the reader startled by an enquiry w^hich seems to limit the power of God ? 
But does not he equally limit the power of God by supposing, or rather affirm- 
ing, that God COULD not secure the greatest good without the existence of 
sin ? On either supposition there is what may be called a limitation of the 
power of God by the nature of things. In one case, the limitation is supposed 
to result from the nature of sin ; in the other, from the nature of moral agency. 
If then one of these suppositions must be made, which is the most honorable 
to God ? 

10. Further, does not he who is startled by this supposition, limit the good- 
ness of God ? Undeniably he does, if it be conceded that holiness is on the 
whole preferable to sin in its stead. For he who admits this, and maintains 
that God could have secured the existence of holiness instead of sin, must also 
admit that God is not good enough to accomplish all the good in his power ; 
not good enough to prevent the worst of evils. And who does most rever- 
ence to God, he who supposes that God would have prevented all sin in his 
moral universe, but could not, or he who affirms that ho could have prevented 
it, but tvould not ? Or is it more honorable to God to suppose that such is the 
nature of sin, that he cottZ^ rio« accomplish the highest good without it, than 
to suppose that such is the nature of/ree agency that God could not wholly pre- 
vent its perversion ? 

11. But the main enquiry on this point remains, — does the supposition that 
God could not prevent sin in a moral system, limit his power at all ? To sup- 
pose or affirm that God cannot perform what is impossible in the nature of things, 
is not properly to limit his power. Is there then the least particle of evidence, 



APPENDIX. 



113 



that the entire prevention of sin in moral beings is possible to God in the 
nature of things ? If not, then what becomes of the very common assump- 
tion of such possibility ? 

12. All evidence of the truth of this assumption must be derived either 
from the nature of the subject^ or from known facts. Is there such evidence 
from the nature of the subject? It is here to be remarked, that the prevention 
of sin by any influence that destroys the poioer to sin, destroys moral agency. 
Moral agents then must possess the poicer to sin. Who then can prove a pri- 
ori or from the nature of the subject, that a being- who can sin, icill not sin? 
How can it be proved a priori or from the nature of the subject, that a thing 
will not be, when for aught that appears, it maij be .? On this point, is it pre- 
sumptuous to bid defiance to the powers of human reason .'' 

13. Is there any evidence from facts? Facts, so far as they are known to 
us, furnish no support to the assumption, that God could in a moral system pre- 
vent all sin, or even the present degree of sin. For we know of no creature 
of God, whose holiness is secured without that influence which results either 
directly or indirectly, from the existence of sin and its punishment. How then 
can it be shown from facts, that God could secure any of his moral creatures 
in holiness, without this influence ; or to what purpose is it to allege instances 
of the prevention of sin U7ider this influence, to prove that God could prevent 
it without this influence ? Rather, do not all known facts furnish a strong pre- 
sumption to the contrary .'' If God could prevent all sin loithout this influence, 
why has he not done it? Be this however as it may, since God has not, so far 
as we know, prevented sin in a single instance without this influence, how can 
it be proved from facts , that he could have prevented all sin, or even the pre- 
sent degree of sin in a moral system ? Had his creatures done what they could, 
then indeed there had been more holiness and less sin. But the question is, what 
could God have done to secure such a result ? Had he prevented the sins of one 
human being to the present time, or had he brought to repentance one sinner 
more than he has, who can prove that the requisite interposition for the pur- 
pose, would not result in a vast increase of sin in the system, including even 
the apostacy and augmented guilt of that individual ? In a word, who is com- 
petent to foretell, or authorised even to surmise the consequences of the least 
iota of change in the present system of influence to produce holiness and pre- 
vent sin ? If no one, then all assumptions on the subject, like that under con- 
sideration, are wholly unwarranted. It may be true, that God will secure un- 
der the present system of things, the greatest degree of holiness and the least 
degree of sin, v/hich it is possible to him in the nature of things to secure. 
Neither the nature of the subject, nor knoicn facts, furnish a particle of evi- 
dence to the contrary. The assumption therefore, that God could in a moral 
system have prevented all sin, or the present degree of sin, is wholly gratui- 
tous and unauthorised, and ought never to be made the basis of an objection or 
an argument. 

14. As an apology for this note, the writer would say that the objection al- 
luded to in the discourse, so commonly rises in the mind in connexion with 
the subject, that it was thought proper to notice it ; and while he knows of no 
refutation except the one given, he was desirous of attempting still further to 



114 



APPENDIX. 



free the subject from distressing and groundless perplexity. This is done in 
his own view, simply by dismissing from the mind the two assumptions which 
have been examined. The mode in which the mind will in this way, be led 
to view the character and governm'ent of God may, it is believed, be shown to 
be free from embarrassment by an example. 

15. Suppose then the father of several sons to have foreknown with minute 
accuracy the various propensities and tendencies of their nature, and all the. 
possible conditions or circumstances in which he might place them, with all 
the results of each condition. Suppose him also to foresee with absolute cer- 
tainty, that to place them at a public seminary, although he knows it will be, 
unavoidably to himself, attended with a temporary course of vice on their 
part, will nevertheless result in greater good than he can secure by placing 
them in any other condition or circumstances. Suppose it to be true, and 
known to him, that their uniform good conduct at the seminary would be far 
better on the w4iole or in every respect than their misconduct. Suppose him 
now to send them at the proper age, to the place of their education with sol- 
emn and unqualified injunctions of uniform good conduct; and all the results 
to be as foreseen. — Now can the procedure of this father be impeached in any 
respect whatever ? Does he not evince wisdom and benevolence in every 
part of it? Does he not evince the most absolute and perfect sincerity in his 
injunctions of right conduct.? Does he not at the same time furnish by what 
he does, adequate and decisive ground for acquiescence in view of the inciden- 
tal evil ; and is there not equally decisive ground for repentance to his diso- 
bedient children in what they do ? If these things are so in the procedure of 
this father, why are they not so in the procedure of God .'' 

16. The writer hopes he shall not be charged without proof, with denying 
what he fully believes — that the providential purposes or decrees of God ex- 
tend to all actual events, sin not excepted. God may really purpose the ex- 
istence of sin, whether he purpose it for one reason or for another ; he may, 
as the example shows, as really purpose sin though wholly an evil, considered 
as incidental, so far as his power of prevention is concerned, to the best moral 
system, as purpose it considered as so excellent in its nature and relations as 
to be the necessary means of the greatest good. And while the theory now 
proposed exhibits the providential government of God as the basis of submis- 
sion, confidence, and joy, under ail the evils that befal his dependent crea- 
tures ; it also presents, as no other theory in the view of the writer does pre- 
sent, the Moral Government of God in its unimpaired perfection and glory, to 
deter from sin and allure to holiness his accountable subjects. 



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